A controversial, opaque US defense initiative to make payments to Taliban fighters who renounce violence has been extended until September 2012. While a large, but unspecified amount of funding is devoted to the program, no one appears to be keeping track of how the money is being spent.
A portion of the funds for the program, which is designed to draw off non-ideological elements from the Taliban, comes from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) [7]. An additional $50 million is set aside separately under Section 1216 of the 2011 defense budget to assist “low level Taliban” reintegration into Afghan society.
When EurasiaNet.org sought information from the Defense Department on how reintegration payments were being tracked, Pentagon representatives referred questions about CERP funds and payments to Taliban militants to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. In turn an ISAF representative explained that the financial structure of its reintegration initiative “is still being constructed.” He went on to say that government officials in Afghanistan, a country that experts say is among the world’s most corrupt [8], have a say in who gets the money and how much.
ISAF claims the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) [9] “continues to show promise” and that “several hundred” militants have signed up since the program started operating last year. But it could be “months” before any financials come to light, Gary Younger, an ISAF Public Affairs Officer in Kabul, admitted.
“There is no answer yet, nor do I expect one for months. As candidates formally step in [to] the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program, they are generally eligible to receive a small transition package which includes food, clothing and a minimal amount of money,” Younger said.
“Provincial and district governors set the level of package, but monetarily we're talking about maybe $100-$120 a month for 90 days, which isn't a lot of money,” he continued. “I can't even confirm at this point whether all who joined the process have received anything.”
Younger could not put a total figure on the payouts to date, noting that “there are a variety of sources for these funds, to include the provincial/district governors’ accounts, UNDP, [Strengthening Peace Program, Provincial Reconstruction Teams] and possibly local provincial/district peace committees.“
“Provincial/district governors haven’t really tapped the Reintegration Trust Fund to any great extent,” he added.
Foreign fighters and criminals are excluded from the reintegration program. CERP funds are available to non-Afghan nationals and are dispersed with apparently no oversight.
Analysts maintain that financial incentives are unlikely to induce a majority of Taliban militants into laying down their arms, an assertion reinforced by the increasing level of violence [10] in 2010 in Afghanistan. Re-integration cash also remains vulnerable to fraud and abuse [11], experts believe.
Leonid Gusev, an international relations expert in Moscow, said that while it is necessary to “establish at least some dialogue” with the Taliban, he cautioned that a reintegration strategy is unlikely to make a significant difference in efforts to contain the Islamic militant insurgency. “[Reintegration programs] are a stop-gap measure. It’s not a far-sighted policy,” Gusev said. “Eventually, negotiations with the Taliban to get them involved in the management of Afghanistan will have to start because the current government is weak. Negotiations have broad international support.”
Candace Rondeaux, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst in Kabul, said reintegration programs face a number of significant hurdles. “CERP funding has been and always will be problematic because of the distorting affect it has on the political-economy of the country,” she said. “The lack of oversight for CERP funding is one of just many problems -- there's little evidence that commanders on the ground understand the economic and political dimensions of the projects they fund and that has serious implications in terms of efforts to reduce grievances and rivalries in insecure areas of the country.”
While US and NATO policymakers now see reconciliation and reintegration as the most practical way at this point to stabilize Afghanistan, this strategy stokes “deep skepticism” inside nascent Afghan government security structures, Rondeaux said.
“Particularly vexing for many Afghans is the perception that the Taliban are essentially being rewarded for bad behavior,” she said. “And for those handful of Afghan security officials who do support the policy of reintegration there are still concerns that there are too many mixed messages on the question of amnesty for acts committed while engaged in hostilities with the Afghan government.”