Turkey: Ankara, Tehran and the Nuclear Issue

As a complement to my Eurasianet article today about the growing regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran, you might also want to take a look at an International Crisis Group report released today about the politics surrounding Iran's nuclear program and what role Turkey might be able to play in brining about a resolution to the standoff between Tehran and the west over this issue.

Placing one’s eggs almost exclusively in the sanctions basket is risky business. There is a good chance they will not persuade Iran to slow its nuclear efforts, and so – in the absence of a serious diplomatic option including a more far-reaching proposal – the U.S. might well corner itself into waging a war with high costs (such as possible Iranian retaliatory moves in Iraq, Afghanistan and, through proxies, against Israel) for uncertain gains (a delay in Iran’s nuclear progress countered by the likely expulsion of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, intensified determination to acquire a bomb and accelerated efforts to do so).

Among countries uneasy with this approach, Turkey notably has stood for something different. It is highly sceptical about sanctions and rules out any military action. It believes in direct, energetic diplomatic engagement with a variety of Iranian officials. It is of the view that Tehran’s right to enrich on its soil ought to be acknowledged outright – a nod to its sense of dignity. And it is convinced that small steps that even marginally move the ball forward, even if far from the finish line, are better than nothing.

Ankara is not a central player, and its opposition to broad sanctions and support of dialogue are not dissimilar to the views of key actors such as Russia and China. But Turkey knows Iran well – an outgrowth of its long, complex relationship with a powerful neighbour. As a non-traditional power, anchored in Western institutions but part of the Muslim world, it can play to Tehran’s rejection of a two-tiered world order. This is not to say that Turkey is amenable to a nuclear-armed Iran. But it is far more sympathetic to the view that the West cannot dictate who can have a nuclear capacity and who cannot; is less alarmist when it comes to the status of Iran’s program; and believes that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is both distant and unsure.

But as the ICG's report (and my own article from today) make clear, the waxing and waning, centuries-old regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran is heating up again, particularly because of developments in Syria and Iraq, where the two countries are on opposite sides of the political divide. So while Turkey may be an ideal candidate to help bridge the gulf between Iran and the west, the question that the ICG report fails to address is whether this growing rivalry between Ankara and Tehran may ultimately undercut Ankara's ability to play the role of the trusted interlocutor in the eyes of the Iranians.