Late in 2007 Uzbekistan customs officials intercepted a rail car carrying some radioactive material, most likely either cesium or uranium, en route from Kyrgyzstan to Iran. That bit of tantalizing information comes courtesy of WikiLeaks, which has released several U.S. State Department cables about the incident. Unfortunately, the cables don't shed light on the most important questions: who was sending it, who was receiving it, and what were they going to do with it
The seizure was made on November 28, 2007, according to the initial report:
1.(S/NF) Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftel that it has received a report indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. This report came to post's attention via xxxxxxxxxxxx (please protect) reporting informally, unofficially to Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) rep....
¶2. (S/NF) Details of the incident follow:
A) (S/NF) Current location of material: The rail car in question has been quarantined in the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxxx on the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan border by the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
B) (S/NF) Transport status of material: (e.g. stationary or in transit, who is responsible for it, how secure is it, what does the host government plan to do with it) The Ministry of Emergency Situations has quarantined the rail car and the Institute of Nuclear Physics was making preparations as of December 3 to open the rail car for further investigation....
E) (S/NF) Intended destination of material: (port or border crossing and country) Iran was the point of destination....
G) (S/NF) Supplier and/or origination point of material. A State Customs Committee official indicated that Kyrgyzstan was the point of origin. This point of origin conflicts with normal rail traffic patterns, however; xxxxxxxxxxxx is near the southern border of Kazakhstan.
As far as I understand it, if you want to travel by rail from Bishkek to Uzbekistan, you have to go through Kazakhstan, so that route doesn't seem to conflict with normal traffic patterns.
But anyway, there are a few follow-up cables that detail the U.S. embassy's efforts -- largely unsuccessful -- to get information on the incident from the Uzbekistan authorities. The best part:
In accordance with Uzbekistan law, the car is being held in abeyance until either the shipper from Kyrgyzstan arrives to explain the detection of radioactivity or until sixty days have elapsed. (Comment: It is very unlikely that the shipper will present himself or herself to explain the contents of the rail car, given the prosecution that would probably ensue. End comment.)
But the last cable we have on the incident is from January 10, 2008, less than 60 days from the discovery, so we don't know if the original owner came to claim his cargo -- or what was, in the end, done with it.
Joshua Kucera, a senior correspondent, is Eurasianet's former Turkey/Caucasus editor and has written for the site since 2007.
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