When they were signed in late 2009, the protocols between Turkey and Armenia -- designed to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries and create a vehicle for discussing their painful shared history -- were hailed as a major breakthrough and as an important victory for Ankara's new "zero problems with neighbors" policy.
Still, despite the applause, it was fairly clear already at the signing -- which was delayed by three hours because of a dispute between Ankara and Yerevan over their respective statements -- that the protocols had a rough road ahead of them. Indeed, not much longer after they were signed, the agreement was as good as dead, killed off by a combination of Turkish buyer's remorse, Azeri bullying and Armenian naivete.
Just how did things fall apart so quickly? In a new report issued by Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human Rights, David Phillips, who has been involved in previous Turkish-Armenian reconciliation efforts, goes a long way towards answering that question by providing an extremely detailed diplomatic history of the protocols.
As Phillips writes, "The Protocols represented an unprecedented advancement in relations between Turkey and Armenia. However, failure to ratify them was a significant bilateral, regional, and international setback." As he sees it, the protocols are dead in their current form and cannot be revived, while Ankara, busy with other, more pressing regional concerns, is not likely to return to the Armenia file for now.
With yesterday's ruling by France's Constitutional Council invalidating a recently passed law that would have criminalized the denial of the Armenian genocide, Ankara and Paris managed to avoid a further breakdown in their already strained relations. But while Turkey may now roll back some of the sanctions it instituted (keeping French military craft out of its airspace, for example) after the law was first passed last month and Turkish shoppers can safely go back to buying French products, this is most likely not the end of the contretemps between the two countries.
Most immediately, French President Nicolas Sarkozy -- whose party first introduced the genocide denial legislation -- has said that he will ask for an amended version of the bill to be put forward. Sarkozy's rival in the upcoming presidential elections, Socialist François Hollande, has also said that he would like to see the law resubmitted to parliament.
But the now failed law is really only a symptom of a deeper rift between Turkey and France, one that is being fueled by the two countries competing interests in the Middle East and Paris's continuing opposition to Ankara's European Union membership bid. Although written last year, an analysis of the Turkish-French rivalry by the Carnegie Foundation's Sinan Ulgen and the Open Society Institute's Heather Grabbe still rings true:
As a complement to my Eurasianet article today about the growing regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran, you might also want to take a look at an International Crisis Group report released today about the politics surrounding Iran's nuclear program and what role Turkey might be able to play in brining about a resolution to the standoff between Tehran and the west over this issue.
The report suggests that sanctions alone might push Iran further into a corner and that diplomatic engagement -- the kind Ankara has been promoting -- should still be given a try. The report also says that Turkey, with its historic connection to Iran and its familiarity with working with the Iranians, could be an ideal country to help engage Tehran on the nuclear issue. From the report:
Placing one’s eggs almost exclusively in the sanctions basket is risky business. There is a good chance they will not persuade Iran to slow its nuclear efforts, and so – in the absence of a serious diplomatic option including a more far-reaching proposal – the U.S. might well corner itself into waging a war with high costs (such as possible Iranian retaliatory moves in Iraq, Afghanistan and, through proxies, against Israel) for uncertain gains (a delay in Iran’s nuclear progress countered by the likely expulsion of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, intensified determination to acquire a bomb and accelerated efforts to do so).
Last October, with his wife and several ministers in tow, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan became to first non-African world leader to visit Somalia in the last 20 years. Erdogan's visit has actually turned out to be more than just window dressing: in recent months, Turkey -- which had previously not been a major player in international relief work -- has taken the lead in providing aid in the war-torn country, in the process earning plaudits from both locals and other international organizations.
With a one-day summit on Somalia, which will gather leaders from some 50 countries and international aid organizations, scheduled to start tomorrow in London, the "Turkish model" of aid appears to be of particular interest. From a new BBC report that looks at Turkey's humanitarian work in Somalia:
In the months since the militant Islamist group, al-Shabab, was finally pushed out of the city by African Union soldiers Turkey has emerged as the most visible foreign presence in Mogadishu - if you discount the green armoured cars belonging to the AU force (Amisom), which still growl their way through the busy streets.
While most foreign organisations remain cooped up at the heavily guarded Amisom base by the airport, some 200 Turkish nationals are now living and working in the city on a variety of projects, ranging from construction to logistics and aid.
"They are our brothers" is a common reaction from Somalis when the Turkish are mentioned.
Despite warnings from Ankara that such a move would fundamentally undermine Turkish-French relations, France's Senate today passed a bill that would criminalize the denial of any genocide, including the 1915 mass extermination of Armenians by the Ottoman state. The law, which could lead to a punishment of a year in jail and a fine of 45,000 Euros ($57,000), was also passed about a month ago by the parliament's lower house.
Ankara had already taken action in response to the lower house's passing of the bill, recalling its ambassador to France for a time and suspending military and some economic cooperation with France. But Turkish officials have warned that a successful vote in the Senate, which now only needs to be signed by President Nicolas Sarkozy to become law, will lead to "permanent" sanctions, which will be introduced in the coming days. Although Sarkozy sent a letter a few days ago to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip that said the bill does not target a particular country and which urged Turkey to respond with moderation, it is doubtful Ankara will be in the mood for that. Writes analyst Barcin Yinanc in the Hurriyet Daily News:
Add France to the countries that Turkey now has strained relations with. Following a successful vote today in France's lower house of Parliament which made it a crime to deny that the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman forces in 1915 was a genocide, Ankara has recalled its ambassador in Paris and announced a set of "sanctions" against the French. The move only worsens what had been an increasingly tense French-Turkish relationship. From Reuters:
Lawmakers in France's National Assembly - the lower house of parliament - voted overwhelmingly in favour of a draft law outlawing genocide denial, which will be debated next year in the Senate.
French Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Juppe, speaking to journalists after the vote, urged Turkey not to overreact to the assembly decision, called for "good sense and moderation."
But Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan angrily criticized France for passing the draft legislation, which touches on a highly controversial period in his country's history.
The bill, put forward by members of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's ruling party, was "politics based on racism, discrimination, xenophobia," Erdogan told journalists.
He said Sarkozy, was sacrificing good ties "for the sake of political calculations," suggesting the president was tying to win the votes of ethnic Armenians in France in an election next year.
Erdogan said Turkey was cancelling all economic, political and military meetings with its NATO partner and said it would cancel permission for French military planes to land, and warships to dock, in Turkey.
Juppe said Turkey had also recalled its ambassador from France, a decision he regretted.
With the French parliament set to vote tomorrow on a bill that would allow for the punishment of anyone who denies that the 1915 mass killings of Armenians by the Ottomans was a genocide, relations between Turkey and France continue to worsen. Ankara is warning of political, economic and cultural consequences if the legislation is passed and is suggesting it contravenes European values.
Some prominent Turkish Armenians have now also entered the fray, voicing their opposition to the French move. Most prominent among them is Orhan Dink, brother of slain journalist Hrant Dink, who told a Turkish television channel he believed the French move was violated freedom of expression. Meanwhile, perhaps trying to appeal to French culinary tastes, Turkey's Armenian Patriarchate issued a statement asking France's lawmakers not to "spoil the taste of our soup of brotherhood."
As Today's Zaman columnist Orhan Kemal Cengiz reminds readers, Hrant Dink -- who had been tried in Turkey because of his insistence that the country confront its past -- opposed similar legislation when it was previously proposed in France in 2006.
Relations between Turkey and France over the last year have been nothing but rocky. Of course, there is French President Nicolas Sarkozy's continuing opposition to Turkey's bid to join the European Union. The two countries were also at odds during the start of the NATO military campaign against Libya earlier this year, with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan vocally criticizing France's role in the operation and questioning Sarkozy's intentions. Ankara, meanwhile, was dismayed when during an October trip to Armenia, Sarkozy called on Turkey to "face up" to its past regarding what happened to the Armenians who were citizens of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
While the Franco-Turk rivalry has cooled off a bit in recent weeks, the issue of the Armenian Genocide is threatening to again raise tensions between the two countries. As Today's Zaman reports:
Ankara has warned France of the “irreparable damage” that could ensue should France’s latest move to criminalize denying that an alleged Armenian genocide took place in Turkey in 1915 be passed next week in the French parliament.
The homepage of the (newly, and poorly, redesigned) Hurriyet Daily News features a fairly provocative headline today: "Turkey given possession of nuclear warheads, report says." So has Turkey just become the Middle East's newest nuclear power? The real story is a lot less sensational, yet also much more interesting, than that.
Turkey, as a member of NATO, has in fact hosted tactical nuclear weapons since the 1950's. Today, NATO keeps an estimated stockpile of 60-70 nuclear bombs at the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, down from 90 in 2001. Most of these (some 50) are designed to be delivered by United States aircraft (which are not housed at Incirlik and would have to be flown in and armed for any mission). The rest are earmarked for Turkish fighter jets, although it appears that Turkish pilots are currently not being trained for nuclear missions. (Hurriyet's sloppy story follows up on a more carefully written one that appeared the day before in the Vatan newspaper, written by Washington correspondent Ilhan Tanir.)
From an interesting report published at the end of last year by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which looked at the status of the the US's tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, especially in light of NATO's newly-developed "Strategic Concept," which places less importance on these weapons:
Up until the Arab Spring spilled over so violently into Syria, the rapprochement with Damascus could have been considered one of the great successes of Ankara's outreach to its neighbors. But Turkey-Syria relations have deteriorated as rapidly as the situation inside Syria has, leaving Ankara with some very difficult policy choices, among the most prominent ones being how to deal with the issue of sanctions against the Assad regime. Ankara has suggested for weeks now that it will roll out a host of sanctions aimed at the Damascus regime, but has yet to make the details public. (Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu today said sanctions would soon be announced, after he holds consultations with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is recovering from a recent operation. More details here.) (UPDATE- Ankara Wednesday unveiled its new sanctions program, which includes a freeze on certain Syrian assets in Turkey and a hold on dealing with Syria's Central Bank, among other measures. Details here.)
The issue is, of course, a political one. But for Turkey, which uses Syria as an important trade route and whose imports to the country have boomed in recent years, the sanctions issue is also very much an economic one. In a recent piece in The National, analyst Henri Barkey, says Ankara's hesitation regarding Syria sanctions is strongly influenced by economic concerns:
