The Cable, dated March 8, 2008 and signed by then-charge Richard Hoagland, describes American concerns about the government of Turkmenistan's obstructions of the Embassy's efforts to deter Turkmen intelligence agencies' surveillance.
Reftels correctly assert that Embassy Ashgabats Surveillance Detection (SD) operations have been severely restricted by the Government of Turkmenistan (GOT) and that it is unlikely that the GOT will agree to authorize normal SD operations in the near future. Since April 2007 to resent, the SD Team is not allowed to conduct operations outside of the Embassy compound territory. This includes coverage of the Residential compound, Public Affairs off-site location and the USAID/EXBS off-site location.
Despite the obstruction, the post asked for permission to keep the extra personnel to go on conducting surveillance and analysis.
That means if you're talking to someone at the Embassy residences and the various public affairs and USAID locations in Ashgabat, "you're on the air" to the Turkmenistan Ministry of National Security (MNB). No surprise there. The MNB maintains very harsh control over the communications and movements of both citizens and foreigners in an effort to prevent any kind of challenge whatsoever to the authoritarian government.
Yet it is well known to journalists and regional experts that the U.S. does attempt to foil electronic surveillance in its embassies; for example, 22 years ago the U.S. embassy spent millions rebuilding its mission in Moscow after it was found to be riddled with bugs.
U.S. embassies operating in countries like the former Soviet republics are under intense surveillance from the successors of the KGB in these countries, and feel they are justified in trying to thwart the secret police in their efforts to spy on their own citizens as they participate in public programs at U.S. facilities.