UPSTREAM INTERVENTION
Anthony White

I want to begin by dealing with the strategy of "upstream intervention," whereby developed States in major zones of illicit narcotics consumption switch some of their enforcement focus from their own frontiers to areas within or adjacent to zones of illicit cultivation and production. In providing assistance to less developed producer and transit States, the aim of donors is to reduce the quantity of illicit drugs reaching their own territories by strengthening the interdiction capacities of beneficiary States or sub-regions so that they become effective first-lines of defense for developed consumer zones.

From the point of view of donors, upstream intervention not only lies at the heart of international drug control but enables them collectively to exert their efforts closer to the sources of illicit narcotics, rather than near to the market places. Upstream enforcement projects will, naturally, be underpinned by unstated domestic interests on the part of the donors, for whom potential "spin-off" dividends may include reductions in domestic law enforcement expenditure and numbers of prison detainees and local drug users. Such projects may also assist in developing more favorable environments for trade or in supporting other broad political objectives.

This kind of self-interest is not unreasonable, but there perhaps remains open some question of whether upstream intervention can have the effect of contributing to hastening a State that is still mainly one of drugs transit towards acquiring increasing problems of domestic drug usage, organized crime and public corruption, not to mention rapidly swelling prison and HIV-infected populations. The capacity of a State to absorb this kind of situation may be inadequate, and any accompanying lack of credible human rights infrastructure may result in draconian measures against local populations that could be more damaging than drug abuse itself. Many, myself included, have asserted that unless stringent enforcement measures are instituted in geographic areas that are still principally ones of transit, these areas will inevitably succumb to the same awful social phenomena that afflict developed consumer zones, such as addiction and organized crime. However, I now increasingly find myself wondering on what I based that assertion. I believe comprehensive research is needed to identify and formulate the kinds of safeguards that should accompany "upstream" intervention initiatives so as to avoid their inadvertently contributing to deteriorating social situations in drugs transit zones.

The "success" of many projects continues to be assessed by purely quantative measures, such as more arrests and more seizures of drugs. Last year in Washington D.C., a first-hand account was given of alleged cases of members of Tajikistan's elite Drug Control Agency "buying" from far less well paid mainstream enforcement bodies the right to claim credit for arrests or seizures of drugs, even though the Agency had been in no way involved. An allegation was also made that drugs found on some minor couriers were being supplied to them by unknown agents provocateur in order that enforcement personnel could then pick them out with ease and thereby boost national arrest and seizure statistics, not to mention personal financial bonuses. A mid-term evaluation of the Drug Control Agency project, carried out earlier this year on behalf of the United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), did not address these and a number of other important issues. It did, however, acknowledge major weaknesses of project design and strategy that I myself had highlighted over three years earlier, when I was chief of drugs Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement in ODCCP, and which had gone unheeded by the Office's now discredited former Executive Director, Mr. Pino Arlacchi.

Integrity and credibility are key to international organizations operating anywhere, but particularly in sensitive geographic areas. Last year, the UN's Inspector-General published a series of official findings exposing Pino Arlacchi´s mismanagement of ODCCP, at which time I publicly disclosed that Arlacchi had brought two individuals into the organization on the basis of past personal association in Italy and then appointed to crucial ODCCP positions in Central Asia for which they were totally unqualified. These individuals continue to hold those positions and the more senior of them, Ms. Deledda-Titchener, is herself now the subject of a string of formal complaints of mismanagement that bear ominous similarity to those that brought about the downfall of her former mentor.

Since I understand that the drug control agency model is favored by Mr. Arlacchi's successor as one to be replicated throughout Central Asia, I believe it may have been a mistake for the mid-term evaluation team assembled by ODCCP to have entirely comprised law enforcement practitioners from States that had already indicated support for the drug control agency concept. It might be wise for a new, but this time multi-disciplinary, team of evaluators to be commissioned to look into the approach in greater depth and breadth, examining how essential strands of effective drug control, human rights and broad social development are interacting with one another within the sub-region and what enforcement strategy is in the best long-term interests of local populations.

The massive profits generated by the illicit drug trade have without question substantially fuelled corrupt practices throughout the globe. While the overwhelming bulk of these profits accrues within or in the vicinity of developed consumer zones, those generated close to production areas, where salaries and standards of living are so much lower, can cause as much, if not greater, damage to societies. All informed sources seem to suggest relatively high levels of public corruption in Tajikistan and Central Asia. These sources also indicate that drug trafficking through and local levels of abuse within the sub-region are on the increase. The simple equation of these two factors suggests that if drug trafficking and abuse are on the rise, then so must be corruption, even if from an already relatively high level. It also implies that the vested interests of those who are most corrupt are best served by perpetuation of illicit trafficking, rather than by its suppression.

I apply an equation of my own in assessing whether a State's approach to the illicit drug trade is consistent with essential principles of human rights and natural justice. Few governments are under any illusions when it comes to the kind of profile that applies to those within their communities who are most heavily engaged in drug trafficking or are profiting most from such activity. All governments are aware of the kind of profile that fits the overwhelming bulk of those who are incarcerated in its prisons for drug offences. The closer that these two profiles coincide, the more assured will I be that things are as right as can be. However, the more I am confronted with situations in which it is apparent that they are widely separated, the more troubled will I be.

In April 1999, the signing of the formal agreement for the current project involving the development of the Drug Control Agency took place in Vienna.. On the eve of that event Pino Arlacchi was shown by one of his staff a copy of a startling Russian intelligence report (of which I myself have a copy) apparently cataloguing complicity at the highest levels in major drug trafficking within the sub-region. We cannot know the truth of the information contained in that document, but the fact is that the signing went ahead the next day without any investigation or enquiries being launched into the allegations. Sadly, expedience dressed up as pragmatism is as natural to international drug control as it is to global politics and we can scarcely expect it to be otherwise.

I sincerely wish for Tajikistan the kind of peace and future prosperity it deserves, for which reason I thoroughly support any soundly formulated and properly implemented measures aimed at protecting its people from the ravages of drug addiction and organised crime. However, the need to develop proper standards of human rights and social development is no less paramount. The fundamental dilemma of upstream intervention is that while it is implemented in all good faith with a view to creating buffer zones for developed consumer States, there can be no such buffers for the transit States in which it is implemented. For a developed consumer State, there are many more than one line of defence; for a country like Tajikistan, that single line is the only one that will ever be available to it. For that reason alone we need to be sure we get this right.