Iran's English-language state-run station Press TV has quite a scoop:
Kyrgyzstan's new leaders have said they intend to remove a US military base, which currently serves as the premier air mobility hub for the US-led forces in Afghanistan, from their soil.
What is the source of this news? It's not clear, as there are no direct quotes, and Kyrgyzstan's new leader, Roza Otunbayeva, has already been on the record saying that nothing would happen to Manas.
It also seems wise to use a bit of skepticism when considering this report from Uzbekistan, from the Uzbek-language Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran External Service, via BBC Monitoring:
Dust containing uranium penetrates into human blood, causing cancer. The dust with uranium containment has been frequent here, in Termiz since 2001 when the US-led military operations against the Taleban started in Afghanistan.
Of late, cases of illnesses with various types of cancer, especially, lung cancer, has increased in Termiz.
Though this phenomenon has officially been acknowledged, the problem itself should be studied thoroughly.
I regularly follow Press TV, and I hadn't previously seen much indication of trying to stir up anti-American rumors in Central Asia. Did this start with the whole Jundullah/Manas thing? Will be interesting to see if this continues.
There has been some speculation that Russia might be maneuvering, behind the scenes, to get Kyrgyzstan's new leaders to shut down the Manas Air Base. This analysis from RFE/RL calls attention to a visit that a Kyrgyz opposition leader made to Moscow just before the demonstrations, where Vladimir Putin expressed support for the opposition. The country's new interim leader, Roza Otunbayeva, made her first phone call to Putin. And a senior unnamed Russian official told Reuters:
"In Kyrgyzstan, there should be only one base -- Russian. He said Bakiyev had failed to fulfill a promise to close the U.S. base."
Later in the RFE/RL piece, Alexander Cooley (him again) points out that it is totally reasonable for Otunbayeva to make her first call to Moscow:
Central Asia observers aren't surprised by the new Kyrgyz leadership's courting of Russia. Columbia University professor Alexander Cooley, who wrote a book about the Manas air-base dispute, says relations between Bakiev and the Kremlin had deteriorated so much, Otunbaeva's first order of business was "to make nice" with Moscow.
"It's not surprising that the first public phone call she makes is with Putin," Cooley says. "She doesn't do a CNN appearance, she doesn't call Obama."
Even before we had any idea what was going on in Kyrgyzstan, there was a lot of hand-wringing yesterday over the status of the Manas Air Base/Transit Center after the "revolution" that seems to have taken place there. That has tamped down a bit, once it emerged that Roza Otunbayeva, the new leader of the caretaker government, said that Manas would be unaffected.
Well, a little. Major Chris LeCron, executive officer for CENTCOM Deployment & Distribution Operations Center, which handles logistics of moving equipment into Afghanistan, including via the Northern Distribution Network, flags the story on his official blog, and adds a little comment:
We rely heavily on Manas, Kyrgyzstan and hope everything settles down soon. From a transportation standpoint, the air base in Manas helps as a staging base for cargo and troops.
The situation in Kyrgyzstan appears to be pretty grave, with protesters in Talas taking over a government building. It's ongoing, and to make too many conclusions just yet would obviously be premature. Still, I was struck by this paragraph in EurasiaNet's latest story:
In the evening, rumors began circulating that two planeloads of special security troops had been dispatched by the government and were preparing to move into the town center. One witness said that, despite the possibility of a clash, the crowd of protesters in Talas was growing. Many intended to stay in the square overnight.
Of course, we should be extremely cautious about rumors that emerge from a crowd of protesters. However, it's not a stretch to imagine that Kyrgyzstan might deploy some sort of security forces. And just imagine, if the government had a group of well trained anti-terror troops, those would certainly be among the most likely to respond.
And that puts the proposed US-built anti-terror training center in Batken in some new perspective. The current government in Kyrgyzstan appears more and more brazen in its efforts to maintain power. Might it use its security forces like Uzbekistan did in Andijan? (Or even a fraction as violently?) And what if those troops were US-trained? I would imagine the Americans who are in charge of the Batken center are watching this situation in Talas pretty closely.
Gallup has done a new survey of the non-NATO former Soviet countries, and found that in only one -- you get one guess which -- did more than 40 percent believe NATO to be a "protection" of their country. Yes, it was Georgia, where 56 percent of people believed NATO to be protecting their country. Azerbaijanis were the next most favorably disposed toward NATO, with 38 percent seeing it as protection, followed by Turkmenistan (36 percent), Uzbekistan (31), Moldova (30), Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (25), Armenia (22) and Tajikistan (18). Ukraine, Belarus and Russia saw NATO even less favorably.
Apparently, most of the people in these countries see NATO refracted through the lens of their regional security issues, especially NATO member Turkey and NATO bugaboo Russia. The pollsters write:
Views about NATO across the rest of the CIS region are largely defined in terms of a country's relations with Russia and its citizens' sociocultural ties. Historically, Tajikistan has been oriented both toward its neighboring countries that share the Persian language (Iran and Afghanistan) and toward Russia, on which it depends for security and labor migration. The wars in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as Russia's constant hidden or open opposition to the United States, may influence Tajikistanis' views of NATO--and hence the organization's relatively low average protection rating of 9 percent. It is interesting to note, however, that the percentage of Tajikistanis who associate NATO with protection rose significantly between 2008 and 2009--from 5 percent to 18 percent--and potentially reflects their increased level of approval of the new US leadership (30 percent in 2008 versus 42 percent in 2009).
So, American and British troops will march through Moscow in this year's Victory Day parade, but Georgian troops won't. Reports RIA Novosti:
Russia has sent no invitation to Georgian military officials to participate in the May 9 Victory Day parade on Moscow's Red Square, a Russian Defense Ministry spokesman said on Monday.
"The invitations were sent to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member-states. Georgia is not part of the CIS," Col. Alexei Kuznetsov told journalists.
Of course, as RIAN points out, the U.S. and Britain are also not part of the CIS, so Georgia's snub doesn't have anything to do with that. No need here to point out the real reason.
In other WWII news, a Georgian WWII monument destroyed in December will be rebuilt in Moscow, starting just before Victory Day, reports RT:
Within a year and a half Moscow authorities promise to erect in the Russian capital a copy of the “We fought the Nazis together” monument that was demolished in Georgia on December 19, 2009.
The monument will be placed on Remembrance Alley in the World War II Victory Park on Poklonnaya Hill... Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov has already signed an order to lay the foundation stone on May 6.
The Georgian government had originally said the Kutaisi monument was only being "restored," but the force of the explosion of this renovation effort was apparently so strong that it send chunks of concrete into a house, killing two people.
Trying to figure out what is going on with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization always requires a bit of tea-leaf reading and Kremlinology, given that the organizations who most reliably report on the group tend to be the state-owned media of the member countries. My experience covering one of the SCO summits (in Bishkek in 2007) made clear just how opaque the group is.
That said, there has been a spate of stories this week discussing Pakistan's potential membership in the group. The foreign minister of Uzbekistan is visiting Pakistan, and Uzbekistan -- chair of the SCO this year -- supports Pakistan's membership. This analysis suggests that membership for Pakistan is likely:
Will Pakistan be accepted into the SCO? It all depends on Russia. There is not other opposition in the group. Russia on previous occasions has demanded Bharat’s inclusion along with that of Pakistan. Bharat however is not longer interested in the SCO, and Delhi’s relations with Moscow have soured. So Islamabad may soon become a member of the SCO. The SCO is considering the membership applications of Iran and Pakistan. While there is much discussion of Iran on the agenda, whose absorption into the regional grouping would be seen as a provocative step, there is almost no opposition to the membership of Pakistan.
What might Pakistani membership mean? Not clear, given that it's still not clear exactly what the group is supposed to be doing. Is it a military bloc, or an economic cooperation group, or a cultural exchange forum (or a floor wax, or a dessert topping...)
A Georgian opposition website claims that the notorious Imedi TV stunt exposes Mikheil Saakashvili's lack of trust in the army:
Then, on 13 March, a key element of the Imedi faked news broadcast was the claim that part of the army had gone over to the opposition - which in this context meant it had voluntarily signed up to Russian overlordship. Whether or not one believes the tape of a phone call between Imedi's chief Giorgi Arveladze and his deputy about the programme - in which Arveladze says "Misha" has seen and approved the faked bulletin - is genuine, it is clear that the programme reflected the inner political thinking of the regime, and so shows that they regard the army not as a bulwark of Georgian sovreignity but as a weak spot.
This seems to be both a savvy analysis and a dangerous political game -- for both sides -- to be playing.
While the international media have given a lot of attention to Russian National Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev's floating of the possibility that Georgia could have been behind the Moscow Metro attacks, South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity's contribution seems to have slipped under the radar. The same day as the attacks, GeorgiaTimes reported:
At the hearing with leaders of security and law enforcement structures Kokoyty paid special attention to messages about Guantanamo Bay's prisoners in Georgia.
"Considering that in immediate vicinity of South Ossetia Georgian authorities intend to open a base for training subversive agents, I cannot rule out these people will be used as suicide bombers here or in North Caucasus," Kokoyty said.
Yes, it's a win-win proposition for Tbilisi: curry favor with Washington by taking some Gitmo prisoners off its hands, while gaining cannon fodder to use against the South Ossetians. Well played, Misha!
