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PROMISES VS. RESULTS
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The Saakashvili government initially targeted Shida Kartli’s
contraband trade with neighboring South Ossetia as a way to get the
breakaway territory to return to the Georgian fold. Critics argue that
the strategy has backfired. Check out four promises and their results.
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PROMISE:
2005 - “If during the Soviet period South Ossetia
enjoyed an old form of Soviet autonomy, today, under
this plan,
it will enjoy a much more fair
form, even broader in fact than that accorded to the Republic of North
Ossetia in Russia. Specifically, our plan envisions a constitutional
guarantee of autonomous status that includes the right to freely and
directly elected local self-governance, including an executive branch
and a parliament for South Ossetia.”
- President Mikheil Saakashvili
January 26, 2005
South Ossetia Peace Initiative
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RESULT:
2005 - The de facto president of the breakaway republic of
South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoiti, promptly rejected President
Saakashvili’s initiative and stated that: “To date the
discussion of the status of the Republic of South Ossetia is not on the
agenda. We see nothing new or constructive in the proposals of Mikheil
Saakashvili. This is an attempt to make the situation in the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone worse, to whip it up.”
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PROMISE:
2004 - “Contraband from Tskhinvali, and the South Ossetian region
in general, has been practically blocked. According to my calculations,
this will bring an extra 200-250 million lari [$110-137 million] to the
Georgian budget, once we have blocked contraband in Samegrelo [region
bordering Abkhazia]. Most of that money will be spent on strengthening
our state agencies, including, in the first place, our police and
military structures, so that there is peace and our population is
protected.”
- President Mikheil Saakashvili
June 12, 2004
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RESULT:
2005 - Even with the closure of Georgia’s Ergneti market, a key
contraband hub, smuggling continues. With no border or customs controls
at Roki tunnel, a contraband highway from Russia, Ossetians still
deliver goods to Shida Kartli and other Georgian regions unimpeded. In
Shida Kartli, officials put contraband trade levels at 20 percent of
their pre-summer 2004 levels.
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PROMISE:
2004 - In his August 19 speech announcing the withdrawal of Georgian
forces from South Ossetia, Saakashvili stated: “We will leave the
best 500 soldiers in our villages under the peacekeepers’ quota
that will defend Georgian villages from the attacks and possible
provocations…. I want to confirm our firm decision to protect
population of our villages and … our peacekeeping battalion
… will be manned with our best soldiers.”
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RESULT:
2005 - Since December 2004, Georgia has removed the vast majority of its
peacekeepers from South Ossetia – and even brought numbers lower
than pre-anti-contraband campaign levels. In a March interview, Levan
Nikoleishvili, chief of the general staff, put the number of Georgian
peacekeepers in South Ossetia at “approximately 30.”
Residents of Georgian villages complain that the Georgian government has
now left them “unprotected.”
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PROMISE:
2004 - After regaining Ajaria, President Saakashvili turned towards South
Ossetia with a May 31 speech that outlined his carrot-and-stick approach
to the region. Despite the mobilization of interior ministry troops
along the South Ossetia conflict zone, Saakashvili promised no war,
stating “We will not allow any military action there. We do not
intend to attack anyone.”
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RESULT:
2004 - By July, Georgia’s anti-contraband campaign had evolved into
a small-scale conflict after Interior Ministry troops confiscated
Russian missiles en route to South Ossetia. In response, armed Ossetians
entered Georgian territory and detained 38 policemen from the village of
Vanati. As the situation deteriorated, Georgia ordered its troops to
withdraw from South Ossetia on August 19.
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