“What is Putin’s favorite female name?” roars the announcer of a Vladimir Putin-themed quiz at the opening of Putin Pub in Bishkek on Saturday October 11. “Alina!” the crowd chants back in unison, referring to the former Olympic gymnast, Alina Kabaeva, long rumored to be the Russian president’s lover. “Not Lyudmila?” the announcer goads, name-checking Putin’s ex-wife. “No way!” comes the decisive reply.
Aside from the quiz, ubiquitous Putin paraphernalia, and alcoholic drinks named after both Kabaeva and Putin’s political patron-turned-rival, the late Boris Berezovsky, the Putin Pub, located in a southern suburb of Bishkek, has a strangely familiar feel. The pub’s smart phone-wielding administrator, a stout man with a mane of black hair and a pencil-thin beard, seems to have been in charge of every newly opened Bishkek restaurant-pub in recent memory, for instance.
In a nod to the stealth military operation that laid the foundations for Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, wait staff wear the word “#вежливыелюди” (Polite People) stenciled on the reverse of their uniforms. Thankfully these waiters are far more communicative than the unexplained army types who mysteriously surfaced on the Crimean Peninsula in February before calls for a referendum to join Russia. But bringing the onion rings while they’re still warm seems to be a challenge, as it is for waiters in almost every Bishkek gastro-pub.
Moscow’s sanctions-struck energy giant Gazprom has announced it is no longer interested in buying Central Asian gas, leaving Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan dependent on exports to China.
Contractually, Gazprom officials have noted they are locked into obligations to buy from Ashgabat and Tashkent for the short term. But Gazprom is “working to annul these contracts,” Vsevolod Cherepanov, head of Gazprom’s Department for Gas Production, said at the St Petersburg International Gas Forum on October 7. Cherepanov did not explain the reasons for cutting back on purchases in Central Asia, but noted that Gazprom’s domestic production is expected to increase in the coming years.
According to Gazprom’s website, the official line remains that the production and import of “natural gas from Central Asia and the Transcaucasian region is an important element in the formation of [Gazprom’s] resource base, meeting the demands of Russia’s internal market, CIS countries and beyond. The business strategy of Gazprom in Central Asia rests on a strengthening of its position in this region. This will maintain and increase the share of Russian gas provided to its traditional markets in Europe.”
Gazprom’s exit will leave purchases of Central Asian gas an increasingly Chinese pursuit. In the two years prior to the opening of the China-Turkmenistan pipeline, which went into operation in late 2009, Gazprom imported an average of 63.4 billion cubic meters of gas (bcm) from Central Asia annually, over two-thirds of which came from Turkmenistan. In the years since, the company says, the volume going to Russia has shrunk to an average 34.1 bcm annually, less than a third of which is sourced in Turkmenistan.
Tajikistan has coupled one of its habitual Internet blocking sprees with an alarming show of police strength in central Dushanbe. The two cautious moves together appear designed to persuade a cowed population that heeding online calls for revolution is a bad idea.
Losing access to several websites simultaneously – typically social media and news sites – has become a regular fact of life for Internet users in Tajikistan. The latest filtering, which the government has denied imposing and Internet Service Providers have refused to admit on record, is unusual only in that Amazon.com, rarely cited as an agent of revolution, has been included on the blacklist. Northern Sughd Oblast, home to Tajikistan’s second-largest city, Khujand, has been almost completely offline since October 4.
Truth is no longer something expected from the government’s hated telecoms regulator, which consistently denies it blocks websites. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have a strong incentive to follow suit by attributing the bans to “technical problems,” or face the possibility of losing their licenses. But one provider speaking anonymously to Russian news agency Interfax was reported as saying October 6: "We have received an order from the communications service [to block] a list of websites: Facebook, vk.com, lenta.ru, youtube.com, mk.ru, amazon.com, ru.wikipedia.org and dozens of web anonymizers that allow bypassing these blockings."
With elections to Kyrgyzstan’s ever-volatile parliament just a year away, it is an uneasy time to be a private businessman in the Central Asian country. According to managers at one of the country’s most popular media outlets, the pre-election shakedown has begun.
As politicians prepare for the 2015 ballot, the competition over votes and the resources necessary to secure them is expected to be intense. One way of fundraising is to turn to the time-honored tradition of corporate raids – raiderstvo in Russian – at key moments in the political calendar. Now Vechernii Bishkek, a profitable media outlet whose Russian-language newspaper has a weekly circulation of over 50,000 copies, is claiming that it has fallen victim to a raid from “people close to President [Almazbek] Atambayev.”
Vechernii Bishkek’s ownership structure is complicated. In 2000, the paper – and, significantly, its wholly owned print house – fell into the hands of Adil Toygonbaev, the son-in-law of then-President Askar Akayev. Toygonbaev secured a 50-percent stake in the holding company from one of its two owners before reportedly expropriating it entirely in a move that simultaneously relieved his family’s regime of the paper’s critical reporting and added the country's best-selling Russian-language newspaper to the family's list of assets.
Weak links in Russia’s petroleum-refinery network and the Kremlin’s power play in Ukraine are shortchanging Central Asian petrol markets, importers complain. With alternatives expensive or unfeasible, and regional refining capacity severely limited, local energy executives are ruing Moscow’s traditional sway over the region’s petrol supply.
A German national’s successful lawsuit against Turkmenistan’s government after Ashgabat expropriated his poultry farm offers insight into some of the unusual tricks the isolated Central Asian country can hatch on investors.
The Washington D.C.-based International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes found in favor of Turkish-born German businessman Adem Dogan on August 12, Investment Arbitration Reporter (IAReporter) wrote last month. The amount of the award was not disclosed.
Dogan entered the Turkmen market in 1999 during the reign of the capricious Saparmurat Niyazov—who fancied himself Turkmenbashi, the “Father of the Turkmen.” Working with a local partner, Dogan’s egg farm soon became the largest of its kind in Turkmenistan, a country that sources most of its eggs from neighboring Iran.
According to a 2008 report by Bloomberg, not everyone was thrilled with Dogan’s project. Rather than seeing the farm as a way to ensure food security, Niyazov saw its success as a national humiliation. Citing transcripts of cabinet meetings in the totalitarian country, Bloomberg noted that “Niyazov harangued ministers, asking them why it took a foreigner to run a successful chicken farm.”
The project fell apart after control over the farm’s lease was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Defense. Turkmenistan’s army chiefs “began to pressure the operators for a share of profits, and later, for ownership of the entire firm” with “godfather-style offers,” according to IAReporter’s brief on the court hearings.
Three years after Kyrgyzstan slapped Vladimir Putin’s name on a mountain, some intrepid local businessmen are aiming to cash in on the name of Russia’s strongman president—recently found to be the most popular politician among Kyrgyzstanis.
Since early this month a black billboard promising a “Putin Pub” coming “soon” has loomed over the intersection of two central thoroughfares in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. Cast in white, the Russian leader’s visage emerges out of the darkness in a style reminiscent of Marlon Brando on “The Godfather” film posters.
The backers of the “pub/sports bar/karaoke” joint are shrouded in mystery. That is not uncommon in Bishkek, where locals spend hours debating which parliamentarian owns what. But Artem Kolosov, who has been promoting the bar actively on social media, confirmed to EurasiaNet.org that the billboard is no hoax.
Thailand-based Kolosov, who describes himself as the pub’s “PR Director and Art Director” wrote to EurasiaNet.org in English: “I am sorry I cannot say where and when it will open. In mid-September opening [sic]. That's all I can say.”
As with Bishkek’s popular Obama Bar, with which Putin will soon compete, few in Bishkek seem concerned about naming rights. There is already the Guinness Pub, Kyrgyz Fried Chicken, Burger Kiиg and a number of other rip-offs.
But one commenter writing on the website of Kyrgyz news service AKIpress thought differently, musing: “Maybe Putin is opening the bar himself? Now that [Western] sanctions have hit Russia, his profits have fallen. So, he has decided to open a pub in a friendly country to create a new stream of income.”
The Kyrgyz government’s penchant for trying to revise deals with foreign investors stands to have a big financial backlash. An assortment of angry investors anticipates winning damage awards totaling almost $1 billion in international arbitration.
Turkmenistan may have become a byword for slow-moving regional rail projects, but a long-planned link connecting the country and neighboring Uzbekistan to the Persian Gulf via Iran appears to have found momentum again.
At a “high level meeting” in Ashgabat on September 3, delegates from the three countries plus Oman and Qatar began ironing out details of a plan first agreed in April 2011, Trend.az reported. That meeting came just under a month after the Turkmen and Uzbek foreign ministers held talks on the project with their counterparts in Oman.
Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov first proposed the railroad in 2010. For his double-landlocked country, the project assumes a special significance. Some have noted that it could ease exports of Tashkent’s key cotton crop toward markets in the Middle East and beyond. Tashkent is particularly keen to facilitate trade ties with manufacturers indifferent to widespread evidence it uses forced labor to harvest its lucrative cash crop. Last year according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Uzbekistan produced 904,000 metric tons of cotton. Turkmenistan, which produced 327,000 metric tons over the same period, could also benefit from the line.
Alexander Sodiqov, the Tajikistan-born academic arrested on espionage charges in June, still does not know if or when he will be free to leave his native country and resume his studies abroad.
After holding him for over a month, the secret police (GKNB) released Sodiqov on his own recognizance on July 22 and forbid him from traveling. The initial criminal investigation then expired August 19, but because Sodiqov and his lawyer were not informed that the case was formally closed, sources close to Sodiqov believe that by default it has been extended. Under Tajik law, prosecutors can extend a criminal investigation for up to a year without a court hearing.
Sodiqov is eager to return to his PhD program in Canada.
“I am hoping that the investigation will end soon because classes at the University of Toronto start on September 8 and I need to be there to teach,” Sodiqov told EurasiaNet.org, explaining that the terms of his release precluded him from providing detailed comment to journalists.
Tajik authorities have not provided any indication when the investigation may conclude. Currently the GKNB and other security agencies are believed to be operating overtime as Dushanbe prepares to host a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit this month.