Remember the report that claimed that Georgia was selling its entire fleet of combat aircraft? I was skeptical, and apparently rightly so. The Georgian Air Force is disappearing -- but it's just a bureaucratic move, bringing the air forces under the control of the army. Reports Georgia Times:
Givi Targamadze, the chairman of the Committee, said in this case no redundancy was meant; just Air Forces would exist as a separate structure no longer.
"Practice revealed that the Air Forces of Georgia are usually used for support of land operations. Such examples exist in world practice - for example, there is no command of the air forces of Canada. This change will simplify the command in conditions of specific operations."
First, the speculation was that the U.S.-funded anti-terror center in Kyrgyzstan's Batken region was a U.S. ploy for geopolitical influence. Then, it was a Kyrgyz move to thwart Uzbekistani activities in Batken. Now, official Bishkek says it is none of the above:
On March 17, 2010 Kyrgyz Defense Ministry disseminated the press-releasing, indicating that the construction of the anti-terrorist training center in the Batken Oblast is "the bilateral Kyrgyz-American relations project against international terrorism and religious extremism, transnational organized crime, prevention of drug smuggling, not oriented against third countries and does not conflict with national obligations under CSTO and other international organizations".
As that story, from Ferghana.ru, points out, the Kyrgyz statement went on to imply that the initiative for the project was the American side, while the U.S. Embassy statement said that it was a Kyrgyzstan request. The rollout of this center, from a PR perspective, has been a little rocky...
The annual SIPRI report is out, which enumerates every (known) arms sale around the world. In our humble Eurasia region, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan all got some goodies in 2009. Russia and Israel were the top suppliers.
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not receive any arms imports in 2009, the report said.
Azerbaijan got 70 armored personnel carriers (of the BTR-80A variety) from Russia, and arranged with South Africa's Paramount Groups to start producing Matador and Marauder mine-protected vehicles in Azerbaijan. Baku also bought 50 missiles from Israel for use in its Lynx Modular Rocket Launcher systems.
Georgia bought 70 Ejder armored personnel carriers from Turkey and 32 tanks from Ukraine, 20 T-72s and 12 T-84s.
Kazakhstan completed its receipt of 79 armored personnel carriers from Russia, of the same variety (BTR-80A) that Azerbaijan did, as well as three ANSAT light utility helicopters and 12 Mi-8 and Mi-17 attack helicopters, all of which were bought in 2007.
Kazakhstan also last year signed agreements with Russia for 10 S-330 surface-to-air missile air defense systems and Su-27, MiG-27 and MiG-23UB combat planes.
From Israel, Kazakhstan completed its acquisitions of weapons from Israel bought in 2006 and 2007, including 18 Lynx rocket systems, six Semser 122mm self-propelled guns, and 18 CARDOM 120mm mortars for use on armored personnel carriers.
Kazakhstan also acquired 40 uparmored Humvees from the United States.
Turkmenistan bought six Smerch multiple rocket launch systems, two Tarantul fast-attack boats and ten T-90 tanks, all from Russia.
Erica Marat has a good analysis of the U.S. counterterrorism center in Batken, Kyrgyzstan, and says that, at least from the Kyrgyz perspective, it has less to do with geopolitics than with Bishkek's fear of Uzbekistan:
As one representative of the Kyrgyz defense ministry told Jamestown, military officials in Bishkek hope to maintain a military battalion in the southern part of the country to respond to “local conflicts.” The terminology assumes that such conflicts would be initiated by Uzbek troops. There is a widely held view among the Kyrgyz military that Tashkent is developing its military forces with the aim of one day acquiring Kyrgyzstan’s water reservoirs and protecting the ethnic Uzbek population living in Osh and Batken by military means.
Which, of course, is probably not what the U.S. intends for the center:
The official reason underlying the need for the new center is rooted in the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, and differs from an unofficial viewpoint that suggests the Kyrgyz elites want to militarily protect the southern part of the country more from their neighbor.
Over the weekend, I think we've all learned to take Georgian media reports with an extra grain of salt, and this report seems a bit hard to fathom: Apparently a Georgian newspaper is reporting that the country is planning to sell 12 of its Su-25 aircraft. Via GeorgiaTimes:
The media cites to the Ministry of Defense and say the merge was caused by dissatisfaction with training level of military pilots, failing to hit targets at maneuvers.
"The pilots have counter-arguments," the media says.
I imagine they would. Anyway, according to Jane's, those 12 Su-25s would represent the entire inventory of the Georgian air force's fixed-wing combat aircraft. (In fact, the Su-25 was produced in, of all places, Tbilisi.) So it seems a little skepticism is called for until we hear more reports.
The commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme allied commander Admiral James Stavridis testified before Congress on Tuesday, and said the U.S. was amenable to cooperating with Russia on missile defense:
'First, it would create a zone of cooperation with Russia [from a military standpoint]; secondly, it could technically add to the early warning time because of the location of the system; and thirdly, it creates confidence-building measures between ourselves and the Russians,' the admiral said.
News.az quotes an Azerbaijan analyst as saying that represents a "serious change" in the US position:
The head of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Anatoly Tsyganok, said that the proposal to use the radar could be considered a serious change in Washington's position, 'which first claimed that the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan does not meet the necessary technical requirements'.
Stavridis didn't specifically address the capability of the Gabala radar in his testimony, and other officials have in the past spoken in similar general, favorable terms about this. So I don't know how serious a change this is. But it bears watching.
The commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme allied commander Admiral James Stavridis testified before Congress on Tuesday, and said the U.S. was amenable to cooperating with Russia on missile defense:
'First, it would create a zone of cooperation with Russia [from a military standpoint]; secondly, it could technically add to the early warning time because of the location of the system; and thirdly, it creates confidence-building measures between ourselves and the Russians,' the admiral said.
News.az quotes an Azerbaijan analyst as saying that represents a "serious change" in the US position:
The head of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Anatoly Tsyganok, said that the proposal to use the radar could be considered a serious change in Washington's position, 'which first claimed that the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan does not meet the necessary technical requirements'.
Stavridis didn't specifically address the capability of the Gabala radar in his testimony, and other officials have in the past spoken in similar general, favorable terms about this. So I don't know how serious a change this is. But it bears watching.
General David Petraeus, commander of US Central Command, is visiting Bishkek for the next two days and presumably the status of the Manas Transit Center is at the top of the agenda. But Petraeus also appears likely to have to deal with the reaction to news of the new anti-terror training center in Batken:
The visit, which was not open to the media, comes a day after U.S. diplomats confirmed the United States would help fund an antiterror training center in the southern Kyrgyz town of Batken next year.
A statement on the Kyrgyz president's website said Petraeus thanked Kyrgyzstan for its support of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It said the U.S. general also informed the Kyrgyz president about the situation in Afghanistan and efforts to stabilize the war-torn country.
Bakiev said that "all the main challenges and security threats to Central Asia" come from Afghanistan, adding, "Therefore, Kyrgyzstan is interested in providing security and stability in this country, and it will continue to offer its endeavor for rebuilding Afghanistan – along with the international community."
The Kyrgyz plan to set up a U.S.-funded training center in Batken might upset Russia, as the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization announced its intention last year to build a military base in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Aleksandr Knyazev, a Bishkek-based political analyst, calls Bishkek's decision to allow such a center to be built in Batken a "most irresponsible act," as the Kyrgyz economy depends on Russian investment to a great extent. In 2009, Russia promised to invest $2 billion in the Kyrgyz economy, including key hydropower projects.
Jundullah's spokesman speaks to an Arabic newspaper, and asks many of the same questions as I did about why the group's leader would be going to Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan:
Ridiculing Tehran's official version of the arrest of Rigi, Narui asked: "How can they say he was traveling to Kyrgyzstan to meet with US officials at a time when there is a large US base in Afghanistan? Why should he travel to that country to meet with them when there was no need for him to do so because there are Americans in Afghanistan and Pakistan?"
He also asked: "Which is closer? Kyrgyzstan or Dubai? Why would he take a long route and travel via Dubai while he knew that the plane would fly in Iranian airspace and that there was a possibility he would be kidnapped?" "That is why we say they are lying", he remarked.
Nauri says that, instead, the U.S., in cooperation with Mossad, arrested Rigi in Kandahar. Which, if it were true, would raise another large bunch of questions, about how and/or why the U.S. would have handed him over to the Iranian authorities. More to come from this, for sure.
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, which doesn’t have a common border with Afghanistan – the very important Manas Transit Center, which will be – which we will renew the arrangements some in the next few weeks, and I wanted to launch that process.
That seemed to presuppose the outcome of the negotiations a little more than the Kyrgyz government was comfortable with, and they pushed back a little. Said Kyrgyzstan's foreign minister, Kadyrbek Sarbaev:
"The government of the republic signed no agreement on the renewal of Manas Transit Center lease at the territory of Kyrgyzstan with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke during his visit in Bishkek."
Still, as Ferghana.ru suggests:
On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Kyrgyzstan is not going to keep the base after June, 2010. It has to be mentioned that the agreement assumes automatic prolongation for another year "if neither of the parties informs another party about its decision to break the agreement 180 prior to the end of the agreement’s term."
Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy in Bishkek is also dealing with suspicions that the planned anti-terror training center in Batken is going to be a base of some sort:
