The Russian base in Armenia and Azerbaijan's S-300s

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrives in Yerevan today on a three-day visit, for a "non-official" CSTO summit and, it's expected, to sign a new deal with Armenia extending Russia's military presence there. The deal would amend the lease Russia has with Armenia for use of the 102nd base in Gyumri for an additional 24 years, which would allow Russian troops to stay in Armenia until 2044. (Russia apparently is thinking long-term these days; it also this year signed an agreement with Ukraine allowing use of the naval base at Sevastopol until 2042.)

Connected with this, somehow, is the news that Russia will (maybe) be selling S-300 air defense systems to Azerbaijan. This development was reported by a Russian newspaper three weeks ago and has yet to be authoritatively confirmed or denied by any of the relevant parties. So speculation continues, and there are various theories. One common belief is that it's a sop to Azerbaijan to allay their fears over Russia's strengthening presence in Armenia.

Another school of thought is that it was to scare Armenia into accepting the base lease extension. From EurasiaNet colleague Shahin Abbasov:

Moscow may have an interest in emphasizing that interest [by Baku to buy the S-300] to Azerbaijan’s long-time foe, Armenia, one political analyst believes. The timing of the July 29 Vedomosti article about the alleged S-300 sale roughly coincided with news about an expected August 19 deal with Armenia for a 49-year lease on Russia’s Gyumri base there.

“Both issues appeared simultaneously and I do not have any doubts that they are linked,” commented Ilgar Mammadov, a co-founder of the pro-opposition Respublikaci Alternative movement.

“[T]here are forces in Armenia which criticize and object to these plans. Thus, to make the Armenian public agree to this agreement, the Kremlin leaked information concerning plans to sell the air-defense systems to Azerbaijan, and, generally, about the strengthening of its military cooperation with Baku,” Mammadov argued.

Or, of course, it could be a combination of both of these, and it ends up being win-win for Russia: they get money from selling the S-300s to Azerbaijan and long-term influence in the south Caucasus via Armenia.

But who comes out better in the deal, Armenia or Azerbaijan? It seems pretty clear that Azerbaijan does. The Armenian government claims that the deal will help protect them:

The new wording of the agreement stipulates that the Russian military base, together with the Armenian armed forces, will not only protect Russia's interests, but will also ensure Armenia's security. To this end, Russia will supply Armenia with weapons and modern military equipment...

Armenian politicians have welcomed the extension. Secretary of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia Eduard Sharmazanov told local media that extending the presence of the base will help maintain the regional balance of power.

But plenty of skeptics doubt that, if Azerbaijan were to attack to try to regain Armenian-controlled Nagorno Karabakh, that Russia would do much to help out. In addition to the fact that the CSTO's credibility is badly weakened after it failed to do anything to protect Kyrgyzstan during its recent crisis, legally the situation with Karabakh is tricky, as well, according to Armenian expert Hovannes Nikogosyan:

Yerevan is convinced that the agreement would contribute to the regional stability.

There is a minor legal problem however. According to the treaty between Russia and Armenia (and the CSTO charter) the sides will de facto protect each other in the case of an aggression. The new protocol that awaits signing at the moment says Russia will “protect Armenia's security”. Armenia did not annex the territory of Karabakh – it only extended security guarantees to the province – and legally the term “Armenia's security” seems to apply exclusively to the territory of Armenia proper. The problem is that neither the March, 2008 incident nor Azerbaijan's sabotage offensive against Karabakh last May were explicitly condemned by Armenia as infringements upon its own security. Russia will have no legal right to intervene in Karabakh unless Yerevan states officially that Azerbaijan's offensive against Karabakh would be treated as a threat to Armenia's security.

And while Russia continues to point out that the S-300 is merely a defensive weapon, this is obviously a canard. While, yes, a good air defense system protects you from an unprovoked air attack, it also protects you from a counterattack. So if Azerbaijan were to attack Armenia, and Armenia were to counterattack -- like anyone would expect them to -- then Azerbaijan would be able to far better defend itself against that counterattack. And that puts Azerbaijan in a much better offensive position.

But all this depends on Azerbaijan getting the S-300. So we'll see.