How Europe Views Russia as Election Approache
3/23/00
Moscow’s military campaign in Chechnya is a source of friction
in Russia’s relations with Western European nations The European
Union has been critical of the conduct of Russia’s assault.
On March 20, for example, EU foreign ministers issued a statement
that faulted Russia for not establishing an adequate humanitarian
aid infrastructure in Chechnya. Meanwhile, the Council of
Europe has suggested that Russia could lose its seat in the
41-member organization due to its failure to halt alleged
human rights abuses in the renegade province. In late January,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council, which promotes
democracy and human rights, called on Russia to resolve the
conflict peacefully by April or risk a review of its participation
in the organization.
From March 9-12, a delegation led by Lord Judd of Great Britain
visited Chechnya to evaluate Russia’s progress toward meeting
the Parliamentary Assembly’s recommendations. On March 13,
the delegation criticized the Russian military’s "disproportionate"
use of force. Lord Judd said: "It is beyond comprehension
that, at the beginning of the 21st century, a European city
like Grozny could be systematically destroyed by the forces
of its own government."
Also on March 13, the Russian plenipotentiary human rights
representative, Oleg Mironov, acknowledged that Russia’s membership
was in danger. Although Mironov said the Council of Europe
should provide assistance, as well as criticism, he admitted
Russia had made policy mistakes, such as prohibiting UN Human
Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson from visiting Chechnya.
Various organs of the Council have complained about Russian
actions in Chechnya. In December, Council Secretary-General
Walter Schwimmer demanded a written explanation from the Russian
government about its implementation of the Council’s human
rights norms in Chechnya. The European Convention on Human
Rights allows the Secretary-General to request such an explanation,
but no Secretary-General had ever used this right with respect
to an individual country. Schwimmer explained the situation
in Chechnya merited this unprecedented action. "The war
in itself constitutes a human rights violation," Schwimmer
said, repeating a statement made by the Council’s Commissioner
for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles.
Concurrently, European leaders have sought to establish a
good working relationship with acting President Vladimir Putin,
the overwhelming favorite to win the scheduled March 26 presidential
election. Putin’s hard-line approach on Chechnya has been
a major factor in establishing him as the presidential front-runner.
A significant majority of Russia’s population approves of
the Putin Administration’s handling of the war.
With the approach of the March 26 presidential election,
the Central Eurasia Project spoke with Ellen Hasenkamp, a
correspondent for Agence France-Presse, based in Brussels,
Belgium, about Europe’s reaction to Chechnya, the rise of
acting President Vladimir Putin and the future of EU-Russian
relations. The transcript of the conversation follows:
CEP: What concerns EU leaders most about the Chechnya
war?
Hasenkamp: Every European leader is stressing that
the EU cannot accept the behavior of the Russian soldiers
– that the use of force is excessive and the civil population
is suffering disproportionally. … For example, the German
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer never misses an opportunity
to criticize the conduct of the campaign against Grozny and
the manner in which the city was indiscriminately bombed.
There was no distinction made between combatants and civilians.
Fischer and others emphasize that this is unacceptable behavior
in the EU’s view.
CEP: Is there a discrepancy between the public comments
of EU officials and their political actions?
Hasenkamp: The public stance is to be critical. At
the same time, they all know there are few means to influence
the conduct of the war. … Leaders like Fischer know that Europe’s
overall interests are not to create a break in relations with
Russia. Thus, no leader is willing to adopt measures that
might risk creating tension in Europe’s relations with Russia.
Europeans freely admit that there is little that they can
actually do, other than express moral outrage and adopt a
few symbolic gestures meant mainly for public consumption.
… In the beginning, when the latest round of fighting began,
some in Europe made statements that suggested that the EU
might be willing to back up words with actions. But over time,
the idea of introducing substantive sanctions has lost a large
amount of its original appeal.
CEP: Has British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s visit
to Russia on March 11 had an impact on how Europe views Putin?
Hasenkamp: There has been no major reaction to Blair’s
visit. Outside of Britain, EU capitals have mostly kept quiet.
There has not been much of a public reaction. … The visit
may be symbolic of how Europe is giving in to reality. Everyone
realizes that Putin will be elected president of Russia, and
it is more important to establish good relations with Putin
than to punish Russia over Chechnya.
CEP: Have the visits of EU and Council of Europe delegations
had any impact on policy?
Hasenkamp: These visits are somewhat problematic for
the EU’s political leaders. Every time a delegation visits
and condemns atrocities it fuels public pressure to take action
to stop the violence. Lord Judd has a great deal of prestige,
and if he says that he is shocked by what he has witnessed
in Chechnya this can influence public opinion, which can,
in turn, leave policies open to criticism. … The hope among
European politicians is that the war will end soon … and the
issue will fade from the forefront. … European politicians
know that Chechnya is not another Kosovo. Western armies will
not intervene to stop the violence because Russia is clearly
different than Yugoslavia. The only thing they can do is to
talk to Russian leaders and pressure them to end the war as
soon as possible.
CEP: What are the EU’s policy priorities vis a vis
Russia?
Hasenkamp: The overriding concern of EU member states
is to maintain warm relations with Russia. Everyone in Europe
is aware that a large measure of Putin’s popularity within
Russia depends on the conduct of the war. They are also aware
that the Russian population supports the war effort. …Europeans
are very aware of geography. Russia is not that far away.
It is perceived as being the large neighbor to the east. It
is a frighteningly big country for Europe. So the EU wants
to keep its foot in the door with Russia – being careful not
to isolate Moscow, and leave the Russians on their own. It
is better to have a dialogue with Russia and have constant
opportunities to discuss policies. … The EU is perhaps more
willing than the United States to accommodate Russia. … The
Kosovo War made it clear to European countries that whatever
problem arises on the continent; a lasting solution can be
accomplished only with Russia’s consent. That (Kosovo) demonstrated
to Europeans the need to maintain good relations with Russia.
… Other problems are the proliferation of weapons, crime,
as well as the outdated atomic energy power stations in the
former Soviet Union. Europe has a clear interest in cooperating
with Russia on these issues. And cooperation in these spheres
is enhanced by good relations. … Europeans remember Chernobyl
(the 1986 nuclear power disaster) and they know that if another
accident occurs they stand to suffer much more than Americans.
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Posted March 23, 2000 ©Eurasianet
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The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website,
meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed
debate about the social, politcal and economic developments
of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the
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The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily
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