U.S. Intelligence Assesses "Threats" In Central Asia and Caucasus

What's the biggest "threat" emanating from the Caucasus and Central Asia? Every year the head of the U.S. intelligence community is required to give to Congress a "Worldwide Threat Assessment" describing all the things that could go wrong for the U.S. around the world. Yesterday, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper submitted this year's version (pdf), and our humble region got four paragraphs in the 30-page report. The facts in the report won't be news to readers of The Bug Pit, but what threats the intelligence community chooses to highlight are worth looking at:

The unresolved conflicts of the Caucasus and the fragility of some Central Asian states represent the most likely flashpoints in the Eurasia region. Moscow‟s occupation and military presence in and expanded political-economic ties to Georgia‟s separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia account for some of the tensions. Meanwhile, Tbilisi charged Russia with complicity in a series of bombings in Georgia in 2010 and 2011, while the Kremlin has been suspicious about Georgian engagement with ethnic groups in Russia‟s North Caucasus. Georgia‟s new constitution strengthens the office of the Prime Minister after the 2013 presidential election, leading some to expect that President Saakashvili may seek to stay in power by serving as Prime Minister, which could impact the prospect for reducing tensions.

Clapper doesn't say who the U.S. thinks is responsible for those bombings, only what Georgia's view is. He also isn't specific on what exactly the impact of Saakashvili "pulling a Putin," as Tom de Waal put it, would be on reducing tensions. Why be reticent on these points? The most likely answer is that, as this is a report for Congress, Clapper doesn't want to create any unnecessary political problems with the Russophobes/Georgiophiles there. So, as your mother says, when you can't say something nice, don't say anything at all. And overall, this is a surprising amount of attention to the problems that Georgia itself could cause, even if Clapper doesn't quite spell it out all the way.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region is another potential flashpoint. Heightened rhetoric, distrust on both sides, and recurring violence along the Line of Contact increase the risk of miscalculations that could escalate the situation with little warning.

The Bug Pit already predicted that Karabakh was a more likely source of conflict than anything else in the region, so Clapper probably ought to have led with this rather than Georgia. That's particularly true because war over Karabakh would arguably have a more direct effect on U.S. interests, namely the U.S. oil companies operating in Azerbaijan and the pipelines sending gas and oil from the Caspian Sea to Turkey and Europe.

Central Asian leaders are concerned about a Central Asian version of the Arab Spring, and have implemented measures to buttress their control and disrupt potential social mobilization, rather than implementing liberalizing reforms. The overthrow of the Kyrgyzstani Government in April 2010 and the subsequent ethnic violence in the country‟s south—the unrest in June 2010 left over 400 dead and led to a brief exodus of ethnic Uzbeks to Kyrgyzstan‟s border with Uzbekistan—show that instability can come with little warning in parts of Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan successfully held a peaceful presidential election in October 2011, but Kyrgyz authorities remain concerned about the potential for renewed violence in the country‟s south, and Uzbekistan‟s government has set up temporary shelters in the event of violence and another wave of refugees.

It's interesting that Uzbekistan is framed as part of the solution here, not as a potential problem, and doesn't mention the various problems its had with its neighbors, like the border skirmishes with Kyrgyzstan and the ongoing tension with Tajikistan, which has occasionally turned violent. Those continue to be ongoing threats -- not necessarily major ones, especially to U.S. interests, but they seem more significant than Uzbekistan's role as a home for ethnic Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan.

Central Asia‟s ability to cope with violent extremist organizations—especially militants based in Pakistan and Afghanistan—represents an additional focus, particularly in light of the planned US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. The region‟s violent extremism is also a growing security concern for Moscow. In 2011, Kazakhstan experienced labor unrest and minor clashes with militants, including the country‟s first-ever suicide attack in May. Tajikistan is particularly important due to its extensive border with Afghanistan and its history of internal and cross-border violence. In 2010, Dushanbe had to contend with small groups of militants, an indicator that Tajikistan is also potentially vulnerable.

In both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the source of the unrest would seem to be more local than originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Clapper seems to get this in the case of Kyrgyzstan, but of course that's something that's already happened. Hindsight...

The report also discusses Russia's ongoing military modernization at some length, and concludes that it's oriented towards projecting power in its near abroad:

The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that will allow the Russian military to more rapidly defeat its smaller neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet space, but will not—and are not intended to—enable Moscow to conduct sustained offensive operations against NATO collectively.

And he predicts a stalling of the U.S.-Russia reset, but not necessarily a rollback, which seems about right:

Putin has acknowledged that the “reset” with Washington has yielded benefits for Russia, suggesting he sees value in preserving a cooperative relationship. Nevertheless, Putin‟s instinctive distrust of US intentions and his transactional approach towards relations probably will make him more likely to confront Washington over policy differences.

Maintaining the positive momentum of the reset will also be harder because several areas of mutual interest, such as the New START agreement and cooperation on Afghanistan, have already been addressed. Russia continues to view the reset largely as a US initiative and believes that the onus is on the United States to demonstrate flexibility and make compromises to advance the relationship....

The Kremlin also will remain suspicious of US cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union.

For the first time, this year's report addresses "Mass Atrocities," and sadly Kyrgyzstan gets a mention in that section:

Violence against civilians also emerges in places where poorly institutionalized governments discriminate against minorities, socioeconomic conditions are poor, or local powerbrokers operate with impunity, as in Kyrgyzstan in 2010.

And there's an intriguing mention of "Eurasian organized crime" in the "Transnational Organized Crime" section:

The increasingly close link between Russian and Eurasian organized crime and oligarchs enhances the ability of state or state-allied actors to undermine competition in gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals markets, potentially threatening US national and economic security.

In general, the report seems to lean in the direction of imagining threats to the Caucasus and Central Asia from outside, like Russia or Afghanistan/Pakistan, while underemphasizing the more likely threats from within the region (Karabakh, internal instability/interstate conflict in Central Asia). Most U.S. policymakers dealing with the region understand this, but that may not have trickled up to the level of the high-level policymakers like Clapper, which could lead to some unfortunate policy moves down the road.