One ongoing source of tension between the U.S. and Georgia is the U.S.'s alleged refusal to provide Georgia with defensive weapons in the wake of the war over South Ossetia, which badly diminished Georgia's military capacity. Georgia argues that they are too weak to fend off a Russian invasion, and need U.S. help to strengthen them. Now, a couple of diplomatic cables, recently released by WikiLeaks, shed some light on the internal U.S. debate on the costs and benefits of such help.
One of the cables is from Moscow, and the other from Tbilisi. And perhaps unsurprisingly, the one from Moscow argues that providing arms to Georgia will damage relations with Russia, and the one from Georgia argues that not doing so will sacrifice Georgia, a loyal ally. The two cables were sent on successive days in June 2009. Readers really interested in this debate should read the two cables in their entirety, they each provide a pretty comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of their side of the argument.
The cable from Tbilisi explains how badly Georgia's military has been damaged:
During the August 2008 conflict, Georgia lost extensive capabilities, including 30 percent of its armored vehicles, 40 percent of U.S.-produced AR-15 rifles, and at least 60 percent of its air defense capability. These have not been replaced.
Georgia's goal is not to be able to defeat Russia, but only to slow them down until the rest of the world can get involved:
Current Georgian operational thinking is that if they can defend Tbilisi from occupation for 72 hours, then international pressure will force the advance to pause.
And the U.S. should provide this aid, the cable continues, both to ensure the transparency of the procurement...:
The development of this capacity is not solely equipment-based, but it will require the acquisition of new lethal defensive systems. If Georgia does not procure the equipment from the U.S., it will almost surely seek to procure it elsewhere, as it has done in the past. U.S. involvement would help ensure the transparency of the procurement process itself, as well as increase our control over the amount, type and location of the equipment.
... and to reassure U.S. allies that Washington will support them against Russia:
Retreating from military cooperation would be a step back from commitments we have made to Georgia and other international partners. Not only will Georgia be disappointed in our diminished support, and hesitant to trust us again, but other partners will draw the same conclusions. The Russia-Georgia war has already led some countries, such as Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states, to question the extent of our commitment, even though we never committed to the direct military defense of Georgia. A step back from commitments we have made would remove any doubt in our unreliability and convince countries from Belarus to Kyrgyzstan, even as they try to recalibrate their own relationship with Russia, that the risks of continuing partnership with Russia are less than those of moving toward cooperation with the United States.
The cable from Moscow takes the position that rearming Georgia would unnecessarily strain the U.S.-Russia "restart" in relations, and while it makes the case that Russia's objections are unreasonable, it points out that the objections are nevertheless real:
A decision to move towards a more robust military relationship with Georgia will imperil our efforts to re-start relations with Russia, if it is not carefully calibrated and deployed. While Medvedev understands the strategic and personal benefits of crafting a productive partnership with the U.S., this impulse is trumped by the GOR's "absolute" priority placed on expanding Russian influence in the Eurasian neighborhood, preventing NATO enlargement, and demonstrating Russia's great power status.
It also argues that military aid to Georgia would backfire, by increasing the chances that Russia would see a threat from Georgia (and the U.S.):
[W]e believe a lethal military supply relationship with Tbilisi would come at the cost of advancing Georgia's territorial integrity, and could lessen Russian restraint on weapons transfers to Iran. We believe that keeping the focus on Georgia's economic and democratic development, while continuing our military cooperation with Tbilisi through transparent PfP programming with European partners, and non-lethal bilateral mil-mil training and assistance, is the only viable -- if very long-term -- strategy to induce better Russian behavior and restore Georgian territorial integrity. Critical to this effort will be building ballast in a U.S.-Russian relationship that serves as a break on Russia's worst instincts.
It could also imperil other, more high-profile, U.S. priorities:
The ramifications of a policy clash on weapons sales could also be felt elsewhere, with Moscow seizing a pretext to move forward on the delivery of S-300s to Iran.
None of these are shocking revelations, of course, they basically echo analysts on each side have been saying about the issue. Curiously, though, there's little or no explicit discussion in the cables about Georgia's ability to purchase the weapons, or whether the U.S. would donate them. But the language of "providing assistance" seems to suggest that what's under discussion would be donations, and that seems a qualitatively different thing than allowing Georgia to buy U.S. weapons. The Georgian Embassy in Washington claims that arms purchases -- using Georgia's money -- are being actively blocked; these cables don't mention anything like that.
But given that 18 months later Georgia still isn't getting any weapons -- either sold or donated -- from the U.S., it's safe to say that the "don't rearm Georgia" camp has won out, at least for now.
Joshua Kucera, a senior correspondent, is Eurasianet's former Turkey/Caucasus editor and has written for the site since 2007.
Sign up for Eurasianet's free weekly newsletter. Support Eurasianet: Help keep our journalism open to all, and influenced by none.