Located atop a steep hill, the Armenian Genocide Memorial is one of the landmarks of Armenia’s capital, Yerevan. But it does not stand alone.
Armenia contains nearly 30 memorials to the the victims of Ottoman Turkey’s 1915 massacre of ethnic Armenians, according to the Armenian National Institute (ANI), a Washington, DC-based research and education center. They often stand in places named after locations in Turkey that formerly contained ethnic Armenian communities — Nor Sebastia, Nor Hajen, Musa Ler or Arabkir.
“Monuments have come to serve as a location for gatherings, as the victims of the Armenian genocide have no graves,” claimed ANI Director Rouben Adalian, an historian. During the 1960s, when greater public attention also started to focus on the Holocaust, the Armenian Diaspora began the construction of monuments to the victims of 1915.
In Soviet Armenia, Adalian added, the topic generally had been suppressed. None of the monuments were built before 1965. “[I]t was not even discussed until 1965 when there was a public outcry that the genocide should be remembered.”
Many monuments were built throughout Armenia in the 1970s and 1980s; most adhere to a stark symbolism. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, they often are smaller and use more religious and ethnic-identity references than previously would have been allowed.
In several locations, graves of soldiers killed during the 1988-1994 war with neighboring Azerbaijan over breakaway Nagorno Karabakh have been placed next to the memorials.
Yet other than the best-known memorials in Yerevan, the northern village of Aparan and the hamlet of Sardarapat, not far from the Turkish border, most of these structures are not well maintained, and receive few visitors.
For Armenians, the towns of Muş and Sason in southeastern Turkey, not far to the west of Lake Van, hold particular historical significance. But today, 100 years after the massacre of 1915, few ethnic Armenians still remain there
In the medieval era, Muş served as the central town of the influential Armenian principality of Taron, home to Mesrop Mashtots, who invented the Armenian alphabet in the early fifth century.
Sason, known to Armenians as Sasun, is the setting for the 8th-10th-century Armenian national epic, “The Daredevils of Sasun" (also called “The Daredevils of Sassoun"), which tells how Armenian fighters, led by the legendary ruler, David of Sasun (or Sassoun), repulsed repeated Arab invasions.
Although both locations lost their prominence in modern times, they remained important regional centers for Armenian culture until the bloodshed of 1915.
Today, little sign of that past remains. The old part of Muş, where many ethnic Armenians once lived, has been partly destroyed, though the walls of a women’s hamam and an Armenian church still stand. Khachkars, Armenian memorial cross-stones, stand near many Kurdish houses. Stones with carved crosses often have been used for construction materials. A graveyard can be found on a nearby mountain.
Recently, an Armenian club opened in Muş with the name "Daron - Hay,” a local Armenian rendition of “Taron-Armenian.” Members say they chose the Armenian word “Hay” since the Turkish word for Armenia, Ermeni, can be used as an insult.
Members say, though, that those attitudes are starting to change a little. But still, despite a relative liberalization of government policies in recent years, many ethnic Armenians in Turkey remain cautious.
Someone is profiting from Tajikistan’s official Islamophobia, peddling expensive permits purporting to allow observant Muslims to wear a beard or hijab – fashions that are officially discouraged. The permits, adorned with an official-looking stamp, allegedly go for 250 somoni (about $40) each.
In recent weeks, Tajikistan’s secular government has turned up its routine hysteria about the spread of Islamic practice, with state media dutifully declaring that prostitutes wear hijab – a headscarf and modest clothing for women – to drive up their rates, and police reportedly nabbing bearded men on the street and forcing them under the razor. The campaign seems to be part of an effort to liken any Islam outside of state control to terrorism.
The State Committee on Religious Affairs – the body that oversees mosques, appoints all imams, and tells them what to say during their Friday sermons – says the idea of such permits is “absurd,” the Asia-Plus news agency reported April 24. No one has the right to issue such documents, the State Committee said in a statement.
But gullibility is understandable. Anyone can see that freedom in practicing Islam is under assault in Tajikistan and, meanwhile, the government has allowed very few trustworthy sources of information on religious affairs.
Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka on April 23 made his first-ever visit to Tbilisi, becoming an unusual guest in a country generally seen as headed in a direction diametrically opposite to that of Belarus.
But that did not faze this 60-year-old strong-armed leader. Sounding all the key notes, Lukashenka promised investment, unwavering support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and even to play a role in helping reconcile Georgia and Russia.
“Let’s think of what steps can be taken to make sure… we live in one family, as we used to live once,” he said at a press-conference in reference to the days when Belarus and Georgia shared a home, the Soviet Union.
Special operations troops from SCO member state militaries at the opening ceremony of joint exercises in Tokmok, Kyrgyzstan. (photo: MoD Kazakhstan)
The China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization is holding joint exercises with special operations forces from Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan -- and they're doing it at a military base in Kyrgyzstan that the United States spent $9 million to build.
The SCO exercises taking place this week involve 20-25 special operations troops from each participating country (all the member states except Uzbekistan, which typically sits out SCO military exercises). During the five-day exercise the troops will practice deploying to mountain areas, deploying from helicopters, seeking and destroying terrorist groups, rescuing hostages, and treating and evacuating wounded troops. Pretty standard stuff for a joint special operations exercise.
What makes this drill stand out is the site: the base of the Scorpions special operations unit in Tokmok, Kyrgyzstan. Readers may recall that this is the base that U.S. Central Command and the U.S. embassy in Bishkek spent $9 million to build. It's no wonder it was attractive to the SCO, given that a Wikileaked U.S. diplomatic cable from the opening ceremony of the base in 2009 described it as "the gold standard in Central Asian construction ... far exceeds any other facility the Kyrgyz currently have." The facility includes
"officer and enlisted housing, classroom training facilities, a multipurpose facility, a dining facility and shower/sauna complex."
Djoomart Otorbaev during an interview with EurasiaNet.org in November 2014.
After a tumultuous year in office, Kyrgyzstan’s prime minister – the fourth since parliamentary elections in 2010 – has resigned.
Djoomart Otorbaev, an urbane, Western-oriented technocrat, announced he was stepping down on April 23 shortly after presenting his annual report to parliament. His year in office was dominated by inconclusive negotiations over the country’s largest gold mine and attempts to mitigate the fallout from Kyrgyzstan’s impending entry into the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.
"Thank you for recognizing the work of the government as satisfactory. This is not the work of one person. In democratic country there should not be a monopoly on power. I think this branch of power needs another shake, therefore today I'm announcing that I leave my post,” Otorbaev said in comments carried by the AKIpress news agency. "I think my decision to resign will allow the majority coalition to choose a more decisive prime minister.”
Much of his time in office since April 4, 2014, had been spent negotiating with Toronto-listed Centerra Gold over the fate of the Kumtor gold mine, located high in the mountains near the Chinese border. The two sides have been locked in a dispute for over two years, since parliament demanded more of the mine’s profits stay inside Kyrgyzstan. Kumtor produces between 8 and 12 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s annual GDP, and almost half of industrial output.
In November 2014, in a Kazakhstani village near one of the world’s largest oil, gas and condensate fields, 25 schoolchildren and four adults suddenly grew ill and fell unconscious.
Residents of the village, Berezovka, had noticed flaring at the nearby Karachaganak field and had smelled gas the day before. They say they were poisoned and have demanded relocation. Though some local officials did speak publicly about the problem at the time, a watchdog says that Kazakhstan’s government and its Western partners are ignoring the illnesses and falsely accusing residents – who have complained of poisonings since 2002 – of faking.
The field is operated by Karachaganak Petroleum Operating BV (KPO), a consortium including BG Group from Britain, Italy’s ENI, Chevron from the USA, Russia’s Lukoil and Kazakhstan’s state-run KazMunayGaz. It is Kazakhstan’s largest producing gas field.
Crude Accountability, a Virginia-based watchdog focusing on hydrocarbon extraction in the Caspian Sea basin, says KPO is trying to “hush up” the tragedy.
Independent monitors have found dangerous chemicals including hydrogen sulfide in Berezovka’s air, Crude Accountability said this month. And since the initial poisonings last November, several other bouts of fainting and illness have hit the village: “Almost 50 percent of the villagers are chronically ill and 80 percent of the children suffer from respiratory diseases.”
It is a story of two presidential palaces, three nettlesome leaders and millions of wasted taxpayer money. And it has left many Georgians rolling their eyes at the government’s apparent preoccupation with petty politics rather than on such challenges as creating badly needed jobs and kickstarting the languishing economy.
But, beyond that, the palace-fight once again has focused a spotlight on the ever shadowy role of the billionaire believed to be the real power behind the Georgian government — ex-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili.
A president with newly limited powers (under 2010 constitutional reforms) must be matched by a limited workspace, the thinking goes. Under Ivanishvili, Georgia purchased a 19th century downtown mansion in Tbilisi to serve as a new presidential headquarters.
But the Saakashvili palace seems to have grown on Margvelashvili and he has refused to swap offices
The government thus ended up allegedly spending 28 million lari (about $12 million) on preparing a presidential office that now has no president in it.
Azerbaijan, faced with growing tensions with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh, has not yet indicated a willingness to buy. But Iran’s offers for military cooperation go in other directions, too.
At a press-conference on April 21, Iranian Ambassador Mohsen Pak Ayeen said the two neighbors will set up a joint mechanism to tackle defense challenges.
“There are developments in the world and in the region that have an impact on our region,” the ambassador said after Dehqan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev agreed that there is room for expanding military cooperation between their countries. “Threats coming from ISIS and al Qaeda have been discussed [by Azerbaijani and Iranian officials]. It was decided to make joint efforts to tackle religious fundamentalism,” APA reported Pak Ayeen as saying.
A new website aims to help Central Asian scholars enter the academic mainstream.
Launched in early April, the Central Asian Analytical Network, or CAAN, is the brainchild of the George Washington University’s Central Asia Program. The website’s goal is to make it easier for scholars in the region to publish and distribute their work. It will post commentaries and academic papers on a daily basis, as well as provide a digital library to facilitate research.
“Young scholars [in Central Asia] often complain that they have limited opportunities to publish their work, either due to higher academic standards set by western journals or censorship issues in their home countries,” Aitolkyn Kourmanova, CAAN’s chief editor, told EursasiaNet.org in an email interview.
“The idea is to connect local researchers, academics, policymakers, NGOs and media through one regional networking platform which provides equal opportunities for all to speak up on hot issues, initiate debates, or publish their work,” added Kourmanova. [Editor’s Note: GWU’s Central Asia Program receives funding from the Open Society Foundations. EurasiaNet.org operates under OSF’s auspices].
CAAN additionally plans to produce a regular digest in Russian of English-language academic resources that focus on Central Asia. It also hopes to conduct trainings to improve regional scholars’ writing skills to increase their chances of getting published in outside journals.
“We seek to establish partnership with most think-tanks in the region to keep everyone informed about their work, projects, publications or events,” Kourmanova said.
Jessica Gisondo is an editorial associate at EurasiaNet.