A BMW 7 Series sedan. Will Kazakhstan's Olympic officials be using official money to buy themselves any of these? It's happened before. (BMW.ru)
The question on some minds in Almaty is not if Kazakhstan’s financial hub will win the right to host the 2022 Winter Olympics, but rather, if Almaty does, who will steal the public funds designated for the Games. After all, few in Almaty were shocked to learn this week that the last time they hosted a big sporting bash, millions of dollars disappeared.
A judge in Almaty has sentenced Aidar Musin, a member of the 2011 Asian Winter Games organizing committee, to over five years in jail for embezzling more than $3 million from the state’s budget for those games, reports TengriNews.
Kazakhstan's financial police had alleged that a company with connections to Musin won a 1.4 billion tenge ($7.3 million) contract to provide a telecommunications system and equipment for a ski-jumping complex in Almaty. More than 600 million tenge ($3.3 million) from that contract disappeared, with Musin using some of this money to buy himself a 2009 model BMW 750 sedan and a 2011 model Mercedes Benz E-250 sedan, the Almaty City Court ruled.
Almaty is one of two finalists in the competition to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. Only Beijing is also still in the running after a gaggle of European cities pulled out, citing low public support for the billions necessary to host the spectacle.
Kazakh officials say they are keen to keep costs for the 2022 Winter Olympics under control by attracting sponsors and advertisers to cover most expenses. The budget is currently around $3.7 billion. But as with any major project in Kazakhstan, it is hard to avoid questions about corruption.
Twenty five years ago, he said, "We used to do big, complex NATO exercises in all environments, but the world has changed. We haven’t been doing as many of those in the last 10, 15 years. But I think Ukraine has told us we need to up our game and I think that’s the plan in the near future.”
Hudson was apparently at the Pentagon to discuss with U.S. Navy officials how to beef up NATO's naval forces. “Six or seven destroyers … isn’t going to defeat a complex enemy,” he said. “But it will sustain a theater, ... it will put all the connectivity into a region in place so that the follow-on forces can deliver.”
One wonders what sort of scenario would entail a NATO "defeat" of Russia. The U.S. has already stepped up its rotation of ships into the Black Sea and has promised to do more. Vice Adm. Hudson also said last month that NATO would increase its presence in the Baltic Sea, as well. (That plan has no doubt been given new currency as a result of Sweden's claims that a Russian submarine has been snooping around its waters.)
Georgia’s jailed, former Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili was sentenced to three years in prison on October 20 for his alleged role in a haunting 2006 murder case. Once the all-powerful muscle of ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration, Merabishvili was found guilty of obstructing justice in the high-profile death of a 28-year-old banker, Sandro Girgvliani.
The court ruled that Merabishvili used his office to cover up evidence against his employees who abducted and beat Girgvliani, and left him to die. Grigvliani’s death, which followed an altercation in a Tbilisi cafe that involved Merabishvili’s wife, grew into a national scandal that would haunt the Saakashvili administration for years to come.
Merabishvili’s wife, Tako Salakia, and many interior ministry officials were present at the fateful birthday gathering, when Girgvliani showed up with a friend and got into an argument with the group. Several interior ministry officials allegedly later abducted Girgvliani and his friend, Levan Bukhaidze, and took them to the city’s outskirts to beat them. Girgvliani is believed to have died of his injuries or have frozen to death; Bukhaidze escaped.
Girgviliani’s mother, Irina Enukidze, engaged in a long and daring battle with the authorities, accusing them of covering up the murder. Her claims mushroomed into what became, essentially, the first large-scale public pushback against Saakashvili’s administration. With opposition parties and opposition-minded media by her side, she called for the resignation of Merabishvili and the arrest of his wife; both of whom she was convinced had given the order to teach Girgvliani a lesson.
A Russian Su-27 fighter, soon to be based permanently somewhere in Belarus. (photo: mil.ru)
Russia has chosen a new location for its air base in Belarus and pushed back the date of its establishment by a year.
Russia has been talking about establishing an air base in Belarus since last year, which would be its first post-Soviet military facility in the country, but the details keep changing. In June 2013, Russia said it would set up the base near Lida "within months." In August 2014, Russia's air force chief Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev said that the base would be located instead in Baranovichi (and denied that Lida had ever been the plan), and would open in 2015.
But this week, Bondarev again addressed the question of the base, and said it would now open in 2016 and would be in Babruysk, in eastern Belarus. (Lida and Baranovichi are both in the western part of the country.) “The airbase of the Russian and Belarusian Air Force will be created in 2016. Su-27 fighter jets will be based there,” Bondarev told reporters.
Russia wants to revive a tsarist-era project for building a new road to Georgia, but Georgians remain uncertain about whether the intention has to do with transit for trade or tanks or both.
The topic was slotted for further discussion at a routine, October-16 meeting in Prague between Georgian and Russian officials, but details have not emerged.
The road, which would run from the restive Russian republic of Daghestan to Georgia’s Kakheti region, is meant as an alternative to the only fully functional road link between Georgia and Russia, known by its unfortunate historical name, the Georgian Military Highway.
The highway, at times barely two lanes, winds north through canyons and towering mountains in eastern Georgia, and is highly susceptible to the elements. Heavy snowfalls and landslides often block the road, leaving trucks queuing for weeks before they can go through.
To the west, there are two crossings into breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both of these passages are outside Tbilisi’s control and remain closed to international traffic.
Increased transit would bring more income for Georgia’s lackluster economy, and especially for Russian ally Armenia, which heavily relies on exports to Russia. But many Georgians have qualms about giving their enemy number-one more options to roll in the tanks should the 2008 war repeat itself. Particularly in the wake of the uproar over the proposed Abkhazia-Russia treaty.
The fact that several months before the 2008 invasion, then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin arrived in Daghestan and called for construction of this same road as another corridor to Georgia has offered little reassurance on this front.
Turkey's ties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are complementary to its ties with the West, not a replacement for them, the country's minister in charge of European Union integration has said. This appears to be a step back from previous statements of then-prime minister, now president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in which he has repeatedly identified the China-led SCO as an "alternative" to the EU.
Any cooperation between Turkey and the Shanghai Five is “complementary rather than alternative” and Turkey’s strengthened ties with the group of countries -- which is also known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -- might add more to European Union, EU Minister Volkan Bozkır said in an exclusive interview with Deutsche Welle in Berlin.
“EU membership is Turkey’s primary strategic target since we have been struggling with it for 50 years already. However, the perception is that if Turkey forges a relationship with the SCO it would bring about the end of its EU bid. The world has already become globalized. Turkey has and will have ties with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], the G20 and African and Latin American organizations. All these ties are complementary rather than alternative. Thus, Turkey having this kind of relationship might contribute more power to the EU,” Bozkır said in an interview on Wednesday, dismissing the fact that any close ties with the SCO might damage Turkey’s years-long EU efforts.
Tbilisi has accused Moscow of plans to pull a Crimea in breakaway Abkhazia through a treaty that proposes a merger of military forces, coordination of police and an alignment with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.
On the surface, it may seem that Abkhazia's fate could not be any more tied to Moscow than it already is. The Russian military is the only outside guarantee of the region's de-facto independence from Georgia, while the Russian market provides an economic lifeline. But for all that, Abkhazia is actually serious about its claim to independence from everyone, Russia including.
In an interview with Ekho Kavkaza, the speaker of Abkhazia's de-facto parliament, Valery Bganba, complained that the document "in many places" amounts to a "loss of sovereignty."
The cornerstone of the treaty is the formation of a collective military force, with Russia appointing an ad-hoc command in times of crisis. Many Abkhaz think such force is necessary to repel any attempt from Georgia to retake the territory; an event which Abkhazia has been expecting ever since its 1992-1994 war with Tbilisi. Many believe that events in Ukraine have increased the likelihood of such an attack.
The ruble vs the tenge over the last 12 months. The sharp change in February indicates the first tenge devaluation. Since then, the ruble has continued to slide, again putting pressure on the tenge. xe.com.
As the price of oil falls, and as Russia’s Central Bank struggles to keep the ruble from hitting a new record low each day, Kazakhstan’s currency is facing pressure on two fronts. The major oil producer, whose economy is tightly linked to Russia’s, already sharply devalued the tenge once this year. But facing these new challenges, can the Kazakh National Bank hold its currency stable? And can Kazakhstan keep its books balanced?
Higher output and weaker global demand have pushed the price for benchmark Brent crude to $83 per barrel, its lowest in four years, down 27 percent since June. Oil, Kazakhstan’s chief export, is still above the government’s fiscal breakeven point of $65.5 per barrel, as calculated by the IMF. But it is below $90.6, where Kazakhstan faces a balance of payments deficit that puts further downward pressure on the currency. Moreover, trade with Russia is down 22 percent this year.
Kazakhstan’s “tenge weakened in forward markets last week, responding to a drop in the price of oil and sliding ruble,” Halyk Finance, an Almaty-based investment bank, said in an October 13 note. “The weakening of the Russian ruble and falling oil prices are the main fundamental reasons of the tenge weakening in forward markets.”
Russia is Kazakhstan’s main trading partner. And because of the falling price of oil, and the effect of sanctions the West has imposed on Moscow for meddling in Ukraine, the Russian currency has fallen nearly 20 percent this year. That has put the ruble-tenge exchange rate back where it was just before the tenge devaluation (see chart).
Airbus has a contract to sell military helicopters to Uzbekistan but it is in peril because of a dispute over export regulations between the two main partners, France and Germany.
The deal for the helicopter had not been previously reported, and the information emerged during a conference in Berlin. It seems that Germany has many more reservations about selling weaponry to countries with bad human rights practices than does France. From Bloomberg:
Delivery of 14 Airbus military helicopters to Uzbekistan is being held up after Germany blocked a permit to sell a slip ring needed in the flyer’s optical system, Airbus Chief Executive Officer Tom Enders told executives and reporters in Berlin yesterday. Blocking the sale of a “sub-sub component” is “grotesque,” said Enders, adding that he’s considering shifting helicopter development to France from Germany.
When you think caviar, you don’t necessarily think of breakaway Nagorno Karabakh, a remote South-Caucasus region over which Azerbaijan has been warring with separatists and Armenia for years. But that is about to change. Karabakh claims it has just entered into the caviar industry and, potentially, in a big way.
The region’s de-facto prime minister, Ara Arutiunian, believes that Karabakh is destined to become a global player in the caviar industry by dint of a new fishery business in the village of Magatis set up in part by Armenian Diaspora investments, Armenian and Russian news sites reported, citing a Karabakhi media outlet. The first batch of black caviar is expected to be produced as early as this December.
Aqua-farming may seem a peculiar economic-development choice for the landlocked region, but Arutiunian insists production levels will hit 30 tons annually in seven years — a level that appears to be a drop in the bucket compared with Azerbaijan or Russia, both caviar-majors.
How exactly Karabakh ("black garden" in Turkish and Persian) would get its caviar to outside markets is a larger question. The only way out of the region for ordinary vehicles is via Armenia, the region’s protector, but Armenia has just joined the Eurasian Economic Union, a Moscow-led trade club that, in theory, would require it to set up a customs post with Karabakh, as the internationally recognized property of Azerbaijan.
That little detail, though, was brushed to one side during Armenia’s October 10 signing of the Union treaty. To hear officials (de-jure or de-facto) in Armenia and Karabakh tell it, no customs post will be built.