It would seem that the Uzbek government’s handling of the mid-June refugee crisis, in which roughly 100,000 ethnic Uzbeks from Kyrgyzstan fled to Uzbekistan, has given President Islam Karimov’s administration a significant boost.
Foreign observers in Tashkent have generally lauded the Uzbek government’s response to the humanitarian crisis. In particular, the Karimov administration’s restrained political stance played an important role in keeping the violence in southern Kyrgyzstan from spreading, observers believe. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61333
The government’s actions also have caused some Uzbek citizens to view the government, which has had the reputation of being one of Central Asia’s most repressive, in a new light. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].
The influx of refugees posed a logistical challenge for Uzbek officials that required an unprecedented marshalling of resources. Over the course of a few days in mid-June, between 80,000 and 100,000 – mostly women, children, and elderly – crossed into Uzbekistan and required emergency assistance. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].
In recent years, the Uzbek government has been widely portrayed as bloated, heavily corrupt, and vastly inefficient. Of late, Karimov’s administration has faced international scorn for its continuing reliance on child labor in the cotton sector. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].
But foreign observers found the Uzbek response to the humanitarian crisis to be strong. A functioning chain of command, involving national and local government officials, helped coordinate the handling of the refugee surge. Foreign visitors to the Fergana Valley were “surprised at the quality of service for refugees at the border,” said a longtime foreign observer based in Tashkent.
Government officials set up triage stations near the border. Officials directed refugees to shelters at schools, summer camps, cotton collection facilities, dormitories, sanatoria, and the Andijan stadium. Some refugees melted away into homes of relatives or others who simply opened their homes to those in need, confirmed a UNICEF official.
In addition, local Uzbeks spontaneously provided food and other forms of assistance to refugees, international observers noted. Appeals broadcast on state-run media, as well distributed via text messages, helped galvanize public support for the refugees.
From the start of the crisis, the Uzbek government seemed aware of the possibility that violence could spin out of control and spread across the border. In an apparent effort to tamp down tension, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on June 12 saying the violence against ethic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan was perpetrated by those seeking to provoke confrontation. It did not stem from ancient ethnic hatreds, the statement stressed.
During the early days of the crisis, there existed a strong desire for revenge among refugees, according to numerous observers. One visitor to the refugee camps noted that many survivors reported that “they were waiting for just one word from the president [Karimov] to exact revenge.” It never came. Karimov seemed preoccupied with keeping the violence contained. Authorities closed the border to Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan to lessen the chance of Uzbek nationals traveling into Kyrgyzstan bent on seeking rough justice. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive.]
To a certain extent, the Karimov administration’s effort to keep the mood for revenge in check was motivated by a self-preservation instinct. Many Uzbeks revile the government for its interventionist economic policies and its heavy-handed crackdown on personal liberties. Public dissatisfaction with the government over the years has sparked protests, and played a prominent role in the 2005 Andijan massacre. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].
Accordingly, officials in Tashkent certainly have no desire these days to see Uzbeks on either side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border get their hands on guns. Officials remain concerned that ire focused on Kyrgyzstan today could be one day redirected toward the Karimov administration.
To date, there have been no reports of acts of retribution against the sizable Kyrgyz population in Uzbekistan’s portion of the Fergana Valley, and many Uzbekistan nationals seem to share the official view that the ethnic strife was stirred up by “outsiders” and was a by-product of dysfunctional Kyrgyz politics; Kyrgyzstan is often disdained in Uzbekistan for its chaotic, unstable polity.
The Karimov administration’s actions fostered a sense of pride among many -- in both the president personally and in his government. “I am proud of my president,” said an Uzbek national who was studying at a university in Osh and who spent five days in hiding before being able to make his way back home. His response was typical.
Refugees themselves have complained that Uzbek authorities pressured them to return to Kyrgyzstan before they felt it was safe to do so. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. But such complaints have not resonated widely with Uzbeks in Uzbekistan.
Some foreign observers say the refugee crisis caused the Uzbek government to open up. Prior to June, as the longtime foreign observer based in Tashkent noted, government efforts to relate its point of view had been virtually nonexistent. The observer described the government’s communications strategy as stuck “in the Soviet period.”
“There is no communication, no nothing,” the observer said. “They just don’t know how.”
However, during the height of the refugee crisis, the Uzbek government appeared to embrace candor. Officials invited foreign observers to visit refugee sites, including delegations from the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, the World Health Organization, and the OSCE. In perhaps the most surprising of shifts, the British Broadcasting Corp. was invited to film at refugee camps. The operations of the BBC and virtually all other foreign media outlets were shut down in Uzbekistan following the 2005 Andijan events.
“It’s a new attitude,” said the Tashkent-based observer. “It’s the first time the government started to communicate.”
Whether the government can build on this shift – which another longtime resident described as “transformative” – will be known only with the passage of time. It is also an open question as to whether Tashkent would again open its borders to ethnic Uzbeks, if Kyrgyzstan experienced another bout of instability.
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