From: Justin Burke (JBurke@sorosny.org)
Date: Tue Oct 17 2000 - 14:47:24 EDT
NEW MOVES ON AN OLD CHESSBOARD
By Paul Goble
Tashkent's new willingness to recognize the Taliban as
the Afghan government challenges Russian efforts to recoup
influence in Central Asia as well as some widely held
assumptions about the sources of Islamic fundamentalism there
and elsewhere.
But because it does both of these things simultaneously,
this latest Uzbek shift appears likely to rearrange many of
the pieces on the chessboard of Central Asian geopolitics,
calling old arrangements into question, opening the
possibility for new ones, and possibly undermining his own
position.
Speaking in Tashkent on 12 October, Uzbek President
Islam Karimov said that he is ready to recognize the Taliban
as the government of Afghanistan. "It doesn't matter whether
we like that government or not," he added. "The main
criterion is whether the people of Afghanistan trust it."
If Uzbekistan eventually does take that step, Tashkent
would become the fourth government around the world to do so,
thereby reducing the isolation of a regime which controls 95
percent of Afghanistan's territory but which many believe
sponsors terrorism.
But Karimov's remarks, a complete reversal of his
position up to now, do not appear to be addressed primarily
to the Taliban--although his foreign minister has
acknowledged that Tashkent has had informal conversation with
Taliban representatives.
Instead, Karimov's about-face appears directed in the
first instance at Moscow and those Central Asian countries
which are following its lead and also at Western governments
which up to now have been his biggest supporters.
By announcing his willingness to recognize the Taliban,
Karimov effectively rejects Moscow's entire effort to regain
influence in Central Asia by positing an external
fundamentalist threat to these countries that they can meet
only with Russian aid.
The most recent of these Russian attempts came earlier
last week when Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the
leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as well as
those of Armenia and Belarus to discuss a common response to
Islamist threats.
The tenor of that Bishkek meeting was reflected in the
comments of a Kyrgyz security official who argued that
threats to the stability of the Central Asian countries are
"external" rather than "domestic" and that they come "from
Afghanistan."
And this same official added that the Russian Federation
is "the core and the nucleus of regional security, around
which other countries are consolidating" because they see
Russian forces along the Tajik-Afghan border as an important
deterrent.
Karimov not surprisingly stayed away from the Bishkek
meeting, but his subsequent statement makes it clear that he
rejects both Russia's diagnosis of the problems Central Asia
faces and Russia's prescription as to how to deal with them.
Indeed, by adopting this new position on the Taliban,
Karimov is challenging more than just Moscow's efforts. He is
calling into question the view that Islamic fundamentalism is
something that can be exported from one country to another.
That would put him at odds not only with Russia and his
Central Asian neighbors but also with many Western
governments on whom Karimov has relied to pursue his
independent course. Almost all of them remain convinced that
fundamentalism is an exportable phenomenon.
Moreover, some Western governments are likely to be
especially concerned by the timing of his words. They came
just as some suggested a link between the bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole and Osama bin Laden, to whom the Taliban gave
refuge.
And Karimov's shift could also have some important
domestic ramifications if either his regime or its opponents
should conclude that Tashkent's harsh approach to Islam is
breeding the very Islamic fundamentalism for which the
Taliban had been blamed.
In either case, that could lead to new challenges and
changes in Uzbekistan and as a result of these to changes in
its relationship with its neighbors, with Russia and with the
West.
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