"Bakiyev Can Be Bought": U.S. Embassy Tied Rent for Kyrgyz Air Base To President's Reelection
Competing aid packages offered by the U.S. and Russia to either maintain or close the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan in 2009 were aimed at "buying" the re-election of former Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, U.S. diplomatic cables show. The embassy acknowledged that helping build up a "war chest" for a "corrupt and authoritarian government" could result in "political blow-back," but didn't appear to think that should necessarily outweigh the advantages of such a plan.
The Pentagon's role in fostering corruption in the Bakiyev government, via murky contracts to supply the air base with fuel, have been investigated. But the cables show that the State Department also was willing to funnel money to Bakiyev in ways that embassy officials themselves recognized would affect the election -- and then criticized the election afterwards for its "misuse of government resources" to aid Bakiyev's reelection campaign.
In February 2009, Russia offered Kyrgyzstan a $2.15 billion aid package, and Bakiyev immediately reciprocated by announcing the closure of the U.S. base. A few days after that announcement, on February 5, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek wrote a cable arguing that Bakiyev needed the money for upcoming presidential elections. While a large portion of the Russian aid would go towards building a dam and so would be "irrelevant to Bakiyev's short-term need for campaign cash," the rest would make up a "slush fund" for him:
Piecing together information from different sources, our initial analysis is that Bakiyev's actions have been driven by the need to secure a war chest for early presidential elections, and the key components of the Russian offer are the $150 million grant, and the $300 million concessional loan, both of which Russia has reportedly pledged to provide by April 30. With a $450 million slush fund in hand, Bakiyev can raise salaries, fund social housing, ensure there will be no shortages of food in the markets, buy off local officials, and buy the votes needed to engineer a successful re-election.
A week later, another cable proposes making a one-time offer of $150 million to keep operating in Manas through 2011:
Despite Russia's public protestations to the contrary, it is clear that Moscow purchased Kyrgyz President Bakiyev's decision to close Manas. It is also clear that Bakiyev views the Base exclusively as a commercial commodity.
This has two implications. First, Bakiyev can still be bought, and should the U.S. offer him enough money, we could retain access to Manas. Second, however, Bakiyev has also shown that he is an unreliable partner, vulnerable to Russian pressure, who sooner or later will demand more compensation, regardless of the terms of whatever deal we might be able to reach now. Together, this means that if we are to extend our access to Manas beyond the six month notification period, we will need to reach both a political accord with Moscow and a financial agreement with Bakiyev.
The cable continues with an analysis of how to satisfy both Russia's and Bakiyev's interests, and concludes that U.S. money for Bakiyev's reelection would be necessary to compete with the Russian money. But it argued that the U.S. could lowball Bishkek, considering that the U.S. offered more geopolitical benefits and were less likely to renege on the deal:
The Russians might reduce their offer somewhat (us leaving in 2011 might be worth less to them than in 2009).. [I]f the U.S. pledge provided the money Bakiyev wants for his political purposes in a timely manner (i.e., in time to use for his re-election campaign), he could accept a reduction in the Russian offer.
There could, however, be "blow-back," the cable notes:
The above strategy only makes sense, however, if we assess that it is worth perhaps as much as $150 million to gain two more years' access to Manas, and that is not a judgment we can make from here in Bishkek. We should also keep in mind that there might be political blow-back from giving this (admittedly corrupt and authoritarian) government a heavy infusion of cash.
It wasn't just Washington and Moscow lining up to contribute to Bakiyev's reelection: a cable from April 2009 suggested that Bakiyev hit up the Canadian operators of the Kumtor gold mine, to renegotiate the contract under which they operated in Kyrgyzstan. As a result of those efforts, the Kyrgyzstan government got "an immediate tax payment of $22.4 million. The influx of funds will likely aid Kyrgyz White House efforts to marshal all available support to reelect President Bakiyev this July."
Diplomatic cables also reveal that Kyrgyz opposition figures approached the U.S. embassy ahead of the election seeking their support. One, former Deputy Prime Minister Elmira Ibraimova, approached the embassy in February to discuss her intentions of forming a bloc to oppose Bakiyev.
Ibraimova understood that the U.S. was in a delicate position over the future status of Manas Air Base, and would proceed very cautiously. She did not ask for financial assistance, but did request that the U.S. maintain a "centrist position" -- and not side with Bakiyev.
Another oppositionist, former Presidential Chief of Staff Medet Sadyrkulov, also met with the embassy that month and took a different tack: he said the U.S. should abandon their support of Bakiyev because of his threat to close Manas, and should back him instead:
Sadyrkulov claimed that Bakiyev reached a decision to close Manas Air Base in December after discussion with the Russians over the $2.5 billion assistance package. Sadyrkulov said he refused the offer to be foreign minister because he wanted no part of the Base closure. He advised not to negotiate over Manas with the Bakiyev government, but wait until his new government was in place. He also asked for financial assistance from the [US government] to support his efforts.
The embassy was suspicious of Sadyrkulov's proposal, wondering if it was a "provocation," and asked the State Department for guidance on how to proceed. It's not clear what advice State gave, and only a month later, Sadyrkulov died in a car accident, which some in the opposition said wasn't an accident but an assassination (though his wife later told the U.S. embassy she believed it was in fact an accident).
In the end, Washington and Bishkek came to an agreement: $60 million a year. Another cable describes the endgame of that negotiation:
With regard to reimbursement for use of Manas, the Kyrgyz representatives argued that $40 million was insufficient. They asked for the amount to be increased. Ambassador [Jackson] McDonald [the lead State Department negotiator] said that he had consulted with Washington following yesterday's discouraging negotiations and was authorized to increase the offer to $52.2 million per year or three times the current reimbursement ($17.4 million). The Foreign Minister said that his recollection from the 2006 negotiations was that the $17.4 million amount was supposed to have been $20 million. He argued forcefully for three times $20 million for a total of $60 million. After extensive argumentation and based on the authorized ceiling of $75 million, Ambassador McDonald agreed to the sum of $60 million.
It's not clear when that money started to be disbursed, and if any of it could have materially helped Bakiyev's campaign.
Later that year, a Congressman from American Samoa, Eni Faleomavaega, visited Kyrgyzstan and revealed why he probably won't be allowed to negotiate future contracts with the Kyrgyz:
During his discussions with the deputy ministers, parliamentarians, and students, Chairman Faleomavaega recounted a meeting two years ago with Kyrgyz Ambassador to the U.S. Zamira Sydykova and other Kyrgyz officials in which they lamented the low level of payments they received for hosting Manas Air Base. Faleomavaega recalled telling them that if they thought the payment was not sufficient, then they should get serious and "kick us out." He was surprised in February when the Kyrgyz heeded his advice, and he told his interlocutors that he frankly thought that given the $900 billion the United States has spent in Iraq, we could easily afford another $60 million in payments for the base.
By then, though, the agreement had already been reached. On June 23, the U.S. embassy in Bishkek told EurasiaNet: "We applaud the decision by the Kyrgyz Republic to continue to play a key role, as the international community broadens and deepens its commitment to bringing stability and security to Afghanistan and the region."
The election campaign had just begun. The day before, the embassy wrote a cable describing the official kickoff of the presidential race:
With the campaign having officially started, we will now see how well-prepared the candidates are for the campaign and how extensively administrative resources are deployed for the benefit of incumbent President Bakiyev. Embassy will continue to monitor and report developments.
Bakiyev won the election (though he would be overthrown in street protests the next year). When the election was over, a U.S. embassy press release lamented that "the election failed to meet many of the Kyrgyz Republic's international commitments" and noted especially the "misuse of government resources"
There was no mention of what role the U.S., Russia or anyone else played in building up those administrative resources.
Joshua Kucera, a senior correspondent, is Eurasianet's former Turkey/Caucasus editor and has written for the site since 2007.
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