Russia's new political-military bloc, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, has been widely criticized for its inaction in the face of real threats to security in the region that it covers, most recently when fighting broke out between CSTO member states Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. But it's rare that the organization has had to explain itself: it operates, for the most part, in countries where the press doesn't often challenge authority figures. But when Yevgeniy Denisenko of Kyrgyzstan newspaper Vecherniy Bishkek interviewed the CSTO's secretary general, Nikolay Bordyuzha, he actually asked the question that outside observers of the organization have been asking:
Denisenko: However, threats to stability in the CSTO do not come only from outside, but from inside, too. It is sufficient to recall the events in the Kazakh town of Zhanaozen [the riots of December 2011], the conflict on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border [in 2010] and the current incident involving the use of weapons on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Does it not seem to you that concentrating on foreign dangers, the CSTO is underestimating the internal risks?
Bordyuzha: There are questions that should be solved bilaterally. The Kyrgyz-Tajik incident is one of them. That was a border incident and no-one except these two states themselves and those responsible for the demarcation and delimitation of the border, can solve this question. It is another matter that the CSTO can act as a mediator, which is what we are doing. This role involves providing the platform for a deeper discussion of the problems that have emerged.
Denisenko: However, in this case we are talking about colleague countries, CSTO members.
Russian authorities seem intent on keeping the country's civil society activists away from the Sochi Olympics - even if all they are interested in is attending the sporting events.
The means with which Moscow is accomplishing this aim is the "Olympic Passport," or spectator pass, which all ticket holders to Sochi events are required to obtain. Ostensibly, it is an extra security measure, a requirement that no other host country has imposed to date. After purchasing a ticket for a ceremony or sporting event, each ticket holder must apply for the spectator pass online, to be picked up in Sochi and presented on entering Olympic venues.
Russian authorities reserve the right to refuse anyone a spectator pass for any reason. A story in the February 5 edition of The New York Times looks at how the opaque decision process is enabling rights abuses.
The underlying purpose of the measure is supposedly to contain the threat of terrorism at the Winter Games. But as the Times story and other sources suggest, the requirement is also being used by the Russian government to crush the potential for any expression of political dissent. Multiple activists have received rejections thus far, including a native Sochi man who documented abuses against migrant workers brought in to build Olympic infrastructure; an organizer of last year's mass protests against President Vladimir Putin in Moscow; and a politician from the Udmurt Republic, known to Russians as the "welfare deputy" since his month-long experiment of living on a Russian minimum wage.
Olympic ID refuseniks, it should be noted, are allowed to return tickets to official vendors for a full refund.
Lawmakers may have destroyed Kyrgyzstan’s reputation among investors in the process, but after a year of heated arguments, which often spilled out into the streets, parliament voted to accept a restructuring roadmap with the country’s largest investor on February 6. The arrangement evenly splits control of the Kumtor gold mine between Bishkek and Kumtor’s Canadian owners.
But Kumtor will probably remain divisive. Outside the high-altitude mine in Issyk-Kul Province, villagers have been holding another one of their periodic roadblocks in recent days, demanding concessions from the government and the mine. In a country with widespread unemployment and few opportunities, young men like those blocking the road this week are easily whipped into a fury. Many observers believe they are paid. The ostensible reason for the latest roadblock is the arrest of several local men last August on charges of trying to extort $3 million from the mine.
In the late-afternoon vote on February 6, after weeks of deliberation, 60 deputies voted for the resolution and 35 against. Two abstained and 23 were absent, according to a count published by AKIpress.
Under the agreement, Kyrgyzstan would trade its 33-percent share in Toronto-listed Centerra Gold for a 50-percent interest in a new company that would own and operate Kumtor. In 12 years, Kyrgyzstan would have the opportunity to purchase another 17 percent of the joint venture at market value.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is concerned about the possibility of the American military conducting intelligence operations in Kyrgyzstan and will bring up the issue with his Kyrgyzstani counterpart Almazbek Atambayev when the two meet at Sochi during the Olympics. That's according to Russian diplomatic and military stories quoted in a story in Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta which provides a useful report what Moscow is thinking these days about Central Asian security.
Atambayev, having managed the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Manas military base, still leaves on the territory of the country a large-scale foreign military aviation presence, including American (and their allies). Concern has been expressed by experts about the possibility of conducting military surveillance with them. But Russia, of course, has no need for that. Evidently Putin, in his conversations with his Kyrgyzstan colleague, will touch on this problem. Russia has contributed too much to strengthening regional security for its interests not to be considered,
The piece also mentions the billion-plus dollars in military aid that Russia has promised Kyrgyzstan, and complains that "for Kyrgyzstan that's a lot, but the leadership of the republic, it appears, is trying to sit on two chairs" [that is, the U.S. and Russia].
Defending his choice to enter a Moscow-centered Customs Union, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan commented on February 4 that Armenia joining the European Union was never part of Yerevan's game-plan, Public Radio of Armenia reported.
It has been lovely to work with the EU on democratization and human rights and all, but Armenia never considered committing to a more serious relationship, said Sargsyan, whose pro-Moscow choice last September took Brussels by surprise.
Speaking about another Western club with which Yerevan has had a standing flirtation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Sargsyan expressed dismay that NATO, as he put it, had allowed member Turkey, Armenia’s bête noire, to take certain undefined "actions" that damage NATO's "security system."
That said, Armenia will not shy away from being "just friends" with the EU and NATO. Still, its "steady" remains Russia; namely, Moscow's Customs Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization. One provides duty-free access to the vast and nearby Russian market, while the other keeps hostile neighbor Azerbaijan at bay. (At least in theory. )
Yerevan announced on February 3 that it will complete the road map to membership in the Customs Union by year-end, and set January 1, 2015 as the date for its trade-nuptials with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
A woman cleans rice to start the process of making plov in the inner courtyard of a mixed ethnic family in central Osh. Plov is a traditional Central Asian slow-cooked dish made primarily of rice, and depending on the country, region, or city can include various cuts of meat (lamb, beef, or fish), vegetables, and dried fruits.
Zach Krahmer is a visual storyteller and photographer based in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. More of his work can be seen on his portfolio Web site.
Georgia's ex-Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili has found a new calling -- to teach Georgians how to make what Ivanishvili will consider to be informed decisions. And he's got just the tool in mind -- a new foundation, called "Citizen."
“Yes, we need to learn how to hire the government. First of all, we need to learn well who to hire,” Ivanishvili told a capacity-crowd press-conference in Tbilisi on February 4.
He plans to expand on this through his new NGO, which, he said, will help train Georgian media and experts in deep, “correct” ways of interpreting news and facts. The organization also will underwrite media research and sponsor a training course for experts.
Deciding that there's no time like the present to start this mission, Ivanishvili, who has no work experience in journalism, took a few reporters to task during his hours-long press conference, lambasting them for their supposed impatience and incompetence. The journalists, for their part, were more interested in his perceived failure to live up to the lavish campaign promises that helped put him in office in 2012.
Screenshot from YouTube video from Azerbaijani television showing captivity of alleged Armenian saboteur Mamiko Khojayan.
Two weeks after tensions spiked on the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, much information about what is actually happening there remains unclear. A spokesman for Azerbaijan's defense ministry said on February 3 that "dozens" of Armenian soldiers had been killed, while the Armenian authorities in the de facto Nagorno Karabakh government denied that. And many of the first-reported claims about the upsurge in fighting -- an Armenian vehicle destroyed, attempted incursions by both sides -- remain murky.
One initial report has proven especially embarrassing for the Azerbaijani side. Citing the defense ministry, Azerbaijani media reported that on January 28, an Armenian "saboteur" was captured by Azerbaijani soldiers: "Armed and injured leader of an enemy intelligence-sabotage group Mamiko Khojayan was captured by our soldiers after a brief firefight."
But when Azerbaijani television stations aired footage of Khojayan, the image was not of an elite special ops commando, but of a disheveled, disoriented old man. And soon after, neighbors and relatives of the man in Armenia identified him as a 77-year-old mentally ill man.
So what do the Armenian government, the Armenian Apostolic Church and Sierra Leone all have in common? The answer is businessman Ashot Sukiasian, who was arrested in Tbilisi on February 1 in connection with an alleged $10.7-million con-job.
Several years back, Sukiasian borrowed that sum from AmeriaBank, an Armenian concern of uncertain ownership, to invest in importing raw diamonds from Sierra Leone for refining in Armenia, the Hetq.am investigative service reported last May. Diamond-refining is one of the few booming businesses in Armenia, and a key source of exports.
Documents unearthed by Hetq.am revealed that Sukiasian borrowed the money for his own diamond venture in the name of Wlispera Holdings, a Cyprus-based company allegedly co-owned by Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian and former Archbishop Navasard Kjoian.
Prime Minister Sarkisian and Kjoian have denied being Sukiasian's business partners, but the ownership documents for Wlispera Holdings have their signatures, Hetq reported.
Russia has agreed to give Kazakhstan S-300 air defense systems, as well as to share a Russian missile-testing range in the country with Kazakhstani troops, the two countries' defense ministers announced.
The S-300 gift had been announced some time ago, but nothing had been said about it for years, leading to speculation that Russia had rescinded the offer. But on a visit to Astana on January 31, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said that Moscow would deliver five "divisions" of S-300PS (consisting of 12 units per division) this year.