The commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme allied commander Admiral James Stavridis testified before Congress on Tuesday, and said the U.S. was amenable to cooperating with Russia on missile defense:
'First, it would create a zone of cooperation with Russia [from a military standpoint]; secondly, it could technically add to the early warning time because of the location of the system; and thirdly, it creates confidence-building measures between ourselves and the Russians,' the admiral said.
News.az quotes an Azerbaijan analyst as saying that represents a "serious change" in the US position:
The head of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Anatoly Tsyganok, said that the proposal to use the radar could be considered a serious change in Washington's position, 'which first claimed that the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan does not meet the necessary technical requirements'.
Stavridis didn't specifically address the capability of the Gabala radar in his testimony, and other officials have in the past spoken in similar general, favorable terms about this. So I don't know how serious a change this is. But it bears watching.
The commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme allied commander Admiral James Stavridis testified before Congress on Tuesday, and said the U.S. was amenable to cooperating with Russia on missile defense:
'First, it would create a zone of cooperation with Russia [from a military standpoint]; secondly, it could technically add to the early warning time because of the location of the system; and thirdly, it creates confidence-building measures between ourselves and the Russians,' the admiral said.
News.az quotes an Azerbaijan analyst as saying that represents a "serious change" in the US position:
The head of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Anatoly Tsyganok, said that the proposal to use the radar could be considered a serious change in Washington's position, 'which first claimed that the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan does not meet the necessary technical requirements'.
Stavridis didn't specifically address the capability of the Gabala radar in his testimony, and other officials have in the past spoken in similar general, favorable terms about this. So I don't know how serious a change this is. But it bears watching.
General David Petraeus, commander of US Central Command, is visiting Bishkek for the next two days and presumably the status of the Manas Transit Center is at the top of the agenda. But Petraeus also appears likely to have to deal with the reaction to news of the new anti-terror training center in Batken:
The visit, which was not open to the media, comes a day after U.S. diplomats confirmed the United States would help fund an antiterror training center in the southern Kyrgyz town of Batken next year.
A statement on the Kyrgyz president's website said Petraeus thanked Kyrgyzstan for its support of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It said the U.S. general also informed the Kyrgyz president about the situation in Afghanistan and efforts to stabilize the war-torn country.
Bakiev said that "all the main challenges and security threats to Central Asia" come from Afghanistan, adding, "Therefore, Kyrgyzstan is interested in providing security and stability in this country, and it will continue to offer its endeavor for rebuilding Afghanistan – along with the international community."
The Kyrgyz plan to set up a U.S.-funded training center in Batken might upset Russia, as the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization announced its intention last year to build a military base in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Aleksandr Knyazev, a Bishkek-based political analyst, calls Bishkek's decision to allow such a center to be built in Batken a "most irresponsible act," as the Kyrgyz economy depends on Russian investment to a great extent. In 2009, Russia promised to invest $2 billion in the Kyrgyz economy, including key hydropower projects.
Jundullah's spokesman speaks to an Arabic newspaper, and asks many of the same questions as I did about why the group's leader would be going to Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan:
Ridiculing Tehran's official version of the arrest of Rigi, Narui asked: "How can they say he was traveling to Kyrgyzstan to meet with US officials at a time when there is a large US base in Afghanistan? Why should he travel to that country to meet with them when there was no need for him to do so because there are Americans in Afghanistan and Pakistan?"
He also asked: "Which is closer? Kyrgyzstan or Dubai? Why would he take a long route and travel via Dubai while he knew that the plane would fly in Iranian airspace and that there was a possibility he would be kidnapped?" "That is why we say they are lying", he remarked.
Nauri says that, instead, the U.S., in cooperation with Mossad, arrested Rigi in Kandahar. Which, if it were true, would raise another large bunch of questions, about how and/or why the U.S. would have handed him over to the Iranian authorities. More to come from this, for sure.
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, which doesn’t have a common border with Afghanistan – the very important Manas Transit Center, which will be – which we will renew the arrangements some in the next few weeks, and I wanted to launch that process.
That seemed to presuppose the outcome of the negotiations a little more than the Kyrgyz government was comfortable with, and they pushed back a little. Said Kyrgyzstan's foreign minister, Kadyrbek Sarbaev:
"The government of the republic signed no agreement on the renewal of Manas Transit Center lease at the territory of Kyrgyzstan with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke during his visit in Bishkek."
Still, as Ferghana.ru suggests:
On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Kyrgyzstan is not going to keep the base after June, 2010. It has to be mentioned that the agreement assumes automatic prolongation for another year "if neither of the parties informs another party about its decision to break the agreement 180 prior to the end of the agreement’s term."
Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy in Bishkek is also dealing with suspicions that the planned anti-terror training center in Batken is going to be a base of some sort:
A U.S. Navy frigate, the USS John L. Hall, has completed its visit to Georgia, where it spent four days making a call at the port of Batumi. These sorts of things are pretty routine for the U.S. Navy but Georgian officials portray them as something much more meaningful. As GeorgiaTimes observes:
Washington and Tbilisi provide a different appraisal of the visit. The USA officials characterize the visit as a friendly and planned one, while the Georgian security officials see it as political and moral support of Georgia on the part of the United States' government...
It was noted during the meeting between the ship commanders and the US Embassy officials that the ship arrived to Georgia with a friendly mission. "The visit is a planned one; such visits are paid by the American warships to the Georgian ports several times a year", - the Americans said. However, in three days, the vague notions of "friendship" and "planned activities" acquired a definite and a rather urgent meaning, which became clear due to the revelations of Minister of Georgia for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, who said in his interview that the US Navy ship will evidently become a restraining factor for Russia. "There are other factors as well that Georgia will use in case of a real danger of another aggression on the part of Moscow, which possibility is quite expected. Moscow was unable to achieve its purpose in Georgia", - the minister stated....
Not so long ago, President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili suggested that Washington should use the sea ports and airports of the republic as a base for NATO's blows against the forces of the Taliban extremist movement.
Kyrgyz cleaning woman Mairamgyl Satieva gets her mink coat from Lt. Col. Rex Vanderwood, 376th Expeditionary Mission Support Group deputy commander
The Manas Transit Center, like everyone else in the post-Soviet world, celebrated International Women's Day. Celebrating other people's holidays can provide plenty of opportunities for cultural missteps, which can be magnified when they're done by an institution as closely watched as Manas. While an earlier event marking the day -- a basketball game pitting women from the base against a local team -- had a lot more to do with what American women do than what Kyrgyz women do (notice they didn't include the score; I expect it made the Canada-Slovakia women's hockey game in the Olympics look like a nailbiter) -- today's event definitely had more to do with local mores:
In honor of Women's Day March 8, the First 4 club at the Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, raised money and purchased 500 tulips to give to the Kyrgyz women who are employed here.
Additionally, because this is the centennial anniversary of Women's Day here, the 100th female host nation employee to arrive on the Transit Center March 7 was presented with a random bonus: a mink coat.
"I didn't even know you all knew about Women's Day," said Mairamgyl Satieva, the recipient of the coat.
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Eldar Mammadyarov has expressed concern about the opening of a direct land connection between Russia and Armenia via Georgia through the Larsi checkpoint. Azerbaijani’s concern is based on the fact that through this connection Moscow could supply Yerevan with military cargo designed for the 102nd Russian military base located in Gumri, Armenia. If Azerbaijan receives information that Armenia is being supplied with arms through this route Baku will immediately react and ask Tbilisi for explanations.
The Russian media reports that Baku is thinking of taking "adequate measures" against Georgia in response to the Upper Larsi checkpoint opening. Energy and investment projects and the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be affected by these.
For its part, Georgia says “No weapons or ordinance for Russian troops in Armenia will be allowed access” through the border checkpoint. Though, technically, that doesn't preclude allowing weapons for Armenia, that seems pretty unlikely. It seems to me more likely that this is the best pretext Azerbaijan could come up with to object to the opening of the border, whose closure was causing economic problems for Armenia. But maybe I'm missing something here?
EurasiaNet's Deirdre Tynan reports today that the U.S. appears to be funding an "anti-terror training center" in Batken, in Kyrgyzstan's far southwest. As you would expect, this occasioned the usual geopoliticizing:
Analysts say the opening of a US-funded training center in Batken would be widely interpreted as dealing a blow to Russia’s geopolitical position in Central Asia.
"Batken is a very fragile place, and I think building such a facility there is part of US strategy and directed toward securing [the Pentagon’s] place in the region," said Bishkek-based political analyst Mars Sariev. "I think the second phase of the process, after building and equipping the facility with American equipment, will be putting in American instructors to prepare our military or Special Forces."
"This will, of course, affect the Russians. Russia doesn’t much like the prospect of strengthening US-Kyrgyz relations," Sariev continued.
Andrei Grozin, director of the Central Asia Department at the CIS Institute in Moscow, said an American-funded training center, even if it was officially handed over to Kyrgyzstan, would be viewed dimly by the Kremlin. "Having both a Russian base and anti-terror training center built by Americans [in Batken] says a lot about Kyrgyzstan’s multi-vector politics," Grozin commented.
"For Russia, it’s a geopolitical statement, it’s about putting the Russian flag in the area," Grozin added, referring to the planned construction of a CSTO base in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Erica Marat calls attention to some little-noted changes in the structures of Kyrgyzstan's security services, which amount to President Kurmanbek Bakiyev consolidating centralized control over security structures to "prevent any attempt at regime change."
This, taken together with the recent Russian moves on its military bases in Kyrgyzstan, suggest that Bakiyev is less likely to rely on Russian support in the event of another regime change attempt in Bishkek, she argues:
Unlike Akayev, who fled Kyrgyzstan through the Russian air-base in Kant five years ago as a result of widespread demonstrations, Bakiyev shows no sign that he would rely on Russian support during a crisis. Rumors in Bishkek suggest that the Russian airbase in Kant will soon downsize its personnel, while Russia is reconsidering its plan to open a second base in Osh.
At the same time, the U.S. gives Kyrgyzstan more or less a carte blanche in return for hosting the Manas Transit Center:
Bakiyev’s regime shows no interest in participating in wider anti-terrorist efforts apart from hosting the US military base.
For this minor effort, the Kyrgyz government is often acknowledged as an important partner at official meetings with US representatives. Most recently, during his press conference in Astana US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, expressed thanks to the Kyrgyz government for hosting the US transit base. The increasing politicization of the domestic military structures under Bakiyev’s rule receives little attention from international actors.
So does this mean that Bakiyev might depend more on the U.S. for support in case of another Tulip Revolution? Or that they are becoming more inward-looking? Thoughts?
