Andrei Kortunov Examines Russia’s Positions on Central Asian security
11/14/00

Russia has joined the states of Central Asia in expressing alarm over recent military gains made by Afghanistan’s Taliban movement, as well as the threat posed by the Islamic insurgency in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Leading Russian international security affairs expert Andrei Kortunov spoke with EurasiaNet about Russia’s strategy and interests in Central Asia. The transcript of the interview follows:

EurasiaNet: The situation in Central Asia is deteriorating with the Taliban making advances, and a split has appeared among some Central Asian nations. Uzbekistan, in particular, is reaching out to the Taliban. How does Russia view President Islam Karimov’s actions vis-à-vis the Taliban, and what might Russia do to respond?

Kortunov: Well, I think that the Russian position is dubious because, on the one hand, they are concerned about Taliban, and about connections between Talibs and the rebels in Chechnya. In Moscow, they know pretty well that there are some of what they call "mercenaries" from Afghanistan fighting in Chechnya, and there are links between the two regions. On the other hand, I think they realize that Uzbekistan doesn’t have too many choices and if indeed the whole of Afghanistan, in the near future, is controlled by Talibs, then Karimov will have no other option but to start negotiating with them.

So Moscow understands that Uzbekistan really needs some fall-back positions. However, as far as I can see, they still believe in Moscow that the Talibs will not be able to control all the territory of the country, and that the [anti-Taliban] Northern Alliance will have enough power and local support to keep some territories in the north of the country. The recent developments in Afghanistan suggest that the Talibs are not that close to any ultimate victory, so depending on how the military situation changes, the participants might try to stick to their traditional partners, or maybe to look for a third party…

EurasiaNet: Who might that third party be?

Kortunov: Some other mediators who don’t represent the Uzbek group, but who are also not a part of the Talib community, might emerge as brokers or mediators. This is something which cannot be excluded. But of course if worst comes to worst, Russia itself will be forced to negotiate with Talibs directly.

EurasiaNet: What extent is the threat posed by the Taliban to Russian interests?

Kortunov: Well, it’s hard to tell. … There are political forces in Russia, and some local leaders and journalists who tend to be apocalyptic about the Taliban and their potential march through Central Asia. They have their own domino theories about Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and some go as far as to state that this form of Islamic fundamentalism might reach Russia proper, and the Turkic republics of the Russian Federation -- places like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan-- not to mention the northern Caucasian republics. This penetration could be at least ideological, if not direct in terms of the military.

There are more conservative estimates, and some experts claim that Talibs are mostly inward oriented, in that they have no capacity and no intentions to export their values and their principles to the world, and therefore it’s mythical to imagine very active and drastic penetration of Talibs into Central Asia. Of course, the idea of Russia being conquered or somehow taken over by Talibs is kind of a fantasy.

EurasiaNet: Would you say, though, that the Taliban poses a threat to Russian interests in Central Asia proper, and what is Russia’s aim, ultimately, in Central Asia?

Kortunov: Well, I think that first of all, Russia is a status quo power in Central Asia. It would prefer to see only gradual change, and if it is a choice even between rapid transition to democracy on the one hand, and keeping stability on the other, I guess right now that, in Russia, the predominant view is: ‘let’s keep stability, let’s be very cautious, let’s not push them in the direction of Western-type liberal democracy, because if the price is to lose stability, it’s too high a price to pay.’ So Russia is supporting existing regimes in the countries of Central Asia. It is interested in preserving the buffer between South Asia - Afghanistan, Pakistan – and its own territory.

Russia is clearly interested in keeping its strategic positions in the area - like the presence of the Russian military patrolling the borders, Russia’s interest is in limiting illegal drug trafficking, because it goes to Russia, and through Russia to Europe. Likewise it is quite interested, as I said earlier, in somehow insulating the Chechen situation from what is happening or might happen in Central Asia. So I will say that it is generally a conservative position that has primarily security dimensions, but which also has some political and economic dimensions, because Russia is interested in exploring natural resources, especially in Kazakhstan, especially in the case of oil.

But it is not limited to oil. If you take Uzbekistan, of course there are large enterprises in the Russian Federation that depend upon cotton imports from Uzbekistan, even now, after ten years of the Soviet disintegration. If you go to Ivanovo and see that many of the factories are primarily used for cotton, it’s not always registered. Sometimes, if you’re looking only at the sheer statistics, you might come to the conclusion that the economic relations between Russia and these countries are close to zero. But it’s not exactly the whole picture.

So, there are certain economic interests, and there are what they call "ideological interests" – you know, that in Russia the ‘Eurasian’ idea is still quite popular, and some Russian nationalists believe that Russia should probably decrease its activity in Europe because Europe will never accept Russia as an equal partner, Russia will never be integrated into the European Union, and Russia should rather concentrate – at lease concentrate more than it does now – on its relations with Central Asian governments.

EurasiaNet: Turning the last question to the Caucasus, and you mentioned oil and gas also, Russia and Azerbaijan have, in recent months, seemed to be inclined to improve bilateral relations. What is Russia’s aim in Azerbaijan, and is it your impression that perhaps [Azerbaijani President Heidar] Aliyev, who is concerned with ensuring a smooth transition of power to his son, is looking mainly to Russia to act as a guarantor of Ilham Aliyev’s succession?

Kortunov: Well, I think that there are a couple of interests. The most adamant common interest, paradoxically, is the oil. Because Russia and Azerbaijan might have different views on pipelines, or on the Caspian Sea status or something like that, but both Russia and Azerbaijan want to explore all the resources, and they want to market the oil of the Caspian Sea region. There are a lot of connections at different levels. There are speculations that the family of Aliyev for example has some shares in Lukhoil, and that on the other hand some of the Russian oil barons have their interests within Azeri oil companies, so there should be some kind of interaction and cross-fertilization.

Now that oil is so expensive in global markets, of course there are additional incentives to do something in the field and to do something fast. Plus, Azerbaijan still depends on Russia in terms of oil extraction machinery, and Russia is interested in Azerbaijan in terms of oil transportation, so there are some of what they would call objective mutual interests.

The second issue for Russia, which is quite important, is how to provide for the positive neutrality of Azerbaijan, at the very least, on issues of the north Caucasus. And it’s not just Chechnya, it’s also Dagestan, which borders Azerbaijan. There are some minorities which migrate from one country to another, and from the position of Aliyev, the position of the intelligence community of Azerbaijan and the security community in general is quite important.

On the one hand, if you look at Azerbaijan, I think transition is an important issue, and of course Aliyev should be concerned about transition, but also the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, now that Azerbaijan is also not immune to secessions, both in the north and in the south, and therefore Aliyev is not that critical of the Russian actions in Chechnya because he realizes that in some cases he might face similar problems in his own country. In this sense, I would say that we might see new rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan, and maybe Putin is better equipped to deal with Aliyev than his predecessor.

Editor’s Note: Andrei Kortunov is president of the Moscow Public Science Foundation, and is the director of the Open Society Institute Russia’s education programs.

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Posted November 14, 2000 © Eurasianet
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