Eurasia Insight:
FSB DIRECTOR PATRUSHEV INTERVIEWED ON WORK OF RUSSIAN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
10/11/07
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from BBC Monitoring

Text of interview with Army General Nikolay Patrushev, director of the Russian Federal Security Service, by Argumenty i Fakty Chief Editor Nikolay Zyatkov: "Counterintelligence: Today Spies Are Caught like This..."report by Russian weekly Argumenty i Fakty on 10 October

Russia today is the object of close attention from several dozen foreign intelligence services. Army General Nikolay Patrushev, director of the Russian [FSB] Federal Security Service, talked to Argumenty i Fakty Chief Editor Nikolay Zyatkov about the kind of secrets that foreign spies seek and how Russian counterintelligence works.

[Zyatkov] Nikolay Platonovich, what is the reason for the increase in foreign special services' intelligence activity with respect to Russia in recent years?

[Patrushev] Foreign intelligence services' activity with respect to our state has always been on a large scale, and their level of activity has not declined. In the process the leading foreign powers' expenditure on maintaining their special services is increasing annually by 15-20 per cent. They are primarily interested in information about the political and socioeconomic situation in Russia and the steps taken by the country's leadership aimed at strengthening the state, territorial integrity, and the economy and at defending national interests in the international arena, including reactions to developments in the CIS countries. Foreign intelligence agencies are especially interested in the state of combat readiness, the progress of the reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces, primarily their nuclear missile component, the development of the defence industry complex, advanced models of weaponry and military hardware, promising scientific research, the situation in the N! orth Caucasus and regions of the Far East and Siberia, and raw materials and their transportation infrastructure.

Significant efforts by foreign special services are currently aimed at obtaining information about the situation relating to the upcoming State Duma and Russian Federation presidential elections. They have shown great interest in the disposition of political forces, data characterizing candidates for deputy and for the head of the country, and opposition activity. In addition, they are attempting to influence protest sentiments and actions in Russia in a way that benefits the leadership of their states.

In addition to this, politicians who still think in Cold War terms continue to retain their positions in a number of Western powers.

Considerable efforts are being made in the spirit of the Brzezinski school to prevent Russia becoming an equal participant in international relations, and claims are being made against our territories and national assets. Giving themselves the credit for the disintegration of the USSR, they are now nurturing plans aimed at dismembering Russia. They see the special services and organizations as a pretty effective instrument for implementing them.

Georgia and Poland in the service of the CIA

[Zyatkov] Which states' special services are particularly active in this respect?

[Patrushev] Despite the global changes that took place in the late Eighties and early Nineties of the last century, which everybody knows about, the special services of the NATO states continue to be extremely active with respect to Russia. In this category one should specially single out Britain, whose special organs not only conduct intelligence in all areas but also seek to influence the development of the domestic political situation in our country.

The Turkish special services, which are seeking to create and develop positions among the political elite and representatives of big business in Russian regions with concentrated populations of Muslims, also stand out for their actions. The Pakistani intelligence service is seeking to gain access to military and dual-purpose technologies and also to obtain information about Russia's military-technical cooperation with a number of countries.

The CIA and the SIS (the principal intelligence agencies of the United States and Britain - editor's note) are continuing to involve their partners from Poland, Georgia, the Baltic countries, and certain others in their work in the Russian sector.

[Zyatkov] It is surprising that the Polish, Baltic, and especially the Georgian special services are operating actively against Russia.

[Patrushev] What is surprising about it? The American and British special services exert a serious influence on the special organs both of those states and of some other East European countries. This applies to the broadest spectrum: from personnel training and budget distribution to the selection of strategic areas of activity and the direct organization of joint intelligence measures.

For the benefit of the interests of their "senior partners" and in accordance with the ad hoc considerations of their countries' political leadership, the above-mentioned intelligence services conduct operations that extend far beyond the framework of their national interests .

Thus, on the territory of the said countries work has been initiated whose objective is to recruit Russian citizens, and operations to liaise with the network of agents are conducted. In the process some of the American and British allies operate extremely aggressively. In addition, individual officials from the Georgian special services are not averse to maintaining ties with the criminal community and to making increasingly frequent use of it in intelligence actions and various provocations.

[Zyatkov] Information about British intelligence failures has been appearing frequently in various sources recently....

[Patrushev] In countering British intelligence we have always taken into consideration its centuries-long traditions and enormous experience in agent work. We know both its strong and its weak aspects. Since the times of Queen Elizabeth I SIS officials have been guided by the principle that "the end justifies the means." Money, bribery, blackmail, and release from punishment for crimes committed are their principal recruitment methods.

Agents that our counterintelligence service has exposed at various times have held quite high official positions. They include former responsible officials Skripal from military intelligence, Obukhov from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Gordiyevskiy and Oyamyae from external intelligence.

At the same time, in order to achieve certain political objectives, the British have recently gambled on people accused of committing crimes who are hiding abroad from Russian justice. Readers will undoubtedly remember the stories in various media about how Russian citizen Vyacheslav Zharko went to the security agencies with a statement about his recruitment by SIS officers with the active involvement of Berezovskiy and Litvinenko.

All this could not fail to impact on the quality of the work of British intelligence - hence too the failures.

Spies include military personnel and academics

[Zyatkov] Which Russian FSB components are directly engaged in counterintelligence?

[Patrushev] The principal tasks in countering foreign states' special services are entrusted to the Counterintelligence Service, whose title speaks for itself. In addition, it is involved in providing operational cover for the state border and, in conjunction with other Russian FSB components, safeguards the security of foreign states' missions on the territory of our country and also of Russian establishments and citizens abroad in cooperation with interested departments.

A considerable role in protecting information that constitutes a state secret and combating scientific, technical, and economic espionage belongs to the Economic Security Service. The safeguarding of security in the Armed Forces, including the countering of foreign intelligence services, is handled by the Military Counterintelligence Department. Countering foreign special services' attention towards the security agencies themselves is handled by the Internal Security Directorate.

Territorial security organs, security organs in the troops and other troop formations, and operational-technical and scientific and technical structures organize their activity under the leadership of those components. As a whole it can be said that all our components are involved to some extent or other in counterintelligence activity.

[Zyatkov] And what are the results of their work?

[Patrushev] During the period since 2003 more than 270 active cadre officers and 70 agents of foreign intelligence services have been uncovered, including 35 Russian citizens. Criminal actions by a further six citizens of our country who had been intending to pass state secrets to foreign special services on their own initiative were prevented.

As examples one might cite the exposure and sentencing to long prison terms of the above-mentioned Oyamyae, Skripal, and Obukhov, and also Sypachev, Dumenkov, Smal, Beloshapkin, Zaporozhskiy, and others.

This year alone we have put a stop to the activity of 14 cadre officers and 33 agents of foreign states' special services. In particular, a court found former serviceman Shabaturov, who from 1999 cooperated with the intelligence service of one of the West European states and provided it with information about a number of Russian military intelligence officials, guilty of committing a crime covered by Article 275 of the Criminal Code (treason). Very recently, on 12 September, Arsentyev, a former official from one of the Russian Ministry of Defence's scientific research institutes, who passed state secrets to a foreign special service, was convicted under the same article. A criminal case against yet another person is currently being examined in court, and three others are being investigated.

The rock with an electronic filling

[Zyatkov] What new kinds of espionage equipment are foreign intelligence services using?

[Patrushev] Intelligence services strive to provide their agents with specialist equipment developed on the basis of the latest scientific achievements enabling them to operate clandestinely.

For example, liaison operations represent one of the vulnerable points in special services' activity, and so the closest attention is devoted to technical support for these.

In particular, such technical devices were utilized by officers from the SIS field station who operated under cover of diplomatic posts at the British Embassy in Russia and were exposed in December 2005.

The British special services' technical innovations also include a special device disguised as a laptop battery that operates on the same frequencies as the majority of cell phones. The British provided one of their agents with one. The field station officer, while at a distance and without coming into direct contact with his agent, was able to read off information from the "battery" and transmit his own information. In addition, the Russian citizen was given a programme that enabled him to work on the computer without leaving any trace on the hard disc.

Foreign intelligence agencies are also attempting increasingly frequently to make particular use of the potential of the Internet.

[Zyatkov] In recent years we have often heard that foreign intelligence services are using non-governmental organizations in their work....

[Patrushev] The arsenal of foreign special services does indeed include the practice of utilizing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) both to obtain intelligence information and also as an instrument for exerting covert pressure on political processes. It is possible to find examples of this by analysing the events that occurred during the so-called "colour revolutions" in Ukraine, the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, and some other countries. A considerable role in these was played by youth organizations, whose members were trained using foreign money.

There is also the threat of de facto subversive activity against Russia being financed through the opportunities available to individual foreign NGOs. This activity often springs from international terrorist organizations that utilize individual NGOs in their own interests, in particular to provide financial support for bandit formations in the North Caucasus. We take all this into account when organizing our counterintelligence activity.

We also attentively study foreign experience. Thus, in the United States of America a new procedure has been developed for the US Agency for International Development for providing grants to NGOs which stipulates tighter control over their activity, including by the special services. This will enable American competent organs to prevent funds that are allocated to NGOs being used to the detriment of their country's national security.

[Zyatkov] How has the situation changed with the operation of the new Russian law on nongovernmental organizations?

[Patrushev] The amendments made to this statutory legal act relate to statewide measures to regularize the activity of NGOs. They do not affect the rights of the Russian FSB - we have been given no additional functions or powers.

I would especially like to note that we understand the important role played by nongovernmental organizations in developing and strengthening civil society in our country and have an interest in their activity. But the attention of the counterintelligence service is attracted by those NGOs or their personnel who engage in illegal activity in our area of responsibility. For example, there cannot be attempts to obtain illegal access to state secrets or other actions that threaten Russia's security. Naturally, this kind of activity is very far removed from their officially stated objectives.

The common enemy of Russia, the United States, and Britain

[Zyatkov] You have repeatedly stressed the importance of international cooperation among special services in the conditions of the growth of terrorist threats. How can this be reconciled with the work of the counterintelligence service?

[Patrushev] Despite the acuteness of the confrontation with foreign intelligence services, we understand very well that there are areas where special services need to cooperate; this relates primarily to the fight against international terrorism.

In our opinion, we have managed to develop a pretty effective system of international cooperation. Today the steady trend towards expanding its scale is continuing. Our service maintains active contacts with 136 security agencies and special services from 76 countries.

We have developed the closest relations with colleagues from the CIS countries within the framework of the Council of Heads of Security Agencies from those states. In recent years our partners from the Far Abroad have been displaying increasing interest in its work. Thus, representatives of the Italian, French, German, and Spanish special services are invited to Council sessions as observers. In addition, we also utilize the cooperation mechanisms available through the working organs of the G-8, UN, EU, and OSCE institutions, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other international or regional organizations. Cooperation in the border sphere is also expanding - the effectiveness of the work of the Border Committee of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Council of CIS Countries' Border Troops Commanders, the Council on Border Issues of the Eurasian Economic Community Member States, and a number of other structures, is improving.

The development of partnership relations is served by the broader-format events that the Russian FSB organizes on an annual basis - the international conferences of leaders of special services, security agencies, and law-enforcement agencies. Representatives of 53 countries and 4 international organizations participated in the work of the sixth conference, which was held in Khabarovsk on 6-7 September. In the course of this meeting there was a constructive and extremely useful exchange of opinions on the most topical problems of the fight against terrorism.

Editor’s Note: Source: Argumenty i Fakty, Moscow, in Russian 10 Oct 07