Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Preventative Action Needed

The last time I laid eyes on Tajikistan before emigrating in 1991, the country was on its final descent into civil war. I was too young to understand the forces at work that were driving people toward conflict, but not young enough to be indifferent. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left the country with little direction and no leadership.

At the time, the conflict in Tajikistan seemed isolated from the rest of the world. Twenty years later, I realize that a conflict such as Tajikistan’s is not an independent event, with consequences limited to the country in question. The international community, however, has been slow to see the connection between strife in small nations and its global impact. Despite the recent turmoil in Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, Western leaders still seem surprised when conflicts in relatively obscure areas spill into the international arena. The upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East certainly has the international community’s attention now. But perhaps global leaders should expand their horizons a little more so that they may head off a conflict elsewhere before it begins.

One such area is Central Asia, a region that is primed for trouble. In particular, the potential for conflict between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is growing. Already, their bilateral relationship is severely strained by disputes over the allocation of energy and water.

Tajikistan, the poorest of the five Central Asian republics, possesses about 40 percent of Central Asia’s water. However, what the republic has in water, it lacks in energy. Dushanbe is buckling under a crushing national debt, while being dependent on Uzbekistan for energy supplies. And this dependency is fueling mutual antagonism. Tashkent has often resorted to cutting off natural gas exports either to compel Tajikistan to pay for the energy it imports, or to express displeasure with political or economic decisions in Dushanbe that run counter to Uzbek interests. The erratic supply of power, in turn, has exacerbated Tajik citizens’ discontent with their own government and with neighboring states.

Russia’s continued desire to play a dominating geopolitical role in Central Asia creates an additional complication.

Tajik leaders see the ability to harness water resources as being crucial to the country’s ability to climb out of a debt pit. President Imomali Rahmon’s administration has a strategic plan to build hydropower facilities and export electricity, but it lacks the resources to implement the blueprint. Russia has expressed on-and-off interest in financing hydropower projects, including the crown-jewel of Tajikistan’s development strategy, the Rogun Dam.

For a variety of reasons, however, the Rogun project remains stuck. Fierce Uzbek opposition to the plan, for one, helped prompt Russia to back away from construction. In 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the withdrawal of Russian investment in Rogun until agreement had been reached among all parties. Tajikistan responded by asking its citizens to help finance the project, while also seeking financial support from Iran. After garnering some funds, Tajikistan began building its first two units and a 500kw transmission line to Afghanistan.

In February of 2010, Uzbekistan’s prime minister published an open letter to Tajik leaders in the official Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka, outlining Tashkent’s concern about the potential ecological damage that Rogun could cause. In addition to the warning, multiple complaints were brought to the United Nations.

Tajikistan’s Prime Minister, Akil Akilov, responded to the Uzbek move with a public defense of Dushanbe’s development plans, citing the World Bank’s support for the project, and pointing to assessments that indicated Rogun’s construction would not have serious social, economic or environmental consequences, provided that appropriate water-management mechanisms were put into place.

The Tajik response did nothing to ease Uzbek opposition, and tension has kept on escalating. Even so, Tajikistan’s dependence on Uzbek gas served as an incentive for Dushanbe to keep engaging Tashkent.

Things may be reaching a critical point. Late last December, Tajikistan’s 25-year lease with Russian monopoly Gazprom paid off. Gazprom head Aleksei Miller announced that the Sarikamysh gas fields may have enough reserves to power Tajikistan for 50 years. Uzbekistan will surely hope this energy discovery will prompt Tajikistan to suspend the Rogun plan. But that may not be the case, as the estimated reserves are not enough to fulfill Tajikistan’s goal of becoming an energy exporter. On the contrary, the find may ease Tajikistan’s dependence on Uzbekistan and, therefore, make Dushanbe less willing to compromise now than before.

This is an appropriate time for international governments, organizations and banks to utilize their influence in the region to ensure peaceful negotiations between the two republics. If dealt with correctly, the next time I lay eyes on Tajikistan, I hope it will be a stable, prospering republic.