Turkmenistan: Trans-Caspian Could Take A Third of Gazprom's Business

Peretz Partensky

Pipeline in Turkmenistan, 2009

Ashgabat is viewing as belligerent and provocative Russia's recent addition to its Caspian fleet of two more ships with powerful weapons and training exercises last month for a group of missile boats, says Viktoriya Panfilova,, writing for Russia's daily Nezavisimaya gazeta (ng.ru).

The Kremlin's dislike of Ashgabat's new-found cooperation with the European Union on alternative energy routes could prevent Turkmenistan from signing on to the free-trade agreement already signed by other CIS members.

Of course, Turkmenistan has responded in kind, ratcheting up its naval presence in the Caspian as well.

The Turkmen Foreign Ministry said in its statement last month, its involvement in the Trans-Caspian pipeline is dictated by economic interest and mutual advantage with the EU, not the desire "to harm someone's interests".

In an interview with Panfilova, Mikhail Krutikhin, a partner for RusEnergy, a consulting agency said that Ashgabat has a point with its protests lately.

"You can see the statements of the analysts that are outright funded by the [Russian] presidential administration. They have reached the point where they are simply threatening Turkmenistan with nearly an armed intervention from the Caspian Sea, if they suddenly decide to build the Trans-Caspian pipeline to Azerbaijan," he told Panfilova.

On the other hand, he said Russia's "nervous attitude toward the Trans-Caspian pipeline is understandable," and this "short and cheap gas pipeline, which does not interfere with other Caspian countries in any way" could deprive Gazprom of part of its market in south and southeastern Europe.

For comparison's sake, he said that Gazprom sold 107 billion cubic meters of gas (bcm) in 2010; the Trans-Caspian could pump 20-30 bcm. from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan That would mean a third of Gazprom's business.

No wonder Russia is "categorically opposed to the Trans-Caspian," Krutikhin said.