In recent weeks in Afghanistan, Taliban military units have scored a string of battlefield successes against the forces of the northern alliance, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. The victories could help the Taliban consolidate their power in Afghanistan, while raising the threat of instability in the neighboring countries of Central Asia. Russian officials have suggested that Massoud fighters may be allowed to cross into Tajikistan. Meanwhile, representatives of the Uzbek government of President Islam Karimov have engaged in stabilization talks with Taliban envoys. EurasiaNet posed questions about the recent gains made by the Taliban to Barnett R. Rubin, the Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Mr. Rubin is a leading expert on Afghanistan. His comments follow:

EurasiaNet: What are the implications of the Taliban battlefield gains for stability in Central Asia?
Rubin: On the one hand, if the Taliban continue to advance to the northeast, this will make the supply and infiltration routes of both the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU] and drug traders coming from the main opium-producing regions of Afghanistan somewhat easier. It might lead to the flight of refugees into Tajikistan. Less likely, … it might lead some of Massoud's forces to seek refuge in Tajikistan. But the main forces for and against stability in Central Asia are internal. They lie in the patterns of governance and development there. The more Central Asian leaders try to stabilize their countries simply by building a cordon sanitaire around Afghanistan, the less successful they will be.

In addition, the Taliban have not reached internal consensus on what they want to do. Up till now, the priority of victory in the civil war overrode most other considerations. If they further consolidate their power, they will have to decide if they want to strengthen the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and rebuild the country or act as a base for transnational Islamic jihadi forces and smugglers. Pakistan, which has backed their struggle to the point of sending volunteers and troops to fight with the Taliban, will also have to decide what its goal is. To have a friendly government in Afghanistan and spread jihad, while alienating the US, Russia, Iran, and all the Central Asian countries but Turkmenistan, and driving all of these countries closer to India, or to try to stabilize Afghanistan, even at the expense of some local interests, in order to improve its ties with Central Asia and the rest of the world? There are different interests and groups pulling them in different directions. The most important task for the outside world may be to create incentives for both Pakistan and the Taliban to focus on reconstruction of Afghanistan, in addition to the existing sanctions against the Taliban's harboring people wanted for terrorism and Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

EurasiaNet: Are Massoud's anti-Taliban units finished as a fighting force? If they are allowed into Tajikistan, how will their presence impact the Tajik domestic political environment?
Rubin: I doubt that Massoud is finished. He is being actively re-supplied by Iran, and he is gathering forces from different regions around him. According to some reports, he has sent his family back to Panjsher from Tajikistan, to signal to his followers that he is going to stay and fight in Afghanistan. I also think that outsiders generally overestimate the force of "Tajik nationalism," an idea that does not interest Massoud. If he and his forces did enter Tajikistan, he could well prove indigestible. But Massoud's political ambitions are in Afghanistan, not Tajikistan.

Even if Massoud is not finished militarily, however, he does not and has not for some time constituted an Afghan national alternative to the Taliban. At most he is a destabilizing force, and a source of some pressure on them.

EurasiaNet: In their ongoing dialogue, can the Taliban find common ground with President Karimov on a way to promote regional stability?
Rubin: Of course both President Karimov and the Taliban have some reasons to resist the Russian-Iranian-Tajik front, but I think their differences are too great genuinely to find "common ground." In return for recognition or some other major concession, the Taliban might agree to restrain cross-border activity of the IMU, as they seem to have restrained Usama Bin Ladin, but they will not hand over the former any more than the latter. Furthermore, however much of a maverick Karimov may be, he will not stray that far from the Central Asian government consensus. And, lacking that, the Taliban will continue to allow the IMU to operate from their territory. In addition, the drug trade will continue, and it is not really in the power of the Taliban to stop it. The US government has not succeeded in stopping the drug trade in the US, so it is difficult to see how the Taliban could really stop it in Afghanistan. Significant reductions would require a major international investment in alternative livelihoods for peasants and resources for Afghan state institutions. Are we willing to make that investment?

EurasiaNet: Do you expect the Taliban successes to spur increased United Nations interest in Afghanistan?
Rubin: The question is not whether UN interest will increase, but whether the nature of UN activity will change. If the Rabbani-Massoud forces are definitively marginalized, the concept of promoting dialogue and negotiations between them and the Taliban becomes even less meaningful. The UN will have to consider whether it should consider a new direction, focusing on governance, reconstruction, and human security (including human and gender rights), rather than a negotiated political solution.

EurasiaNet: What are the chances that Russia might use military force to contain the Taliban?
Rubin: Despite a few threats, Russia will not use force in Afghanistan again. Under the current leadership, it will try to reassert its influence in Central Asia by promoting a policy of aggressive containment, including, if necessary, a Chechnya-like approach to the Ferghana Valley insurgency. But it will stay north of the Amu Darya.

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Posted October 6, 2000 © Eurasianet
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