|
AFTER WAR, THE STAKES CLIMB IN AFGHANISTAN
Q & A with Ashraf Ghani: 10/01/01
Combined US-British bombing raids likely mark the beginning
of the end of the Taliban’s grip on power in Afghanistan.
However, what the new political order in the country will
be remains unclear. Many experts on Afghanistan say a key
to stability in the future will be the formation of a broad-based
government that includes representatives from all of Afghanistan’s
many ethnic groups. Ensuring a stable recovery from over two
decades of warfare will also require an extensive and ongoing
aid commitment from the international community. EurasiaNet
editor Justin Burke spoke with Ashraf Ghani, a leading expert
on Afghan development issues and an adjunct professor of anthropology
at Johns Hopkins University, about the state-building challenges
in Afghanistan. The text of the interview follows:
EurasiaNet: Do you think the Taliban will be easy
to oust?
Ghani: It depends what you mean by ousting them. If
you mean [removing them from] a core series of governmental
functions, yes. If you mean removing their control of territory
as such, that’s a different proposition. There is no political
roadmap as to what would succeed them. Military action is
proceeding in the absence of a political map and reconstruction
map. And that would imply that, even if the Taliban’s central
leadership is eliminated, the second and third tier would
have a territorial base. And a significant section of their
top echelon – and their intelligence – are going to go underground
to undermine the next government.
EurasiaNet: What are the potential pitfalls for US
military operations?
Ghani: That they will take their own logic, become
extended and become routine – like the 1991 Western campaign
in Iraq. And that they would not take on a political and reconstruction
logic that would win the Afghan population to the side of
peace. [This] would give the Taliban the opportunity to pose
as champions of the nation rather than as a minority.
EurasiaNet: Will US ground forces and a prolonged
occupation be necessary to achieve state building aims?
Ghani: I hope not. Ground troops would be casting
a very large shadow on the nation-building part of the effort.
Reconstruction could proceed, but not nation-building. Nation-building
has a symbolic part about identity. And given Afghan culture,
a dependence on US ground troops would subvert the symbolic
part.
EurasiaNet: What, then, is necessary for successful
nation-building in Afghanistan?
Ghani: The following: first, a commitment to reconstruction.
The best way is to create a trust fund to which everybody
actually contributes in cash. We have a history of pledges
made, and not honored, and there is an enormous amount of
mistrust. A trust fund is necessary because organizations
and institutions that would make use of [reconstruction aid]
for the benefit of people do not exist. Corruption could become
a major issue. This is not a problem you want to throw money
at; you want to get accountable institutions. A trust fund
would enable you to do this, because it would indicate that
the international community has done its bit, and now it’s
up to Afghans and international civil society organizations.
The second part is this: no person or group [in Afghanistan]
enjoys legitimacy, so arrangements can only be transitional.
Legitimacy would be won through a process of demonstration
that the role of government has changed from one of oppressing
people to one of serving people. That requires consensus-building,
and you cannot rush the building of consensus because each
culture and society has its own mechanisms.
The third element, which is going to be extremely significant,
is to learn from the experience of UN interventions in Cambodia,
Kosovo and elsewhere. Large bureaucracies were parachuted
with enormous differences in pay and orientation from local
population, and you’ve got to avoid that at all costs. The
next critical issue becomes a focus on building the capacity
of Afghans who have been dispersed throughout the region and
the globe. [You want them] to come together; so that building
the economy is not dependent on the state. If you make the
economy and voluntary organizations depend on the state alone
for outflows, it's a recipe for patronage.
The other task, which is extremely important, is to get the
voluntary sector organized and coordinated. There is enormous
danger that the voluntary sector today will step in, and pull
and push in very different directions. A whole series of cowboys
with very little understanding of culture and its identity
[could show up in Afghanistan and create problems]. … The
other critical issue is donor coordination. Donors have a
history of lack of coordination. Their rules differ significantly,
they require a whole series of reports, and the local population
spend most of their energy writing reports.
EurasiaNet: What kind of time frame are you looking
at for nation-building?
Ghani: Initially, a series of things in the 3-6 months
after the Taliban lose power. Those are going to be absolutely
crucial in terms of establishing a direction on which you
can build, or that forces and relationships would be put in
place which would be extremely difficult to change subsequently.
And then you have to have the two-year and five-to-ten-year
time frames.
Email this article
Posted October 10, 2001 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org
 |
 |
The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website,
meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed
debate about the social, politcal and economic developments
of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the
Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New
York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation
that promotes the development of open societies around
the world by supporting educational, social, and legal
reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex
and controversial issues.
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily
represent the position of the Open Society Institute
and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.
|
 |
 |
|