Georgia: Tbilisi’s Deployment in Afghanistan Doesn’t Win Many NATO Points
Georgia is the leading troop contributor, relative to its overall population, to US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Many officials in Tbilisi had hoped that their contribution might help the country gain full NATO membership. But that appears not to be the case.
At the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled for November 19-20 in Lisbon, NATO members are expected to debate the alliance’s strategic goals, as well as mull prospects for enlargement. Georgia has long sought membership in the Atlantic Alliance and will arrive at the meeting with an updated resume, including the deployment of nearly 1,000 soldiers in Afghanistan as part of the anti-Taliban coalition, along with a promise to send civilian aid workers as well.
But some analysts say that the robust Georgian presence in Afghanistan is not earning Tbilisi many points in the eyes of some major European members of NATO, who seem happy with the alliance’s existing membership, and who are reluctant to antagonize Russia by trying to expand into a region that Moscow sees as its sphere of influence.
“I’m not at all convinced that Georgia’s contribution to ISAF [the International Security Assistance Force] will buy it much affection from most NATO members, which themselves only grudgingly and barely participate [in the anti-Taliban campaign],” one American policy analyst told EurasiaNet.org, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Coupled with a general aversion to further expansion … and deference to Moscow, I don’t see Georgia making much headway with most of the Europeans.”
Georgia’s NATO hopes seemed to peak in early 2008, when former US president George W. Bush made a push for a Tbilisi membership offer during the alliance’s summit that year in Bucharest, Romania. The Georgian-Russian war in August of 2008 caused NATO members to put the membership question on the back burner.
Ronald Asmus, a former US deputy assistant secretary of state for European Affairs, believes Georgia’s contribution to ISAF is necessary, but not a sufficient step for NATO membership. “One of the key considerations for a candidate country that wants to join into NATO is its ability to demonstrate that it can contribute to the overall security of the alliance and its members,” said Asmus, who heads the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund.
“In the 1990s, it was the Balkans where potential members needed to prove their commitment and willingness to provide to NATO missions,” continued Asmus, commenting via email. “Today the test case is Afghanistan. The fact that Georgia is there working with NATO in a very dangerous part of the country clearly will strengthen its credentials and case. This by itself won’t get Georgia into the alliance but it will help. Georgia has to deliver on other fronts as well.” He identified further democratic and military reforms as among those areas.
Tbilisi, for its part, says that the Afghanistan campaign is not just about NATO. “We do not view this in quid-pro-quo terms in our relations with NATO,” said Georgian First Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria. “We are in Afghanistan because it is in our national interests to see international security efforts succeed in that region and elsewhere. … Georgia’s contribution in … Iraq and now in Afghanistan is also a testimony to Georgia being not just a consumer but also a provider of international security.”
So far, Georgian media outlets, as well as opposition politicians, have not seriously questioned Georgia’s involvement in Afghanistan -- even following the deaths of four Georgian soldiers in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. The biggest news outlets are government-friendly, while the main opposition groups share the government’s pro-Western geopolitical orientation. For many Georgians, NATO membership is virtually synonymous with national security and independence.
“The 2008 war may have reduced Georgia’s chances to join NATO, but it also seems to have reinforced the general sense in the Georgian public -- not without the help of the government’s effective PR efforts -- that Georgia needs protection from Russia, and NATO is their best bet,” said Ellada Gamreklidze, a media analyst with a research interest in Georgia’s NATO integration.
In its membership quest, Georgia has lost an important partner, Ukraine, which has shelved its NATO aspirations. The talk in Tbilisi’s political corridors is that the alliance may now opt to decouple the Georgia-Ukraine membership bid. The best result for which Georgia reportedly hopes is that support for its membership will not diminish during the upcoming summit.
But the challenges do not end there. NATO leaders seem eager to engage Russia, underscored by the acceptance of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev of an invitation to attend the upcoming Lisbon summit. Medvedev has indicated that he is willing to discuss NATO plans for a European missile defense system. Moscow has until now been a steadfast opponent of the NATO missile plan. The possibility of a Russian-NATO deal on a missile defense system is, of course, not a source of comfort in Tbilisi.
“We can only welcome any effort to make Russia part of the civilized family of nations, but, and this is a big ‘but,’ only if Russia subscribes to fundamental principles of international security, which includes respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations,” Bokeria said.
Asmus does not necessarily view a possible NATO-Russia rapprochement as an insurmountable obstacle for the realization of Georgia’s membership goal. The last two rounds of NATO enlargement “took place when relations with Russia were improving not deteriorating,” he noted.
Ultimately, said both Bokeria and Asmus, the fate of Georgia’s application will depend on how hard NATO’s main engine, Washington, will want to push for Georgia’s membership. “The United States needs to take the lead in putting this all together,” Asmus commented.
Giorgi Lomsadze is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi.
Giorgi Lomsadze is a journalist based in Tbilisi, and author of Tamada Tales.
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