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        Tajikistan News 5-13 June, 2001

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IRIN
TAJIKISTAN: US issues travel warning after terrorism convictions

DUSHANBE, 6 June, (IRIN) - On 29 May, the United States warned its
citizens against travelling to Tajikistan due to a potential threat of
armed militants raiding the country. "There have been reports indicating
that an incursion by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into
Tajikistan may occur again this year," the State Department said in a
statement. The Afghan-backed IMU threatens to destabilise the region,
allegedly in pursuit of the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Central
Asia.

"Although the political climate has improved, the situation remains
unpredictable. American citizens resident in Tajikistan are urged to
consider their personal security and safety in view of this warning," the
statement cautioned. It urged Americans to particularly avoid areas along
the borders with Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, the Karategin Valley and
Tavildara District.

This warning was disseminated several hours after a New York court
convicted four men - supporters of the Saudi dissident and international
terrorist Usama bin Ladin - on charges of conspiring to kill Americans in
the bombing of two US embassies in Africa in 1998. Since the bombings,
American employees of the US Embassy in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, have
been temporarily resident in the neighbouring Kazakh capital, Alma-Ata,
from where they periodically travel to Tajikistan.

An official response from authorities in Dushanbe immediately followed the
US State Department warning. The secretary of the Security Council of
Tajikistan, Amirqul Azimov, told IRIN that the US announcement warning its
citizens against travelling to Tajikistan had occasioned regret. According
to Azimov, the situation in the country was under the full control of the
authorities. "We are for our citizens visiting the United States, and the
US citizens coming freely to Tajikistan," he said.

The Tajik official maintained that against a backdrop of expansion of
relations with new the US administration, such a warning from the State
Department would only cause regret and perplexity. Moreover, during his
recent visit to Tajikistan, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central
Command, Tommy Franks, referred to "significant progress" made by
Tajikistan over the past eight years in establishing peace and democracy,
and deemed it appropriate to expand bilateral relations.

Employees of the US Embassy in Dushanbe told IRIN that over the past seven
years the State Department had issued similar warnings on a regular basis.
Staff have been recommended to avoid eastern areas of Tajikistan, from the
Kofarnihon District, 20 km to the east of Dushanbe, up to Garm District,
300 km to the east.

As Semyon Grigoryev, political adviser to the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Tajikistan, told IRIN,
employees of the mission have not been ordered to observe the warning
issued by the US State Department, and their travels throughout the
country have not been curtailed.

Meanwhile, some international organisations have been avoiding travel to
the Rasht Valley in the Karategin area, which was unstable until last
August. In June last year, the chairman of the Garm District, who was
formerly one of the leaders of the former United Tajik Opposition (UTO),
Sergey Davlatov, was killed there.

In early summer last year, members of a unit of the elusive IMU, led by
Juma Namangani, were staying in the Tavildara District along the border
with Kyrgyzstan, but, after negotiations with a government commission,
they left for Afghanistan.

In late August, the Tajik government forces launched an operation against
the armed group of Mullah Abdullo, a former non-affiliated field
commander, who eventually surrendered and returned to civilian life. Tajik
officials maintain that since then the situation in this previous pocket
of instability has been under government control.

In May this year, a new pocket of tension sprang up in the Kofarnihon
District, where skirmishes between the former combatants of the UTO and
local law enforcement agencies broke out. According to Tajik Interior
Minister Khumdin Sharipov, these clashes were sparked by family quarrels,
which ultimately resulted in hostage-taking and civilian deaths.

Although the Tajik authorities affirm that the situation in Kofarnihon is
now under the full control of the government, the United Nations
Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building (UNTOP) has expressed concern over the
potentially volatile situation in the district.

However, the UN Secretary-General's special representative for Tajikistan,
Ivo Petrov, told IRIN that security officers were continuing to visit the
area regularly to conduct talks with local residents and former UTO
combatants who have been reintegrated into civilian life. Petrov plans to
visit the Kofarnihon District within the next few days.

UNTOP Political Officer Waldemar Rokoszewski said that the US was not the
only country warning its citizens against travelling to Tajikistan.
Despite these warnings, experts maintain that the security situation in
the country, especially in Dushanbe, has improved over the past two years.
The uniformed armed personnel and cars with tinted glass have all but
disappeared from the streets of the city.

Life in the post-conflict period is nearing normality, although the
skirmishes in Kofarnihon in May and the assassination of First Deputy
Minister of Interior Habib Sanginov have tarnished the country's image.

The government of Tajikistan and international organisations present in
Tajikistan are endeavouring to change that image for the better, though
experts predict such a change will be a long time coming.

CENTRAL ASIA: IRIN Focus on threat by Islamic militants
ISLAMABAD, 5 June (IRIN) - After two years of violent clashes between
security forces and Islamic militants, Central Asia is bracing itself for
a resumption of hostilities this summer. The extent of this year's
violence will be largely determined by the actions of the elusive Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). But while regional security forces have been
strengthened in anticipation of clashes, theories on the motives of the
IMU and the threat posed by it are divergent.

The IMU leadership claims that its goal is to replace Uzbekistan's secular
government with Islamic rule. "Our aim is to overthrow the existing power
in Uzbekistan, to free hundreds of our jailed brothers and sisters -
Muslims of Uzbekistan - and to create in Uzbekistan a regime in which
people can freely practise their religion," the IMU co-leader, Tahir
Yuldash, told Radio Liberty in Prague in a rare interview following
clashes in Kyrgyzstan in 1999. He added that his militants had launched a
large-scale operation, which, he threatened, would escalate.

Uzbek and Kyrgyz officials dismiss the IMU as a criminal gang, heavily
involved in drug trafficking and determined to bring about regional
instability. Bolot Januzakov, head of the Kyrgyzstan security service,
told IRIN that the IMU was "a bunch of criminals that use Islamic slogans"
with the aim of destabilising the region to facilitate drug trafficking
through Central Asia. There was strong evidence linking the militants to
elements in Afghanistan, from where they had received weapons and
training, he said.

A US military delegation, following a recent visit to the Ferghana Valley
- which straddles three borders and is home to 10 million Tajiks, Uzbeks
and Kyrgyz - reached the conclusion that the IMU threat was insignificant.
In a report released by the Pentagon in April, US Lt-Col William Lahue
said that whereas the IMU "did not pose a significant threat", there was a
real "danger of social havoc", especially in the Ferghana Valley, which
suffered from acute poverty and high unemployment. Lahue said Islamic
groups had accordingly been able to feed off the resulting discontent and
attract local volunteers to their cause. The region needed economic reform
in order to stop the spread of radical Islam, Lahue maintained.

Claims by local analysts concur that the militant movement appears to be
gaining momentum as it engages support from moderate Muslims who are
unemployed and disillusioned with the post-Soviet authorities. Ahmadjan
Saipjanov, a journalist in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, told IRIN that the militants
had been taking advantage of the widespread disillusionment following the
break-up of the former Soviet Union. "The IMU is following the Tajik peace
talks scenario. During the Tajik civil war, the IMU were fighting
alongside the United Tajik Opposition against the government. They learnt
intricate tactics from their Tajik compatriots, and are applying these in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan," said Saipjanov. Although the IMU leadership
has repeatedly stated that it wishes to overthrow the Uzbek government,
Saipjanov said the militants may have a more pragmatic aim - to force the
Uzbek government into a power-sharing arrangement similar to that in
post-civil war Tajikistan.

The five-year civil war in Tajikistan only ended in 1997 when President
Emomali Rahmonov was forced to negotiate with the Islamic United Tajik
Opposition (UTO). A reconciliation process eventually led to a
power-sharing agreement, with the opposition taking a 30 percent stake in
the new government. Saipjanov's view was that the IMU, which had fought
alongside the UTO during the civil war, had a similar agenda in
Uzbekistan. According to Saipjanov, IMU military action against the
security forces maintained pressure on the authorities, while a high
incidence of hostage-taking was aimed at raising worldwide awareness in
the hope of bringing international pressure to bear on the Uzbek
government.

A former UTO representative and now a Tajik official, Sharif Hikmatzade,
confirms this view. He urges Uzbekistan to find a legal and constitutional
solution. "Uzbekistan's government should create a legal, constitutional
way for Juma Namangani [the IMU leader in charge of field operations] to
play some role in Uzbekistan's political arena," he said. Hikmatzade
believes that a viable political role for the IMU in Uzbekistan would
render the need for violence redundant. However, the response of the
regional authorities to the IMU has been heavy-handed. They have cracked
down on religious groups and perceived militant sympathisers.

After heavy clashes with militants last year, the Kyrgyz government
sharply increased military spending to strengthen its security forces.
There has also been a proliferation of security agreements throughout
Central Asia to improve cross-border cooperation in combating militancy
and illegal activities. Kyrgyzstan's interior ministry estimates that
about 80 people were detained last year for illegally distributing
religious propaganda. Of these, 39 have received jail sentences for
violating article 299 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the incitement
of religious hatred.

But while tightening security arrangements may address the symptoms, many
observers stress the need for the root causes of insecurity - poverty and
disillusionment - to be addressed. Investigative journalist Ahmed Rashid
said the ranks of the IMU were continuously swelling, because regional
governments had failed to provide their peoples with stable economic
development and employment opportunities.

According to local opinion, it will take more than security measures to
address the widespread disillusionment. Janybek Berdiev, unemployed in
Batken, Kyrgyzstan, described the results of the discontent which could
potentially swell the ranks of Islamic militant movements. "Many young
people have left Batken for Bishkek [the Kyrgyz capital] and Osh. Those
who stayed are desperate for money. Several people joined Juma [Namangani]
last year because of money. They say they are paid in dollars," he said.
UNDP estimates that the unemployment rate has reached 80 percent in the
Ferghana Valley.

Another Muslim organisation, the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party), is
seen as sympathetic to the IMU. The movement was founded in Palestine in
1953 and aims to unite all Muslims under a single caliphate with an
administration to be governed by Shari'ah (Islamic) law. The movement is
banned in most countries, but in Uzbekistan's part of the Ferghana Valley
it has increasing support from men between 25 and 30 years of age.

Igor Rotar, an analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, met members of the
Hizb ut-Tahrir in May. "My new acquaintances created an impression of
honest young men with fanatical convictions, somewhat reminiscent of the
young communists of the 1920s. They were so certain of the importance of
their arguments that within an hour they tried to convert me to Islam," he
said. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir professes to be pacifist, members have
admitted that there would be ready support for the IMU if it ever managed
to penetrate the Ferghana Valley.

However, it appears that the Uzbek government has finally realised that
countering the threat may take more than tough security measures. Uzbek
President Islam Karimov has announced an amnesty for young people involved
in religious groups, according to Uzbekistan's Turkiston Press Agency.
Rahmatulla Saidazimov, Uzbek language instructor at Ferghana State
University, told IRIN that the authorities had also embarked on
educational projects in the hope that secondary education would steer
young people towards secular rather than religious studies. "The main goal
was to attract young and unemployed people to some form of schooling, and
to keep them busy studying," he said.

THE TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA
A Peaceful Movement for Islam Spreads in Central Asia
BISHKEK, June 7 (The Times of Central Asia)--A non-violent, peacefully inclined
Islamic movement is making surprising gains in Central Asian nations with
repressive governments. Hezbe Tahrir, or Liberation Party, relies on personal
contact and persuasion--not terror--to achieve its goals. Analysts say that for
this reason, the movement could pose more of a danger to Central Asian governments
than the typical armed rebellion.

The underground Hezbe Tahrir envisions a universal caliphate that would peacefully
absorb all Muslims under Sharia rule. The movement, conducted in the strictest
secrecy--with no more than five members in each group, or cell--is spreading
rapidly in Central Asia, said Vladimir Socor, Munich-based analyst for the
Jamestown Foundation of Washington.

"It is moving from its original operating base in southern Kyrgyzstan into many
other parts of Central Asia," Socor said. "The main reason for the growth is that
it does not confront its recruits with the prospect of engaging in criminal
activities. At this stage, they are merely asked to engage in peaceful activities,
such as spreading propaganda through leaflets. Even repressive authorities have
been unable so far to pin criminal charges on Hezbe Tahrir," Socor said. "It is
very seldom that authorities can claim to have found weapons or drugs on arrested
members of Hezbe Tahrir. They almost invariably find leaflets, and that is what
keeps Hezbe Tahrir activists more or less protected from criminal prosecution."

That contrasts with the armed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU, which seeks
to overthrow the governments of Central Asia by force. Socor said its leaders, who
grew up in Soviet Uzbekistan, follow a classical revolutionary-elitist strategy.
They are thus more narrowly based than the Hezbe Tahrir and less well adapted to a
post-Soviet Muslim society.

Muriel Atkin, a professor of history at Georgetown University, said the repressive
policies of Central Asian governments may be helping Hezbe Tahrir get new recruits.
"Regimes there that arrest people on the flimsiest grounds, on charges of
involvement in radical Islamic politics, are sending the message that there is no
way to dissent peacefully in the political system and no way to have any hope of
working for peaceful change within the political system," Atkin said. "And that is
bound to drive at least some of the folks who are discontented to look for groups
that want to work outside the system."

Professor Atkin said Hezbe Tahrir has received little international attention
because of a general hostility to Islamic fundamentalist movements. "Repressive
secular governments are considered preferable to the uncertainties of Islamic rule.
They have not been under great pressure because there is so much international
concern about the so-called Islamic fundamentalism, and some of it is really worth
being worried about," Atkin said. "Labeling everything a regime does not like as
'Islamic extremism' might buy international acquiescence to repression, but it is
creating an explosive situation." And that, according to Atkin, explains the
explosive growth of Hezbe Tahrir.

RFERL

ADB TO INCREASE AID TO TAJIKISTAN
Following talks in Dushanbe on 8 June with Tajikistan's President Imomali
Rakhmonov, Asian Development
Bank President Tadao Chino told journalists that his organization will
provide additional funds to help cover Tajikistan's budget deficit and
to fund programs aimed at reforming the agrarian sector and poverty
reduction, Asia Plus-Blitz and ITAR-TASS reported on 11 June. The ADB
and the Tajik government signed a Memorandum of Understanding last year
whereby the bank undertook to provide Tajikistan with new low-interest
loans totaling $120 million in 2001-2003. LF
UZBEKISTAN CUTS GAS SUPPLIES TO TAJIKISTAN
Senior Tajik energy sector official Mirzo Qulov told Asia Plus-Blitz on 11 June
that
Dushanbe is negotiating with Tashkent for a resumption of natural gas
supplies from Uzbekistan that were suspended last week due to nonpayment
of debts totaling 8 million somonis ($3.4 million). He said limited
supplies of gas will resume "soon." LF
TAJIK RAILWAY OFFICIALS SEEK TO RESOLVE DISPUTE WITH
KAZAKHSTAN
Senior Tajik railway officials traveled to Astana on 6
June in an attempt to clarify the reasons for the Kazakh government's
decision to suspend rail transit from Tajikistan via Kazakhstan to the
Russian Federation as of 10 June, Asia Plus-Blitz reported. The Russian
Communications Ministry has expressed concern at the imminent disruption
of that service, which Astana says is due to Tajikistan's unpaid debts.
Kazakhstan suspended rail transit from Tajikistan last year because of
unpaid debts, unsanitary conditions on Tajik trains, and the number of
passengers traveling without valid tickets. LF

OSCE
Chairman-in-Office offers win-win partnership to Tajikistan
DUSHANBE, 7 June 2001 (OSCE) -- The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Romanian Foreign
Minister Mircea Geoana, today offered a partnership to Tajik authorities, inviting
them to continue and strengthen OSCE values in the country. The OSCE offered to act
as a catalyst between the dynamic evolution in other Euro-Atlantic organizations
and Tajik concerns. As part of a visit to Central Asia, Mr. Geoana was in Dushanbe
where he met the President, the Prime Minister, the Chairmen of both Chambers of
the Tajik Parliament, as well as with representatives of political parties and
movements, non-governmental organizations, national minorities and media outlets.
"Last December, the OSCE-Japan Conference on comprehensive security showed a
positive response from the international community to Tajik concerns. Tajikistan
has one foot in the door of international understanding. We offer to help you widen
the path", said Mr. Geoana. He volunteered to help foster international community
assistance to Tajikistan and the region. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office noted that the
decade since independence in 1991 had been a particularly difficult period for
Tajikistan, and that important progress had been made. He encouraged the Tajik
authorities to continue to abide by OSCE standards in the fields of security and
democracy. Mr. Geoana, asked Tajik authorities to help OSCE assist on various
issues, such as strengthening public and civil services, securing adequate freedom
of the media, fostering the protection of minorities, reinforcing an independent
and impartial ombudsman system, as well as bolstering a constructive dialogue with
opposition political parties.
On security, Mr. Geoana welcomed Tajik support for a regionally co-ordinated
approach to countering terrorism and other cross-border threats (such as organized
crime, trafficking in drugs, weapons, and human beings). He also invited Tajik
authorities to follow up on last October's Tashkent Conference on regional security
and stability, and offered the OSCE's expertise in the collection of small arms and
light weapons.
On the human dimension, Mr. Geoana encouraged the continuation of political
dialogue in the spirit of national reconciliation, which facilitated the peace
process. He also supported efforts by the authorities to support the Tajik women's
NGO sector. With local elections approaching, Mr. Geoana asked for the
recommendations on the last parliamentary elections submitted by the OSCE Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to be implemented.
On the economic front, Mr. Geoana stressed the close link between
confidence-building, economic development and governance. "Good governance and
transparency are key instruments for promoting economic growth and increasing
investment", said Mr. Geoana.
As earlier in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE Chairman in Office promoted a
regional approach to tackle common problems. In this respect, he strongly supported
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's concept of a Trans-Asian Parliamentary Forum
designed to bring together parliamentarians of Central Asia, as well as those from
the Asian Partners for Co-operation to discuss various developments in Central
Asia.
Concluding his various discussions and the development of the partnership concept,
Mr. Geoana said: "You have to help us make your case stronger."
The OSCE has been present in Tajikistan since 1994. Its mandate includes supporting
political reconciliation, democracy building and respect for human rights in
Tajikistan. In particular, the OSCE maintains contact with and facilitates dialogue
and confidence building between regionalist and political forces in the country. It
promotes respect for human rights and monitors adherence to OSCE norms and
principles. The OSCE also promotes ways and means to assist in the development of
legal and democratic political institutions and processes.

EURASIANET
The Caucasus and Central Asia in U.S Foreign Policy
Fiona Hill: 6/8/01
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from The Brookings Institution
<http://www.brook.edu/default.htm>
The Caspian Basin and the surrounding states of the Caucasus and Central Asia have
crept from obscurity onto the U.S. foreign policy agenda. While the individual
countries of the two regions may not be of vital interest to the United States, the
countries that border them are. Four have nuclear weapons, one is an important NATO
ally, and two are states that have posed direct challenges to U.S. security by
their support for terrorist movements.
There is great potential for interstate conflict involving these border countries.
So even if the United States did not consider the Caucasus and Central Asian states
of vital interest, it might be drawn in by the actions of others. Keeping the
regions off the crisis response list should be a priority for the U.S. and Western
governments.
A number of developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia underscore the need for
the United States and its allies to pay closer attention to the area around the
Caspian Basin. The border states of Russia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China and,
more distantly, Pakistan and India, have close links with the region and are
critical to U.S. foreign policy. The Caspian Basin itself has become one of the
principal points of tension in U.S.-Russian relations, and the Caucasus and Central
Asia are focal points for a range of issues on America's global agenda: the rise of
militant Islamic groups, international terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking,
human rights abuses, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian disasters, environmental
catastrophe, and energy security.
In the next two years, the Caucasus and Central Asian states could become zones of
interstate competition similar to the Middle East and Northeast Asia. Economic and
political crises, or the intensification of war in Chechnya or Afghanistan, might
lead to the "Balkanization" of the regions. This, in turn, could result in military
intervention by any of the major powers. Given the fact that both Turkey and Iran
threatened intervention in the Caucasus at the peak of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in
1992-1993, this risk should be taken seriously.
Unfortunately, the Caucasus and Central Asian states lack the capacity to tackle
crises without outside help. Economic collapse has produced social dislocation and
extreme poverty. Widespread corruption and the entrenchment of aging leaders and
their families have eroded support for central governments and constrained the
development of a new generation of leaders. The internal weakness of the Caucasus
and Central Asian states, combined with brutal regional wars, makes them extremely
vulnerable to outside pressure-especially from Russia. Although Russia itself is
weak, it is far stronger than all the states combined, and while its direct
influence over their affairs has declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
it remains the dominant economic, political, and military force.
The West will have to assist the states in bolstering their institutional capacity
and in promoting cooperation among them. American engagement remains crucial given
its weight on the international stage, the potential threats to its own security,
and the fact that it has leverage in the regions. In spite of a few glitches, the
Caucasus and Central Asian states have been receptive to the United States and are
among its few potential allies in a zone where other states are not so amenable to
U.S. activity. Regional countries need American moral and material support to
maintain independence in the face of increasing pressures, and its guidance in
dealing with presidential transition crises and addressing human rights abuses.
Even with limited political and financial resources, U.S. leadership can do a great
deal to defuse regional tensions and mitigate problems. However, this will only be
possible if a policy is defined early and communicated clearly, if there is a
particular focus on partnership with European allies in addressing regional
challenges, and if Russia is encouraged to become a force for stability rather than
a factor for instability in the regions.
The Caucasus and Central Asia at a Crossroads
This is a critical time for the Caucasus and Central Asian states because a number
of negative trends could converge to bring about a crisis. Responding to that
crisis requires the United States to build a long-term strategy based on a frank
assessment of regional needs and of U.S. capabilities and resources.
The Clinton administration's approach to the regions was ad hoc. It tackled a
laundry list of initiatives in response to crises and shifting policy priorities.
Issues such as oil and gas pipelines, conflict resolution, and human rights were
targeted at different junctures, but an overall strategy-which was essential given
limited government resources for the regions-was never fully articulated. As a
result, American priorities were not communicated clearly to local leaders,
resulting in frequent misinterpretations of intentions. Domestic constituencies in
the United States undermined leverage in regional conflicts. Incompatible
government structures and conflicting legislation fostered competition among
agencies and encouraged a proliferation of parallel initiatives, while
congressional mandates limited areas in which scarce funds could be applied and
thus reduced flexibility. The new administration must get ahead of this negative
trend in setting policy and priorities, while tackling U.S. government deficiencies
directly. In crafting policy, several developments need to be considered:
* The civil war in Afghanistan will likely regain momentum this summer.
Already, the incursion of refugees and fighters from Afghanistan into Central Asia
and the activities of Central Asian militant groups have strained fragile political
situations in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.
* Governments in Central Asia are violating human rights as they clamp down
on Islamic groups in response to acts of terrorism and militant activities. In
Uzbekistan, the closing of mosques, a ban on political opposition movements, and
arrests of practicing Muslims have forced groups underground and increased support
for insurgencies and extremists.
* In Chechnya, the war shows little sign of resolution through political
negotiation. Refugees and fighters have been pushed across borders into the South
Caucasus by Russian troops, as well as into neighboring Russian regions. As in
Afghanistan, an intensification of the war in Chechnya is likely this summer.
* Other Caucasus civil wars are in a state of "no peace, no war." Recent
international efforts to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, led by the
United States, France, and Russia, have raised expectations for a peace settlement.
But, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, opposition figures openly discuss the
resumption of war if leaders are perceived to have sold out.
* Georgia is teetering on the verge of collapse, overwhelmed by internal
difficulties and burdened by the inability to combat corruption and tackle economic
reform. The dual secessions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have split the country
and spillover from Chechnya has soured relations with Russia. In winter 2000,
Russia imposed new, stringent visa requirements on Georgia and temporarily
suspended energy supplies over payments and a contract dispute, increasing pressure
on the beleaguered country.
* In both Georgia and Azerbaijan, political succession has become a critical
issue. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan will soon face the same crisis. No
provisions have been made for a presidential transition, and emerging leaders have
often been suppressed or forced into exile.
All of these issues are exacerbated by the continued downturn of regional
economies. The Asian and Russian financial crises of 1998 were a major setback,
leading to the devaluation of currencies, untenable debt burdens, and the
withdrawal of foreign investment. Deep-rooted corruption feeds into the economic
crisis and hinders the emergence of small and medium-sized businesses that could
spur market development and economic growth.
For both regions, Russia is the only source of reliable employment, a significant
market for local products, and, in the short-term, the principal energy supplier.
In Georgia alone, approximately 10 percent of the population currently works in
Russia and sends home an amount equivalent to nearly a quarter of Georgia's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). This influx of economic migrants has exacerbated ethnic
tensions within Russia. Because regional governments cannot pay their energy bills,
clashes over energy with Russia will continue, increasing tensions and instability.

In Central Asia, high unemployment fosters the smuggling of raw materials and
consumer goods, and trafficking in arms and drugs. Eighty percent of heroin sold in
Europe originates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and about half of this production
flows through Central Asia. The heroin trade in Central Asia has created a
burgeoning intravenous drug problem and an HIV/AIDS outbreak that mimics the early
epidemic in Africa. Health workers fear an escalation in a matter of months that
will overwhelm local medical systems and the region's miniscule international
programs. A major HIV/AIDS crisis would be the final straw for states like
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
U.S.-Russian Tensions in the Caspian Basin
Converging with this regional crisis is a sharp difference of opinion between the
United States and Russia over U.S. involvement in Caspian energy development and
engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Moscow, the United States is
portrayed as purposefully weakening Russia's strategic position and bent on
establishing Central Asia and the Caucasus as U.S. outposts. Where American
policymakers speak of intervention in a positive sense to promote regional
cooperation and stability, Russian political commentators speak of American
"vmeshatel'stvo"-literally, negative intervention-to constrain Russia. The United
States and Russia are at odds politically and semantically in the Caspian.
Because approximately 50 percent of Russia's foreign currency revenues are
generated by oil and gas sales, the Putin administration has made increasing
Russian energy exports to Europe a priority. Caspian energy resources play a major
role in Russian calculations. Gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan flows into the
Russian pipeline system, where it supplies the Russian domestic market and
supplements Russia's European exports. Russia is the largest supplier of gas to
Turkey, and has begun constructing a new Black Sea pipeline ("Blue Stream") to
increase supplies. But gas flowing to Turkey from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Azerbaijan-and bypassing Russia-could pose direct competition. Over the last five
years, U.S. policy in the Caspian Basin has promoted multiple gas and oil pipelines
to world markets to increase export options for regional states, persuading Moscow
that the United States seeks to squeeze Russia out of regional energy development.
Beyond energy issues, Russia sees itself caught between NATO to the west and chaos
to the south. In the Caucasus, Russia has lost its strategic defensive structures
against NATO's southern flank in Turkey. Moscow perceives this loss as significant,
given NATO expansion east and the alliance's willingness to use force in the
extended European arena. Explicit statements of intent to join NATO by Georgia and
Azerbaijan have angered Russian policymakers, along with the active involvement of
regional states in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, and the formation of a
regional alliance among states that have opted out of the Russian-led Commonwealth
of Independent States security structures (the so-called GUUAM group of Georgia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova).
Although Central Asia is less a zone of competition because of shared concern about
Afghanistan, which resulted in unprecedented U.S.-Russian collaboration on UN
sanctions against the Taliban in December 2000, U.S. bilateral military relations
with regional states still alarm Moscow. The fact that an energetic Pentagon moved
faster than the State Department to engage Central Asian counterparts has led
Moscow to view U.S. actions in both regions with deepening suspicion.
Crafting U.S. Policy
To address these issues, the Bush administration will first have to recognize that
the Caucasus and Central Asia are a major factor in U.S.-Russian bilateral
relations. Russia does not only view its dealings with the U.S. through the prism
of NATO, missile defense, and non-proliferation issues, although these are
currently the United States' top security priorities in the relationship. Russia's
southern tier is now its most sensitive frontier and the Caucasus and Central Asia
are its number one security priority.
Having recognized this fact, the Bush administration must present a unified front
when dealing with Moscow and the region, and prevent the various agencies from
acting in conflict with each other. The administration needs to articulate a
message that is positive and inclusive for Russia as well as regional states and
stick to it. It should emphasize regional stability, cooperative relations,
political solutions to conflicts, border security, human rights, institutional
development, orderly successions of political power, anti-corruption efforts, and
opportunities for citizen participation in political and economic decisionmaking.
Although this framework would not be considerably different from the general themes
of the Clinton administration, the notion of explicitly recognizing the importance
of the Caucasus and Central Asian regions in the bilateral U.S.-Russian
relationship-and staying focused-would be a departure. The primary goal should be
to encourage Russia to adopt a positive approach to relations with its neighbors
that eschews commercial and political bullying. To this end, the administration
will have to maintain a direct dialogue with its Russian counterparts in working
out a practical approach for the Caucasus and Central Asia.
With its message clear, the administration needs to bring its bureaucratic
mechanisms in line to focus on key issues and countries. Even if responsibility for
the Caucasus and Central Asian states is divided within government departments,
effective structures will have to be created to preserve links between the regions,
and conflicting legislation will have to be streamlined to resolve interagency
conflicts over responsibilities. This will require the executive branch to work
closely with Congress to reconcile appropriations with a comprehensive program for
the regions and to articulate U.S. interests through public hearings and testimony.
If the administration has appropriate mechanisms in place, some policy innovations
should be considered to address regional problems:
Rethink the U.S. Approach to Central Asia
The Central Asian states require the most serious reassessment in U.S. policy.
Central Asia is rapidly becoming a base for extremism and terrorism, and the U.S.
needs to look ahead to avert its "Afghanicization." The pivotal states for regional
security are Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which both border Afghanistan. The United
States has bilateral military relations with Uzbekistan, but is barely present in
Tajikistan, where permanent U.S. representation has been withdrawn because of fears
for the safety of Embassy personnel. The Bush administration must change the
American approach to both countries by emphasizing human rights and cooperative
regional relations in Uzbekistan (rather than simply security), and by increasing
its focus on Tajikistan.
Productive relations between Uzbekistan and its neighbors are key to regional
stability. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have significant Uzbek diasporas and are
dependent on Uzbekistan for cross-border communications and energy supplies.
Uzbekistan has frequently used this leverage to negative effect with these
vulnerable neighbors. The United States should encourage high-level discussions
between Uzbekistan and its neighbors that would address border access and gas
deliveries as well as militant incursions across the Tajik and Kyrgyz borders into
Uzbekistan.
Of all the regional states, Tajikistan is the most receptive to outside assistance,
serving as a potential model for dealing with Islamic and political opposition. The
Tajik government engaged its opposition in a dialogue that resulted in
power-sharing arrangements and an end to a five-year civil war. Given the
precipitous decline of the Tajik economy, even the reestablishment of a permanent
U.S. embassy-with appropriate security precautions-and a modest increase in aid
programs related to job creation and health would be a major boost.
Link Human Rights and Security
As a general rule, the administration should engage Central Asia without
reinforcing authoritarian regimes. In Uzbekistan, while militant groups are real
threats to the state, human rights abuses are an equal threat and increase sympathy
for the militants. The United States has considerable leverage with Uzbekistan
through its military engagement activities. In 2000, Uzbekistan came close to
losing congressional certification for these programs, and the Pentagon placed
greater emphasis on human rights in its special forces training curriculum. Taking
this as a cue, the Bush administration should emphasize mutually-reinforcing
security and human rights objectives throughout Central Asia and should encourage
cooperation among the Pentagon, State Department, and international human rights
groups on security-human rights linkages. The administration should also emphasize
U.S. support for regional non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that seek to
increase both citizen participation in government and access to objective sources
of information.
Spotlight HIV/AIDS in the War on Drugs
While the United States and international organizations have paid some attention to
tackling drug trafficking in Central Asia by funding border security and local
interdiction efforts, the public health dimension has not been addressed. The
growing HIV/AIDS epidemic along drug routes in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Kazakhstan threatens to undermine the region's meager economic and political
achievements. The emergent public health crisis must be part of the U.S. and
international agenda for the region and funding should be allocated for HIV/AIDS
prevention programs and for NGOs working directly with intravenous drug users,
women's groups, and regional youth.
Factor in Other Regional Players
During the Clinton administration, the United States had an Osama bin Laden policy
but no Afghanistan policy, and increasingly lost sight of a wider Central Asian
policy as Afghanistan-related security concerns increased. But without stability in
Afghanistan, local governments can do little to tackle the movement of militant
groups or drugs and arms trafficking across the Afghan border. Active U.S.
engagement with Pakistan is key to addressing the crisis in Afghanistan. Likewise,
Iran is an important player in the dynamic of Caucasus and Caspian energy politics,
but was routinely excluded from regional calculations by U.S. policy. A
rapprochement between the United States and Iran would effect a seismic shift in
regional geopolitics and pave the way for increased cooperation among the states of
the Caucasus and Central Asia. When crafting its strategy, America must consider
how bilateral relations with all the neighboring countries will effect developments
in the two regions.
Engage Europe
Central Asia and the Caucasus have become Europe's backyard, and the European Union
and key states like Germany are beginning to formulate long-term plans for
engagement with the regions. Over the next decade, if Turkey and the Eastern
European and Baltic States accede to the Union, Russia will be the only country
separating an expanded Europe from Central Asia and Afghanistan. As North Sea
energy reserves diminish, Europe will also put greater emphasis on Caspian energy.
Given limited resources, the United States should work with European allies to
identify a long-term strategy for the regions that is targeted to respond to their
most acute needs and not just to the priorities of donors. The European Commission
has a substantial aid program and has spent almost one billion Euros in the
Caucasus alone since 1991. But the Commission is bureaucratic and slow, and
European diplomats acknowledge that assistance has been poorly targeted with little
positive effect on regional stability and development. The United States may not be
able to work directly with the Commission, but many European Union member states
have bilateral assistance programs and could be brought into task forces for
individual states. The United States has already cooperated with France on conflict
resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, and with Great Britain and Germany in providing
security assistance to Georgia. Close German relations with Russia and increasing
German interest in Central Asia offer additional opportunities for a transatlantic
dialogue on regional stability.
Work With Europe to Seek a Political Solution in Chechnya
Chechnya is one of the primary threats to regional stability and the linchpin in
Russia's relations with the South Caucasus. Without movement toward a solution, the
war will drag on, bringing Russia into increasing confrontation with Georgia and
Azerbaijan, and exacerbating an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in the
Caucasus. Chechnya deserves as much international attention to resolution as
Northern Ireland and Palestine, but the United States and Europe have frequently
been at odds in their approach. In its dialogue with Russia, the Bush
administration should continue to emphasize the importance of a political solution
to end the war, and keep the issue high on the transatlantic agenda.
Maintain the General Thrust of Energy Policy
The Clinton administration spent significant political capital on promoting
multiple oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian and the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline across the Caucasus to Turkey. Pipeline diplomacy
often overshadowed other American initiatives in the regions. As a result, some
American policy analysts propose that the new administration step back from this
policy. But, after five years of intensive engagement, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan is
already a regional political reality, even though it has yet to be built.
Repudiating this policy now would be tantamount to a repudiation of U.S. engagement
in the Caspian and relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, the strategic
partners in the venture. The general policy should continue, but it should be
brought in line with broader economic development priorities and initiatives that
address the immaturity and fragility of regional political institutions.
Editor's Note: Fiona Hill is a fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution.This article appeared originally on the Brookings Institution website -
<http://www.brook.edu/default.htm>

ISLAMIC FAITHFUL CONCERNED THAT HIV/AIDS AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS CLASH WITH TRADITIONAL
VALUES IN CENTRAL ASIA
Alisher Khamidov: 6/7/01
Central Asian governments, with the help of international donor organizations, are
becoming increasingly active in HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. [For background, see
the Central Eurasia Project's Eurasia Policy Forum </policy_forum/index.shtml>].
However, the increase in programs designed to stop the spread of the virus is a
cause for concern among some Islamic clergy and practicing Muslims, especially in
the Ferghana Valley. State campaigns encouraging safe sex and tolerance for
homosexuals and prostitutes are seen by the faithful as clashing with traditional
values.
Since the 1991 Soviet collapse, religious leaders in the region have voiced concern
over deteriorating social values in their communities, linking the moral decline
with the post-Soviet penetration of Western pop culture and vices. They consider
the spread of HIV as perhaps one of the most tangible signs of the population's
spiritual degeneration. Government campaigns to promote awareness, they add, do not
address the root causes of the proliferation of infections, namely the popular
drift away from Islamic values. A return to a traditional lifestyle would be the
best way of containing the disease, some clerics suggest.
Islam's influence is widespread in the Ferghana Valley, a region of nearly 9
million inhabitants divided among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Indeed,
authorities view the valley as a hotbed of radical Islam, underscored by the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's insurgent activities of the past two summers. When
roughly 20 new HIV-positive cases were reported recently in the Kyrgyz city of Osh,
which has a population of about 250,000, some local religious leaders said that the
HIV infections were an indicator of the spreading decay of societal values.
"The reason for these evil troubles is lack of faith, discipline and purity among
those who lead corrupt lives influenced by foreign lifestyles shown on cinema,
video and newspapers. If all people in society followed Shariat, if all people
feared God's anger, then all these problems would not appear in the first place,"
said Mahamadjan Mamadjanov, former imam of Central mosque in Osh.
Many officially-sponsored imams have helped officials spread word about HIV/AIDS
awareness and prevention programs. At the same time, such programs have been
attacked by unsanctioned and more radicalized religious groups, especially the
Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The eradication of the disease requires the elimination of Western
influences, many radicals feel. In recently published leaflets, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir
condemned public campaigns to promote safe sex through the use of condoms. The
religious group also attacked local officials for being corrupt and unable to solve
societal problems, including the spread of drug addiction and prostitution.
The sensitivities of religious leaders over HIV/AIDS harm reduction projects are
shared by many ordinary citizens. Several media awareness/prevention campaigns have
met strong popular resistance, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In response
to popular disapproval, and fearing a loss of audience share, many local media
outlets have dropped HIV/AIDS awareness public service advertising, in particular
those containing explicit references to sex.
"In most towns of the Ferghana Valley, sensitivity about practices connected with
sex is traditionally high," said Yusup Tavakilov, a journalist based in the Uzbek
city of Andijan. "In many families, while watching the TV, if there is a porno
scene, or anything that implies sex, they will switch to another channel.
Otherwise, it creates embarrassment for family members."
Some Hizb-ut-Tahrir activists are taking matters into their own hands. In May, a
band of mounted young people, using sticks and kamchi (lashes), swept through one
of Osh's main thoroughfares, Ulitsa Kyrgyzstana, to disperse prostitutes who had
gathered on street corners. Witnesses noted that raiders yelled at girls and
constantly shouted "Allah Akbar." In a private conversation with a local
journalist, Hizb-ut-Tahrir members indicated they would continue to take such
measures against prostitutes, implying they do not believe that authorities have
the will or the desire to address societal problems.
In response to the Hizb-ut-Tahrir action, police in Osh staged a more brutal raid
on local prostitutes. Authorities arrested dozens of women and subjected them to
humiliating HIV testing procedures. A local television news crew was allowed to
film the process, and to report on it in the evening news. In an interview with the
TV correspondent, a chief officer in charge of the operation said the raid was part
of a new anti-AIDS campaign. He added that the crackdown on prostitution would be
ongoing. The raid provoked an outcry from many local non-governmental
organizations, including Medicins Sans Frontieres.
Editor's Note: Alisher Khamidov is the director of the Osh Media Resource Center in
Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
Book Review: New Volume Examines Central Asia's Economic Development
Thierry Malleret: 6/8/01
Central Asia and the New Global Economy
Edited by Boris Rumer, 2000
M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, England
288 p.
Reading Central Asia and the New Global Economy is a must for anybody who professes
an interest in this particular region. The book does a superb job at exploring two
themes - the dissimilarity among the Central Asian republics on the one hand, and
the region's lack of a sustainable economic framework on the other. However, it
falls short of answering some of the core questions regarding globalization's
effects in the region.
Central Asia does not constitute an homogeneous entity. As Boris Rumer puts it in
the preface of the book, "it is becoming increasingly apparent that an approach to
Central Asia as an integrated region is simply irrational and groundless." Indeed,
relations between states in the region are tense, and are becoming increasingly so.
This intra-regional tension in turn affects the situation in the individual
countries. More and more, the quest for stability is pursued to the detriment of
democracy and the rule of law.
In addition, the ten years of transition undergone by the five Central Asian
republics have not laid the foundation for sustainable development. Even if most of
the countries recorded rapid growth last year, barriers to long-term growth exist
in all five countries. Deep structural reforms, large-scale privatization and much
improved law enforcement will be needed to unleash their potential.
However, having digested these two dimensions, a reader may be frustrated by the
book. Central Asia and the New Global Economy is too often on the verge of giving
wrong approximations and says very little about the globalization process itself.
Herein lies the book's primary limitation: it is too descriptive, and not
analytical enough. On the rare occasion that it does become analytical, the
analysis leads to statements which are hard to swallow. Too many false premises
tend to blur the analysis. For example: "a realistic scenario for the next five to
ten years cannot envision Kazakhstan turning into a major oil exporter" (p. 160)
and "Uzbekistan has a set of preconditions that would allow it to enter upon a
trajectory of efficient market development" (p. 162). In both cases, this is
precisely the opposite of what is actually happening. The author would have been
wiser to give these a second thought.
At times, the analysis is plainly wrong. For example, on page 192 we read that "the
top-priority goal of national states consists in reducing the negative current
account of the balance of payments." This is nonsense. In reality, a successful
transition economy would be expected to run a current account deficit along its
transition path, simply because a current account is in deficit either when
investment is high or saving is low (based on the familiar accounting identity M-X
= I-S: imports minus exports = domestic capital formation minus total domestic
saving). As the past ten years of transition have demonstrated, successful
transition economies tend to be associated with high investment and high
consumption (or low saving). Therefore, finding a transition economy that
persistently balances its current account would be surprising, as a surplus simply
indicates that savings exceed investment - obviously the wrong course for an
economy in dire need of capital. This does not mean, of course, that any level of
current account deficit is acceptable. At 9.2 percent in 2000 and 9.3 percent in
2001 (projection), the current account deficit of Kyrgyzstan is unsustainable.
Several chapters have been written by Stanislav Zhukov, a senior research associate
at IMEMO in Moscow who occasionally lapses into an often awkward Soviet style of
writing. His chapters are full of astonishing sentences such as: "The active
intervention of the state into the economic process is an absolute necessity...The
experience of Kazakhstan and especially Kyrgyzstan, demonstrate that blind
adherence to the principles of laissez-faire does not hold out good prospects" (p.
171). Kazakhstan is the region's best performer, and this is due to a substantial
extent to the strong reform credentials of the government and the National Bank.
But laissez-faire? Where in Central Asia has Stanislav Zhukov identified a single
laissez-faire policy? In all transition economies, in fact, too much state has
proved to be a greater obstacle to reform than anything else.
The book's core proposition is that countries in Central Asia are heading south.
This is certainly possible; but again, this may be true for some, but not all:
Kazakhstan might prove to be a pleasant surprise. The idea that the "new global
economy" relates to external balances permeates the book, and this limited
assumption tells the reader very little about globalization and the way in which it
will affect the development of these countries. Globalization is difficult to
define, but it is mostly about open markets and free trade. It also entails more
openness, transparency and greater accountability. It therefore goes much further
than the economy in the strictest sense, and this is precisely what the book is
lacking: an explanation of what the massive implications of globalization are going
to be for businesses and societies.
Globalization is cumulative, creating a very brutal trade-off between quicker
prosperity and greater insecurity. Also, it exercises pressure by accentuating both
the benefits of good economic policy management and the costs of inappropriate
policies. Will globalization deliver the goods in Central Asia? Probably not - the
governance structure is against it. Unfortunately, the book tells us next to
nothing about this.
Editor's Note: Thierry Malleret is the director for Europe and Central Asia of the
World Economic Forum. The views expressed in this book review do not necessarily
reflect those of the World Economic Forum.
Tajik-Uzbek Relations: Divergent National Historiographies Threaten To Aggravate
Tensions
Igor Torbakov: 6/12/01
Tajik-Uzbek relations are marked by increasing rancor. The latest evidence of
tension is Uzbekistan's decision to cut natural gas supplies in early June because
of Dushanbe's debt of about $3.5 million. In recent months the two countries have
also quarreled over Tashkent's mining of the common border in an effort to prevent
Islamic militants from infiltrating Uzbekistan from Tajikistan.
Another potential source of hostility is connected to divergent national
historiographies. Efforts by both countries to forge distinct identities in the
post-Soviet era are a source of considerable friction between peoples who have
co-existed relatively peacefully in the same region for centuries.
Prior to the 19th-century Russian invasion of Central Asia, notions of ethnicity
and nationality were largely alien to the peoples of the region. It was only after
the 1917 Bolshevik revolution that large-scale social engineering, popularly known
under the label of "national delimitation" (natsional'noe razmezhevaniye) occurred
in 1924-1925.
Large chunks of Central Asian territory were turned into "sovereign republics" and
given the names of "titular nationalities." This is how contemporary Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan came into being. However,
during the Soviet era, distinct national identities could not develop properly due
to the specific policies pursued by Moscow, featuring stringent centralized
control.
In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the elites of the newly independent Central
Asian states utilized historical scholarship to help forge distinct national
identities. The creation (or re-creation) of useable past became a preoccupation
for local intellectuals, striving to service the political needs of the new
nations' leaders. This effort, however, contributed to the aggravation of the
already uneasy relationship between some peoples in the region, in particular
between Tajiks and Uzbeks.
Uzbeks and Tajiks have much more in common in terms of shared history and culture
than Kyrgyz and Turkmen do with them, or with each other. The first cities in
Central Asia were undoubtedly Persian. Yet by the 14th century, Turkic culture,
too, had firmly established itself in the region. The result of the interplay of
cross-cultural currents was a unique Turkic-Persian sedentary civilization where
peoples, languages, traditions, and symbols were to the great extent intermixed.
The populations of the oasis towns in the Bukhara emirate and the khanates of Khiva
and Kokand were mixed and almost totally bilingual. This sedentary Tajik-Uzbek
population would invariably identify themselves first through religion, and then
through region and social position. "The settled peoples of Central Asia regard
themselves first as Muslims and then as inhabitants of any given town or region;
ethnic concepts having virtually no significance in their eyes," noted Vasiliy
Barthold, Russia's leading specialist in Oriental studies in as late as 1927.
The Soviet experiment in the "socialist nation-building" launched the process of
destruction of pre-modern Tajik-Uzbek cultural coexistence. Today, the emergence of
the independent states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has inexorably turned the two
historically intertwined peoples into regional rivals. The raison d'etat and the
political desires of local elites keen to legitimize their power have unequivocally
dictated the construction of two separate political identities. To facilitate this
process the writing of two distinct national histories has become a must.
For a variety of reasons the designers of the Soviet "national delimitation" in
Central Asia discriminated against the Tajiks, having deprived the newly formed
republic of Tajikistan of the two most important centers of Tajik urban culture -
Bukhara and Samarkand - which were awarded to Uzbekistan. In the words of William
Beeman, professor of anthropology at Brown University: "The Tajik situation in some
ways resembles that of post-colonial Africa. Tajiks have been given an impossible
piece of territory with disparate population and have been forced to make a nation
out of it."
In contrast, Uzbekistan, due to Bolshevik planners' generosity, has emerged as the
most powerful state in Central Asia, with the richest cultural-historical
background. Given the uneven starting conditions, it is not surprising that Uzbek
and Tajik intellectuals resort to the different historiographic strategies. It is
also noteworthy that the historians of both nations draw heavily on the scholarly
traditions of the previous, Soviet, generation of local scholars.
In constructing their own ethnic historical narrative, the present-day Uzbek
intellectuals make use of the history of the territory paradigm, which was
elaborated by the historians of Soviet Uzbekistan. This approach implies that the
cultural heritage of a certain ethnos comprises all historical names, persons and
artifacts pertaining to the territory that the given ethnos currently inhabits.
This strategy makes it possible to depict an uninterrupted continuum of "Uzbek"
history from the ancient times to the present. Thus, the written texts and the
monuments of material culture of the ancient Khorezm and those located in the lands
between Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers are said to be produced by the Uzbek genius,
despite the fact that the Uzbeks started conquering these territories only in the
end of the fifteenth century. No wonder that the ruthless Turkic (although not
Uzbek) ruler of the fourteenth century, Amir Timur (Tamerlane), has become the
principal historical hero of the Uzbek master narrative. Every Uzbek city has now a
street named after him, there is a huge Timur museum in the center of Uzbek
capital, and his formidable statues adorn the public parks in Samarkand (Timur's
capital) and Tashkent.
In the same vein, contemporary Uzbekistan - an artificial creature created by the
Bolsheviks - is being portrayed as nothing other than essentially a Greater
Bukhara. Again, the history of the territory approach comes in quite handy. A
Samarkand part of Russian/Soviet Turkestan, together with the Tashkent region and
the larger chunk of the Ferghana Valley plus most of the historical Bukhara emirate
and the pieces of Khiva did indeed make up a new state formation.
Tajik scholars, having to deal with the rump of their historical territory, cannot
rely on a similar approach. "Their strategy," says Rustam Shukurov, a specialist in
Tajik historiography at the Moscow University, "was to write the history of Tajiks
viewed as the history of living ethnos with fluctuating, historically conditioned
borders." The foundation of this analytical paradigm was laid down by Bobojon
Ghafurov, the first secretary of Tajik communist party in the 1940s-1950s and,
later, director of the Moscow-based Institute of Oriental Studies.
According to Ghafurov, the geography of Tajik history by no means corresponds with
the geographical borders of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. To be sure, this
was an open challenge, which caused a veritable barrage of criticism from the
champions of history of the territory approach. Ghafurov's intellectual influence
can be traced, too, in the decision of the Tajik government to celebrate in 1999
the 1,100th anniversary of the Samanid dynasty. The Samanid empire (whose principal
city was, by the way, Bukhara, now in Uzbekistan) existed for about 200 years in
the 9th and 10th centuries, and, arguably, played a crucial role in the development
of the Persian culture. Being aware of the dearth of statist elements in Tajik
past, the authorities in Dushanbe have willingly embraced the Samanids as a
cultural symbol of Tajik civilization.
At the same time, Tajik academician M. Shakuri has recently attempted to combine
influential self-identification concepts to reconceptualize the idea of "Great
Khorasan" as a cultural-geographical region. Great Khorasan is a territory that
comprises present-day Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In the
Persian-speaking world Khorasan was traditionally regarded as the cradle of Iranian
culture. In the opinion of Moscow historian Shukurov, the significance of the
"Khorasan concept" is twofold. Firstly, the Tajik historical narrative again
spreads far beyond Tajikistan's current borders, "thus confirming its opposition to
the history of the territory strategies." Secondly, argues Shukurov, the Soviet
term "Tajik" is, in fact, being replaced by its "Khorasan" equivalent - a term
sanctified by tradition and, for any representative of the neo-Persian
civilization, rich in cultural and historic symbolism.
Current Uzbek and Tajik historiographies are on a collision course. The Uzbek
application of the history of the territory approach has, as its indirect political
implication, placed pressure on the Tajik minority in Samarkand and Bukhara to give
up its ethic identity, and register as Uzbek. Meanwhile, the Tajik vision of the
national past as the history of living ethnos, no matter what its current state
borders are, appears to imply that Tajiks are, so far, unprepared to reconcile
themselves with the loss of the major centers of the ancient Tajik-Persian
civilization.
Editor's Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist who specializes in CIS
political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD
from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was a Regional Exchange Scholar at the
Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC,
1995; Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of
Sciences, Moscow, 1988-1997; and Kiev correspondent for the Paris-based weekly
Russkaya mysl, 1998-2000.

Poverty a Crucial Element Leading to Tension and Violence in Central Asia - Experts

Erin Finnerty: 6/12/01
In an Open Forum sponsored by the Open Society Institute on June 11, two experts
identified poverty as a - perhaps the - critical ingredient in the increasingly
violent tension in Central Asia. Dr. John Schoeberlein presented the findings of
the most recent International Crisis Group report, "Incubators of Conflict: Central
Asia's Localised Poverty and Social Unrest" at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Fiona
Hill, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, participated as discussant, drawing
from her May 2001 Policy Brief, "How the United States and its Allies Can Stave off
a Crisis."
In his presentation on the report's findings, Dr. Schoeberlein asserted that
poverty alone does not cause violence, but that it can be a crucial element leading
to tensions or violence in Central Asia. The issue of access to land, water,
markets and jobs are all long-standing characteristics of a devastated post-Soviet
economy that jeopardizes Central Asia's stability.
His findings also point to the governments' and international actors' need to
readdress poverty in Central Asia. The tradition of focusing poverty-fighting
efforts at the macroeconomic level has thus far failed to resolve the problem; a
localized approach is called for instead. This need is hindered by a general
reluctance to admit to the economic problems and a lack of the resources necessary
to address them. It is not enough to help the governments of Central Asia to
control the movement across borders. In fact, this policy of strict control can
exacerbate and lead to greater tension in border regions, as in the case of
Uzbekistan's mining of its borders.
Dr. Hill pointed out that in many post-Soviet conflicts, including
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as those in Central Asia, the
most important common denominator is poverty. Central Asian governments have done
little to combat poverty, and the NGO sector is not able to compensate for this
lack of government action.
Dr. Hill went on to identify the most critical points in the debate on
hyper-depression. The first is the large number of unemployed young men. In some
areas of Central Asia, as many as 95 percent of male high school graduates are
unable to find employment. Their lack of opportunity for employment, coupled with
easy access to weapons, creates conditions of potential violence. Secondly, the
corruption at border crossings discourages legal trade and retards economic growth.
Thirdly, public service reform is necessary for a reduction in bloated, ineffectual
bureaucracies. Finally, very nearly all of the legislation enacted to stop drug
trafficking across borders is detrimental to legal trade, as border guards use drug
trafficking as an excuse to extract bribes from everyone crossing the border,
including legal traders. Without open borders, the region's economies are unable to
revive.

WATER SHORTAGE IN CENTRAL ASIA AND RE-ROUTING OF SIBERIAN RIVERS TO CENTRAL ASIA
Abdukhalil Razzakov
As a result of severe drought, water has become an acute problem in Central Asia.
Governments, international agencies and others are trying to find a solution to
this problem. The proposal to re-route Siberian river of Ob-Irtish to Central Asia
evolved already in 19th century. This proposal was never realized, but recently
resurfaced. The question was reportedly brought up during the official visit of the
Uzbek President Islam Karimov to Russia in early May. Can Ob-Irtish be the panacea
for Central Asia's water problems?
BACKGROUND: The end of 20th century and the beginning of 21st has seen serious
drought in Central Asia and adjoining regions. The water problem has never been so
acute in the post-independent history of the Central Asian states. The ecologic
situation in the Aral Sea basin is disastrous; only one third of the Aral Sea's
surface remains. Economic hardships in the region do not allow governments to deal
properly with these issues: none of the five Central Asian states has achieved the
production level of 1990. Agricultural production is low. For example, Uzbekistan
produced only 3 million tons of raw cotton in 2000, compared to 4-5 million tons in
previous years. This is not a unique problem. The distribution of water among
upstream and downstream countries has always been a thorny issue. Central Asian
history also has experienced serious water clashes. Sources show that Samarkand and
Bukhara fought a war over rights to the Zarafshan River. Generally speaking,
upstream countries tend to capitalize on their advantageous geographic location.
According to many sources, the drying up of the Aral Sea is not a new phenomenon.
For instance, ancient Greek sources do not mention the Aral Sea at all. Academician
L. Berg argues that in 1848-1880 level of Aral Sea was very low, but that it
subsequently recovered. B. Fedorovich has argued that the Aral Sea did not even
exist 18,000 years ago. The present drying of the sea began in early 1960s, with
the massive agricultural expansion of Central Asia singled out as the main reason.
In the early 20th century, however, American geographer Hantington, who visited the
region, came up with the 'theory of progressive drying' of the Central Asian
region. The famous Russian climatologist Voyeykov held the view that the drying up
of the Aral Sea is not dangerous because water is vaporized there without any use.
But the majority of theories supported the opposite view. Thus, Russian academician
Middendorf in 1880-1881 came to the conclusion that the region would in the future
face a shortage of water and natural fertilizers. The proposal to re-route Siberian
rivers to Central Asia was first suggested in the 1880s; over time, various other
suggestions were offered to solve this problem. Middendorf's prediction is
nevertheless being proved right now. If in the 1950s the Aral Sea watered around
2,9 mln. hectares of land, now this is approximately 7 mln. hectares.
IMPLICATIONS: The search for a solution to this problem gathered momentum during
the perestroika period. Firstly, effective water usage techniques were sought, but
taking into consideration the scope of the problem, various proposals of re-routing
Siberian rivers to Central Asia have been developed. Obviously, such proposal had
its supporters as well as detractors. The main points of the proposal included,
first of all, channeling 25-27 cubic kilometers of water to the Aral Sea from the
Ob-Irtish - that is an amount roughly equivalent to the annual inflow of water to
the Aral Sea). This would amount only to 6-7 % of the Ob-Irtish's total waters.
Various 'patriots' opposed the idea. Some Russian experts argued that would 'worsen
the ecologic situation', while a few Americans and Canadians feared that the level
of the Northern Atlantic would diminish as a result, thus affecting shipping
through Northern route. But this does not account for global warming. There is a
fear of an increase in level of world oceans, which would threaten many coastal
states, including large countries such as Russia, the United States and Canada.
Re-routing of a portion of Ob-Irtish waters would hence if anything be beneficial
to global water issues. Recently Western Michigan University Professor Phillip
Miklin supported in general the re-routing of Siberian rivers to Central Asia. He
argued that this decision would be inevitable not only for agricultural reasons,
but also for social reasons. Gradually, the proposal of re-routing the Ob-Itrtish
to Central Asia has resurfaced.
The 1990s saw the break-up of the Soviet Union and the creation of 15 independent
states. Governments seem more exacerbated with problems connected to economic
growth, the elimination of poverty and other transitional problems except ecology.
But for over 10 years no tangible improvements have taken place. It has become
clear that water shortage problems cannot be effectively solved by any of the
states of the region, and a broader international involvement is necessary. Dozens
of international conferences and seminars may have been held by aid agencies, but
unfortunately empiric data shows no signs of a real improvement of the situation.
CONCLUSIONS: Although it seem ambitious, the re-routing of Ob-Irtish appears to be
the only tangible solution to ecologic and other problems caused by drying of the
Aral Sea. In order to minimize negative consequences of this project, it is
necessary to cover the bottom of the prospective channel with concrete or direct
the water through pipes.
Environmental problems are inter-connected with the broader economic and social
problems of Central Asian states. True integration among five states is a key to
success in any sphere. Given the international interest in improving the situation
in and around the Aral Sea and the lives of peoples that live around it, the
international community could conceivably provide funding to support a project,
provided regional states will be able to come up with a tangible and coordinated
project of re-routing Ob-Irtish to Aral Sea.
AUTHOR: Dr. Abdukhalil Razzakov is a Professor at the Tashkent State Economic
University. His doctoral dissertation was devoted to water issues in Central Asia
and he writes extensively on the subject. He is a member of the European Society
for Central Asian Studies (ESCAS).

THE 'ANDEAN SYNDROME'? REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE TALIBAN OPIUM ERADICATION
Svante Cornell and Marcela Londoņo
Given the demand-driven character of the global trade in illegal drugs, the
eradication of opium poppy in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is bound to lead to an
increase in production elsewhere. If the recent history of another major
drug-producing area, the Andes region, is of any relevance, a major increase in
production is to be expected in neighboring and unstable areas suitable for
cultivation: that is to say, the Central Asian republics, especially Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. The possible ramifications of such a development are immense.
BACKGROUND: It is well-known that the trade in illegal drugs, with the high risks
it entails, is driven by the huge profit margins at all levels of the commerce. A
farmer growing coca or opium earns up to five times as much as if he was growing
wheat or rice; yet this pales compared to the profits made by the middlemen that
refine the drugs and carry them from producers through international borders to
customers. Added to this is the addictive qualities of narcotics, especially heroin
and cocaine, which makes the demand for these drugs close to inelastic: no matter
the price, the user needs to have them, and will go to great lengths to get them.
Consequently, the drugs industry is demand-driven. Hence a decrease in supply in
one producing area almost automatically leads to an increase in supply elsewhere.
The highly organized character of drugs trafficking further ensures this is the
case.
The Andes region of South America is an excellent example of this phenomenon.
Colombia may today be the world's largest producer of cocaine; however this is a
recent phenomenon. In the 1980s, Bolivia and Peru both produced larger quantities
of coca, which were partly refined and distributed through Colombia to markets
mainly in North America. U.S.-supported eradication efforts in those two countries
ultimately led to production itself moving to Colombia. This development was
natural, given the protracted civil conflict in the country that denies the state
effective sovereignty over large tracts of its territory. The underdevelopment and
widespread poverty in those regions further aggravated the problem. A symbiosis
emerged between drug traffickers, rebellious guerilla movements, and paramilitary
groups. The conflict situation provided suitable conditions outside government
jurisdiction for the production of coca, the trafficking of drugs; 'taxing' the
drugs trade provided needed funds for the guerillas and paramilitaries. Colombia
presently produces an estimated 80% of the world's supply of cocaine.
Until recently, Afghanistan supplied 75% of world production of opium, the raw
material of heroin. Almost all heroin consumed in Europe still emanates from
Afghanistan. However, the Taliban eradication of opium poppy, which has now been
confirmed by numerous independent observers, creates a serious disruption in
supply. The price of opium inside Afghanistan has skyrocketed. However, as
Afghanistan in 1999 and 2000 produced far more opium than is consumed in its
traditional markets, traffickers still have stocks of drugs, meaning that the
effects of eradication are not yet tangible in neighboring countries. Isolated
reports from the trafficking routes most integrated with Afghanistan - Tajikistan
and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan - nevertheless signal that a
disruption of the trade is gradually taking place there, leading to price increases
and unemployment problems.
IMPLICATIONS: As coca production was partly eradicated in Bolivia and Peru, the
drugs industry engulfed Colombia to an even higher degree than before, and
bolstered - but also commercialized - the guerillas and the paramilitary groups.
Ultimately, the conflict-drugs nexus has come to threaten the integrity and
stability of the Colombian state, and regional security in the entire Andes region.
As stockpiles in Afghanistan diminish, the disruption in supply, together with the
inelastic demand, will challenge traffickers to find new production areas for their
industry. They are likely to look for three things: a climate suitable for opium
production, an area with weak state control; and ideally, located on or near their
existing trafficking routes. Based on these criteria, a tangible increase in
drug-related activity is likely in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and perhaps also in
Pakistan's NWFP. An increase in poppy cultivation has already been observed in the
ca. 10% of Afghanistan controlled by the opposition to the Taliban, the 'Northern
Alliance'. This testifies to the fact that traffickers are able to work on both
sides of the war front between the rivaling Afghan factions, and have transported
drugs across the frontline.
What took place in the Andes has already happened in Central Asia: the blurring of
lines between politically motivated movements and drug traffickers. The Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has mounted insurgencies on the territories of
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for two consecutive years, is known to be a
key actor in drug trafficking from Afghanistan via Central Asia to Europe. The
'commercialization' of the IMU, much like the Colombian guerrillas and
paramilitaries, means that the IMU is acquiring a vested interest in the
perpetuation of instability in Central Asia. As instability is necessary for its
economic activities, it becomes increasingly difficult to co-opt the movement or
reach a compromise with it. Living of the drugs trade, its leaders are simply not
interested in peace and development. Quite to the contrary, the eradication of
poppy in Afghanistan is likely to have significant consequences for the IMU. First
of all, it is likely to gradually worsen its relations with the Taliban regime;
secondly, it gives the IMU an interest in contributing to the expansion of poppy
cultivation in Central Asia. The fact that IMU operations have been concentrated to
mountainous areas in the weakest states of Central Asia - Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, where it has bases - is illustrative. In fact, it becomes an economic
interest for the IMU to ensure continued instability in Tajikistan, and to further
the destabilization of Kyrgyzstan, especially its southern regions.
CONCLUSIONS: If the Andean experience is of any guidance, a major increase in
drug-related activities is to be expected in southern Central Asia. This is likely
to be accompanied by increased unrest and the weakening of state authorities and
their control over territory. If governments are economically and politically
unable to respond effectively to these developments, the nexus between guerrillas
and drug trafficking is likely to grow deeper and more intractable, especially as
local inhabitants become economically dependent on income from opium cultivation.
On a broader scale, this goes to show two points pertaining to the drugs trade in
general. Firstly, whether in South America or in Central Asia, combating the drugs
trade is unlikely to be effective if done through unilateral activities in, or
directed toward, one country. The 'Andean Initiative' currently under way shows an
emerging understanding of this fact. The trade in narcotics is transnational, and
needs to be addressed regionally. If this is not the case, a success in combating
drugs in one country can be a direct cause of a deterioration in another. Secondly,
the drugs trade is demand-driven. As long as demand for heroin and cocaine in the
industrialized world remains high, the immense margins of profit imply that drugs
will be grown somewhere to satisfy that demand. Only if demand in North America and
western Europe is checked can global supply effectively be limited.
AUTHORS' BIO: Svante Cornell edits the Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, and
lectures at the departments of peace and conflict research and East European
studies of Uppsala University. Marcela Londoņo is an advisor on international
affairs in the Vice-Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. The views expressed in
this article do not in any way represent those of the Government of the Republic of
Colombia.

UNITED NATIONS

Assistance for Afghanistan
WEEKLY UPDATE
Issue No.415 7 June 2001

Watching Briefing Completed

A two-day joint United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World
Bank conference was organised in Islamabad to explore ways of bringing
analytical work more into the mainstream of assistance programmes for
Afghanistan. To mark the completion of the joint UNDP/World Bank
project, the 'Afghanistan Watching Brief,' the conference was largely
attended by the donor representatives including the ambassadors of
Japan, Italy, Sweden, and Norway, Mr. Francesc Vendrell, the
Secretary-General's Special Representative in Afghanistan, and UN heads
for Afghanistan, the assistance community as well as those who maintain
interest in Afghanistan from a broader perspective, including Professor
Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid.

Studies on Afghanistan's international trade relations and on the
socio-economic impact of mine action, along with findings of earlier
workshops and conferences on basic education, health service delivery
and food security strategy in Afghanistan, were discussed at the
conference. Other studies include those on the socio-economic impact of
remittances on the Afghan family and household (in progress) and an
overview of agricultural production in the country. The project also
supported a capacity building programme in Peshawar for about 600 Afghan
women working with NGOs. At the conclusion, donor, NGO, and UN
representatives urged the World Bank to expand the range of its
analytical works in partnership with UNDP and embark on a second phase
of the Watching Brief strategy.

Mission to Faizabad
On 28 May, a mission consisting of four ambassadors (Norwegian, German,
Switzerland and UK) arrived in Faizabad to hold a meeting with President
Rabbani, to assess living conditions of IDPs and to see project
activities.

On 29 May 2001, they visited Faizabad hospital, the faculty of medicine,
and the water supply project of Faizabad City. The Director of MoPH
Faizabad briefed them on MoPH activities and support of UN agencies
including WHO for malaria control, TB control program, provision of
medical supplies to health facilities of Badakhshan and Takhar
provinces, and provision of medical training materials to the faculty of
medicine.
They visited the water supply project of Faizabad, particularly the
reservoirs on TV Hill, the Old Reservoir, and the New Reservoir. When
they arrived the workers were busy laying the concrete of the reservoir.
The first phase of the Faizabad water supply project is completed. The
second phase includes a transmission line from the spring source to the
reservoir and from the reservoir to Faizabad New City.

Shar-i-Buzurg
Following two consecutive years of drought, the isolated district of
Shar-i-Buzurg in Badakhshan province is facing a precarious situation
requiring an emergency response. This situation is particularly
difficult in terms of food security, and the situation is aggravated by
the fact that the district has no road links to the outside world and
can only be reached on horseback or on foot, while 97% of the arable
land is rain fed. Moreover, this remote area has received little
attention since the 1998 earthquakes that hit the area. Finally, the
ongoing conflict and the precarious economic situation prevents the
district from drawing assistance from more developed neighbouring areas.

ACTED, present in the area since 1998, implemented a thorough survey of
the area from 5 to 25 May 2001, surveying every one of the 63 villages
in the district. This evaluation, the first comprehensive one to be
undertaken in the area presents an overview of the situation with
special focus on the food situation, the medical situation, water and
sanitation, and agriculture. The findings underlined the emergency
nature of the situation especially in terms of the food deficit, the
exhaustion of cropping strategies, and the lack of seeds for the next
harvest. In some areas, up to 10% of the local population have already
left their homes and gone to swell the number of IDPs in Tarkhar and
Baghlan or have left for Pakistan and Iran. However, because of the
remoteness of the district and the unavailability of cash, it has been
noticed that, even if the situation is particularly precarious, the
local population is waiting for the last moment before leaving their
villages.
If steps are not taken to address the situation in this district, it can
be estimated that a significant portion of the local population could
become displaced in the next months.

IWPR
REPORTING CENTRAL ASIA, NO. 55, June 8, 2001

NO END TO AFGHAN FIGHTING

Afghanistan is bracing itself for yet more fighting as the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance shun peace talks.

By Arkady Dubnov in Moscow

With neither side in the Afghan war showing much willingness to reach a
compromise settlement, a peaceful resolution of the conflict seems as
distant a prospect as ever.

Having won control of over 90 per cent of Afghan territory, the Taliban have
striven relentlessly for a final military victory and have used peace talks
as little more than a pause in which to regroup their forces.

The Northern Alliance, on the other hand, have been unwilling to accept the
status quo and demanded political concessions from the Taliban, which the
group sees as totally at odds with the military reality.

As a result, both sides have sought to resolve the conflict on the
battlefield rather than round the negotiating table.

This became glaringly evident after the Taliban's capture of Talokan - the
administrative centre of the Tahor province - in September last year. In
losing this strategic point, the Northern Alliance was forced to relinquish
control over supply routes to its bases just over the border in Tajikistan.

It was at this point that relations between Afghanistan and its neighbours
began to change.

Tajikistan, a long-time backer of the Northern Alliance, regarded the
Taliban's success as a serious threat to its own security. Other Central
Asian and Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS, countries shared
Dushanbe's concern. CIS collective security arrangements were stepped up. So
too were efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the Afghan conflict.

At the same time, members of the commonwealth agreed to provide military,
financial and political support for the Northern Alliance. Since the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU - which had launched raids into Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan in recent years - are reported to be enjoying the patronage of
the Taliban, there was an added impetus to back Ahmed Shah Massoud's
Northern Alliance forces.

The international community's attitude towards the Taliban also hardened.
The United Nations selectively tightened its embargo against Afghanistan,
with the aim of hitting the rebels rather than the Northern Alliance. The
decision provoked a new round of fighting.

Masssoud's forces saw the move as giving carte-blanche to their anti-Taliban
war, while the Taliban saw itself as set upon by the rest of the world.

The Islamic rebels' apparent objective is to expel Northern Alliance forces
from provinces bordering Tajikistan. Diplomatic sources in the region
suggest the main offensive will kick-off in early July, and that the Taliban
has no intention of re-entering peace negotiations until their military
objectives are achieved.

There are also reports that the Taliban leadership intends to break off
contact with international mediators in the near future. At present, they're
refusing to participate in any talks involving UN representatives, as it has
"betrayed the interests of the Afghan people".

The Taliban's UN boycott makes any peace efforts by countries like Kazakstan
and Kyrgyzstan impossible. Neither Astana nor Bishkek can mediate without UN
involvement.

At present, the Taliban are pushing north of Talokan towards the Tajik
border. Massoud has managed to retain control of the Farkhar gorge,
preventing the Islamic rebels from occupying Badakhshan - the last province
held by the Northern Alliance.

The leader of the ethnic Uzbeks in Afghanistan, Abdurashid Dostum, who was
expelled from the country by the Taliban three years ago, has recently
renewed his alliance with Massoud and could show up in Jauzjan and Balkh
provinces in the north-west.

Massoud hopes Dostum can raise fighters from the ethnic Uzbeks and organise
attacks behind Taliban lines. The Northern Alliance has similar hopes of
Karim Khalili, leader of the Afghan Shi'ites - his task would be to cut off
Taliban supply routes to Kabul from the west.

It's hard to say whether the Northern Alliance will succeed in pushing back
the Taliban. Well informed sources say the rebels are confident Massoud's
new alliances will unravel. And past experience would suggest that they are
probably right.

Arkady Dubnov is a journalist with Vremya novostei newspaper in Moscow

IRIN- Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN: New proposal could mean US $1 billion in extra aid

ISLAMABAD, 7 June (IRIN) - International aid to the stricken population of
Afghanistan could increase fivefold if a proposal put forward by
Switzerland at a two-day conference in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad,
is approved, diplomatic sources have told IRIN.

Swiss, Canadian and Norwegian aid organisations attending the Afghan
Support Group (ASG) conference, which opened on Thursday, intend to
challenge a precedent set by the international community which curbs the
provision of long-term aid to pariah states such as Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. If the challenge is conceded, the result could be more than
US $1 billion of extra aid for the conflict- and drought-afflicted
country.

In such a case, international NGOs in Afghanistan will be able to apply
for long-term development funds worth millions of dollars. Currently,
because of the country's pariah status, such NGOs can only access funds
for short-term humanitarian projects. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates recognise Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

The international community has been reluctant to provide long-term aid
for so long as the Taliban government harbours alleged terrorists and
insists on implementing harsh Islamic policies, particularly with regard
to women. As yet, however, the Taliban have shown no signs of changing,
preferring instead to approach Islamic countries for help in rebuilding
their country.

At a news conference on Wednesday, it was announced that this year's ASG
budget for Afghanistan was US $260 million, only marginally up from last
year's total of US $239 million. German Ambassador Hans Joachim Daerr,
chairman of the ASG, an umbrella organisation comprising 16 countries
which provide the bulk of the aid, said donor fatigue might account for
the small increase of US $21 million.

Astonishment at the "irrational" behaviour of the Taliban might be another
reason for the reluctance to donate money, Daerr maintained. He was
referring to the blasting of the Bamiyan Buddhas in central Afghanistan in
March, and recent harassment of aid workers by the local authorities.

A revision of Afghanistan's status could effectively increase the ASG
budget for Afghanistan to US $1.3 billion. It could also imply a lukewarm
recognition of the Taliban government, a diplomatic source told IRIN. "Aid
organisations would be obliged to sign contracts, and exchange notes with
Taliban officials on behalf of their governments," the official said.

However, Jean-Marc Clavel, who spoke at Thursday's conference on behalf of
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, told IRIN that
overriding Afghanistan's status would not lead to formal contact between
the Swiss government and the Taliban. "A rethink would not mean
recognition of the Taliban government. It would just mean closer links
with the Afghan people," he said.

It was the job of donor representatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan to
convince "our colleagues at headquarters to release development funds
within the funding patterns and rules of our own agencies", Clavel noted.
The release of long-term funds was the only way forward, he added.

The German Ambassador admitted that Germany's donations to Afghanistan
were already providing financial support to the Taliban. "We have
permanent contact with the Taliban. The fact that the German government
does not officially recognise them is not a big deal," he said.

However, if the governments of the ASG's 16 donor countries wished to
avoid contact with the Taliban, there was an alternative, Daerr said. "One
way round the dilemma is to negotiate with the Taliban through NGOs or the
UN. This allows the international community to keep its distance."

AFGHANISTAN: Taliban impose Islamic law on foreigners

ISLAMABAD, 6 June (IRIN) - Foreign aid workers in Afghanistan may be
subjected to corporal and capital punishment, if new regulations announced
by the ruling Taliban are implemented. This could mean death by stoning,
if any married foreigner is found guilty of adultery.

The new ruling, outlined in an announcement by Taliban Information
Minister Mowlawi Qodratollah Jamal, on Tuesday, says that foreigners must
sign a contract agreeing to abide by Islamic Emirate (Taliban) rules
before they can be issued with a work visa. The contract bans them from
eating pork, drinking alcohol, meeting Afghan women, and taking
photographs without permission.

It also forbids the playing of musical instruments, the wearing of
"immoral" clothes, and illicit relations between opposite sexes.
Foreigners found guilty of breaking the contract will be subjected to
strict Shari'ah (Islamic) law. One of the more draconian of these laws
dictates that married men or women caught committing adultery must be
stoned to death in a public stadium, while unmarried offenders will
receive 100 lashes.

The decision to introduce this new-style contract is the latest in a
series of retaliatory moves by the Taliban, angered by United Nations
sanctions and the US government's decision to close down the Taliban
office in New York. Some aid workers see the contract as further
confirmation that a small faction of the Taliban are trying to engineer
the complete withdrawal of foreigners from Afghanistan.

In the capital, Kabul, relief workers have been increasingly harassed
since UN sanctions were tightened in January. UN staff told IRIN that Arab
"guests" of the Taliban had stopped western aid workers in the bazaar and
ordered them to return to their own country. Females had been subjected to
taunts and ordered to "cover your face".

In May, tension between aid workers and the Taliban deteriorated when a
new Italian-funded hospital in Kabul was raided by baton-wielding
religious police after reports that male and female staff were socialising
together in the canteen. Foreign doctors temporarily closed the hospital
in protest against the intrusion.

On 1 June, the campaign of harassment against aid workers intensified when
the Taliban issued a new edict banning foreign women from driving alone,
"in defiance" of Islamic custom. Aid workers were further incensed when
talks between the Taliban and the World Food Programme (WFP) broke down
due to the Taliban's refusal to allow the UN to recruit local women to
identify the capital's "most needy" recipients of subsidised bread.

The UN has given the Taliban a deadline of 15 June to reverse their
decision, otherwise the five-year-old bakeries will close.

The clampdown on "anti-Islamic behaviour" was extended to Afghan medical
staff on 3 June, when Herat hospital in western Afghanistan was raided by
religious police. Armed soldiers stormed the hospital to check the hair
and beards of medical staff and patients. Under Taliban laws, beards must
be kept untrimmed and hair clipped short.

Erick de Mul, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan, has advised aid
workers to "keep a low profile" until the Taliban can guarantee the
security and protection of foreign workers. The latest attacks indicated a
"breakdown in discipline in the movement [Taliban], which makes the whole
operating environment for the UN and NGOs extremely difficult", de Mul
said on Tuesday.

The Taliban needed to "come to terms with reality and start accepting that
the UN and NGOs were bound by certain principles set by the international
community", de Mul said at a press conference in Islamabad on 30 May.
Unless the Taliban were willing to agree to UN terms, the world body "will
have to stop or suspend programmes".

Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Motawakkil appears unruffled by the
deadlock with the UN. The matter of women drivers was "not a big issue",
he told AFP, inasmuch as the UN protocol had already agreed to abide by
"all enforced regulations of the Islamic Emirate". Motawakkil also
expressed confidence that the verbal harassment issue was under control.
"The Islamic Emirate will never permit any of our guests to harass the
others," he said.

Meanwhile, the Taliban's rejection of the UN's political arm, and the
closure of four out of six of the UN's political offices in Afghanistan,
were reinforced by their deputy foreign minister's refusal on 4 June to
participate in UN-led peace talks in Germany. The UN had "lost its neutral
status by imposing sanctions against the Taliban", said Mulla Abdul Rahman
Zahid.

Motawakkil, however, has established a back-up plan. In a letter to the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which currently has 56 member- and
four observer-states, he personally requested that Islamic countries which
wished to donate money to Afghanistan should send their aid directly to
the Taliban government, rather than through the United Nations.

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