U.S. Arms Sales to Georgia Would Perpetuate "Berlin Wall" Mentality: Report
U.S. arms sales to Georgia would perpetuate a "Berlin Wall" mentality between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, focusing on balance of power questions rather than working on a solution to the conflict, says a new report by the Washington think tank Center for American Progress. The report, “A More Proactive U.S. Approach to the Georgia Conflicts," is not strictly about arms sales. In fact, it notes in the introduction that rhetoric about arms sales in Washington is a distraction from the real objectives of making practical improvements in the situation on the ground and in the relationships between the four main actors:
Discussions in Washington on the conflicts unfortunately often do not even address these objectives. Reading the debate, one would think there was a stark choice between “selling out the Georgians” and “arming” them. Analysts and commentators are arguing about the merits of “taking a stand” and “showing support” for Georgia, and how to pressure Russia into changing its ways. These are positions that the Georgian government desires and actively inserts into the U.S. domestic foreign policy debate. But they won’t change the situation on the ground.
That is definitely true. But arms sales are what this blog is about, so we're going to continue. (For smart takes on other aspects of the report, I recommend in particular blog posts by Michael Cecire and Daniel Larison.)
On arms provisions, the report sensibly calls on both sides to desist. From the Russian side, it singles out the emplacement of Russian missiles in South Ossetia:
The most obvious contributing factor to Georgian insecurity is the deployment in South Ossetia of long-range missile systems (Smerch and Tochka-U) that can strike Tbilisi at any time. Georgian officials also emphasize the threat that comes from a Russian buildup of units and hardware in South Ossetia that are highly mobile and therefore could only be used for a rapid forward assault.
The United States should ask Russia to lower the numbers of rapid-assault vehicles, tanks, and drivers stationed at forward outposts in South Ossetia or at least move them to the main base in the north of South Ossetia, which would not diminish Russia’s capacity to defend it. In the future Moscow should consider replacing some of the combat troops stationed there with noncombat personnel.
The positioning of long-range artillery in South Ossetia only increases Georgian insecurity without enhancing South Ossetian security. The U.S. government should push for removal of such weapons from South Ossetia. But in the interim greater transparency about the nature of the buildup in South Ossetia would be an important step forward.
Of course, this is a report written by Americans and framed in a way to provide recommendations for American policymakers. But: good luck, Washington, getting Russia to do all that.
On the question of U.S. arms sales to Georgia, the report blames Russia for ginning up the controversy:
Russia’s stance on this issue is at best unconstructive if not downright hypocritical. Rather than taking steps to reduce the possibility of renewed violence, its senior leadership regularly makes false allegations about U.S. involvement in Georgia’s past and current arms provision, assigns exclusive blame for the events of August 2008 to the Georgian government, suggests that this “fact” has so deprived this government of legitimacy that it no longer has the right to self-defense, and threatens to punish both it (militarily) and any potential suppliers (diplomatically) if they pretend otherwise.
Meanwhile, the extent of Russia’s own deployments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot even be justified on defensive grounds. And Moscow not only stations equipment like the Tochka-U in South Ossetia but does so with no transparency. It announces such steps through anonymous leaks to wire services, which only amplifies Georgian anxieties and destabilizes the situation on the ground.
But the authors still note that U.S. arms sales would be a bad idea -- not so much because it will embolden Georgia to attack, but because it encourages this "Berlin Wall" mentality, that emphasizes holding your ground and not engaging:
But providing or authorizing the sale of defensive weapons to Georgia in response to this behavior would only make it harder to achieve a peaceful resolution that restores Georgia’s territorial integrity. U.S. policy should be guided by the central goal of a peaceful resolution of the conflict within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. And for these purposes arms sales are at best irrelevant and at this juncture likely a major hindrance.
Arms sales would send the message that the United States is more interested in defending one of the sides from the others as opposed to bringing all sides together. They would also further militarize the conflict zone, which could well prove destabilizing. There are other ways of addressing Russia’s unconstructive behavior—particularly through the improved bilateral relationship and the incentives it creates—that would not have that kind of negative impact on conflict resolution.
Worse, the rhetoric employed by advocates of arms sales in Washington is often consistent with the first scenario for Georgia’s future—divided Berlin—described in the introduction: The United States should help its friends dig in on their side of Georgia’s Berlin Wall and let them sit it out until the enemy implodes.
The authors don't specifically address Georgia's main argument for the weapons: that they are needed to fend off a Russian attack, for at least as long as it would take for international diplomats to step in and pressure Russia to stop. But it takes the approach that a Russian attack is unlikely, and so the risk does not justify the benefit.
Overall, it's a sensible, smart report, which -- rarely for a think tank paper -- goes beyond generalities and conventional wisdom to produce some solid, subtle recommendations. Let's hope the State Department and Pentagon are taking it seriously.
Joshua Kucera, a senior correspondent, is Eurasianet's former Turkey/Caucasus editor and has written for the site since 2007.
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