Azerbaijan naval vessels on parade in 2011. (photo: Wikimedia commons)
Azerbaijan will start building a warship next year, military sources told the news agency APA. No details were given, including what sort of ships were under consideration, or who Azerbaijan might be partnering with. Just: "Baku Shipbuilding Plant has already submitted the projects of some ships for Navy for different purposes and the ships will be constructed after the projects are agreed."
While Azerbaijan has been the relative laggard in the Caspian Sea arms race (instead prioritizing equipment oriented toward war with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh), recently it has evinced a bit more interest in its navy. As part of the blockbuster arms deal with Israel it is buying Gabriel anti-ship missiles, and just last month it said it would soon start receiving Uran-E naval missiles from Russia.
Azerbaijan has never before produced a military vessel, so it's safe to assume that it's not doing this by itself. So the big question is, who's the partner? I asked several sources in Baku and Moscow, and no one knew (or would say). The most likely partner would seem to be Turkey, which has been fairly active in helping Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan build up their navies from scratch. And the news came out as Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev was visiting Turkey (though the only defense contractor Aliyev seems to have visited was Turkish Aerospace Industries, where he looked at helicopters and training aircraft). I happened to meet Turkey's top government defense industry official, Murad Bayar, this week and asked him if Turkey was participating, and he answered noncommittally, saying the two sides had "had some consultations, but there is nothing definite."
The prejudice (and sometimes violence) faced by labor migrants from Uzbekistan abroad is well-documented. But the trials and tribulations they face just leaving home is less publicized.
Most migrants heading to Russia first cross the border between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at Chernyayevka, near Tashkent.
Thousands of people mass every day at Chernyayevka, which is the old Soviet name for a village now called Gisht-Kuprik on the Uzbek side and Zhibek Zholy in Kazakhstan.
On a recent November afternoon the crowds – travelers visiting relatives and taking trips as well as labor migrants – were waiting several hours just to leave Uzbekistan.
The longest line was to enter the border crossing: Hundreds of people massed outside in a disorderly queue, which patrolling border guards made no attempts to control other than to open the gates and allow around 10 people through every five minutes or so. It’s a survival-of-the-fittest exercise: Every time the gates open, the line surges forward and the strongest push the weakest back in order to fight closer to the front.
Verbal arguments frequently break out among frustrated travelers, and the occasional scuffle too. One woman fainted in the crush, but the patrolling border guard refused to allow her to bypass the line. The guard intervened only once, when, unable to bear the wait any longer, one couple gave up and climbed over the barrier to leave. “What are you doing?” he shouted at them. “Going home,” replied the man. “This is impossible!”
First authorities shut her television and radio stations in Uzbekistan’s capital, Tashkent. Then they went after her network of stations around the country. Now Gulnara Karimova, the beleaguered elder daughter of Uzbekistan’s president, says someone is trying to force her into exile.
Radio Ozodlik (Radio Liberty’s Uzbek Service) reported this week that the broadcasting licenses of five non-governmental television network-operated channels (NTT) in Kashkadarya, Fergana and Bukhara regions and Karakalpakstan were suspended on November 1. An executive from one of the affected stations told Ozodlik that 80 percent of Uzbekistan’s non-state-run television stations are now off air.
Karimova is believed to have controlled these channels through Firdavs Abdukhalikov, her former spokesman. Abdukhalikov's whereabouts are unknown. He was last seen at the opening of Karimova's annual Style.uz arts festival on October 22, Ozodlik said. A new suspiciously detailed report by a name that few believe belongs to a real person – possibly a pseudonym used by the security services, acting alone or in collaboration with exiled opposition leader Muhammad Solih – says he is being held by the secret police.
In what appears to be the latest sign of an ongoing informal campaign in Russia against minorities from the Caucasus and Central Asia, a prominent member of the Azerbaijani Diaspora in Russia has been shot and wounded.
Mais Kurbanov, deputy president of the Russian Federation of Migrants, was attacked by an unidentified group near his Moscow apartment in the early hours of November 12, APA reported. Russian news outlets report that a nearby CCTV camera caught a “young blonde woman” firing a gun at Kurbanov. Wounded, Kurbanov reportedly ran to a nearby café, while his attackers swiftly left the scene. He survived and remains in the hospital.
The motives of the attack are not yet known, but some Azerbaijanis will see a connection to the outpouring of Russian nationalism in the wake of last month's killing of 25-year-old Russian Yegor Shcherbakov, a crime blamed on an Azerbaijani labor migrant, Orhan Zeynalov.
Crime may not be a rare occurrence in Moscow, but South-Caucasus residents often get the impression that, for many Russians these days, crimes committed by a dark-haired person from the Caucasus are worse than others. The violence against migrant workers that followed Schcherbakov's death, the police manhandling of Zeynalov and the arrests and deportations of Azerbaijanis that followed Shcherbakov's murder have fueled anger in Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, the violence against ethnic Azeris in Moscow continues. On November 13, APA reported about the death of an Azerbaijani flower seller, apparently knifed to death. Possible reasons for the attack have not been released.
Usually wary of Moscow-led initiatives, Uzbekistan has suddenly expressed cautious interest in joining the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia – the trade bloc Russian President Vladimir Putin has made a key feature of his foreign policy.
Senate Speaker Ilgizar Sobirov, the powerful head of the Uzbek parliament's upper chamber, showed interest in joining the Russia-led group on November 12 after meeting a delegation from the Russian parliament's upper chamber, the Federation Council, Russia's Itar-Tass news agency reported.
Sobirov reportedly said Uzbekistan holds a "positive" attitude toward possible membership in the trade body, which lately has been marked by increasingly rancorous internal disputes. “I think we shall support,” Itar-Tass quoted him as saying, in a report light on details.
Uzbekistan's interest in the Customs Union makes sense on paper. Russia is the country’s largest trade partner, according to statistics distributed in Uzbek media by the State Statistics Committee.
Russia is also the primary magnet for the millions of Uzbek labor migrants who sent about $5.7 billion home in remittances last year, or the equivalent of 16.3 percent of GDP.
Russia will fully upgrade the equipment at its military base in Tajikistan ahead of the U.S.'s withdrawal from Afghanistan, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has said. That will also entail making the unit based there into a division again, after it was downgraded to a brigade in 2009, Shoigu said in remarks on Russian television:
"We are moving [the base] to a division structure, by December we will complete this division to about 80 percent, and by the time of elections in Afghanistan and the departure of the coalition forces we will complete it 100 percent with the newest weaponry and military equipment."
Shoigu didn't give any information about whether or not the base, known as the 201st, would receive any new soldiers, but it stands to reason that the upgrade to a division (which usually consists of two brigades) would involve such a move.
Russian officials have in the past given some indication of the equipment upgrades that are intended for the 201st. An unnamed, high-ranking military official told Izvestia last year that most of the base's equipment dated from the 1980s and that all of the vehicles would be upgraded (except for tanks, which are already relatively up-to-date T-72s). The new equipment would include Tigr and Rys all-terrain vehicles and Tor air defense systems, among other equipment.
But according to that story the timeline for the upgrades was 2015, so Shoigu's announcement means that they are intending to accelerate that by a year. And this just after the announcement that Russia would double its footprint at its main base in Kyrgyzstan, as well.
Turkmenistan has chosen a privately made US rocket to launch its first satellite, an American official has said.
US ambassador to Turkmenistan Robert Patterson told a Turkmen-US business forum on November 12 that the telecoms satellite would travel aboard a Falcon 9 rocket made by California-based SpaceX in late 2014, Russia's RIA Novosti news agency reported.
French firm Thales Alenia Space is designing the satellite and training specialists from Turkmenistan’s National Space Agency, which was set up up in 2011, RIA Novosti said.
The satellite is expected to provide broadcasting, Internet and telephone communication and video conferencing services. Internet and mobile communications are tightly controlled in the gas-rich authoritarian country.
If the project is successful, Turkmenistan will be the second nation in Central Asia to build and launch its own satellite. Neighboring Kazakhstan launched a Russian-made KazSat satellite in 2006 but lost communications with it in 2008. In 2011, it launched the KazSat-2 satellite, designed by Russia and equipped by France.
As RIA Novosti points out, though this is Turkmenistan’s first satellite, in 2005 it launched a copy of the former president’s soporific spiritual guide, the Rukhnama, into space aboard a Russian rocket.
Well-meaning and with lofty goals, Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy came crashing down once the advent of the Arab uprisings exposed some of the policy's internal contradictions and shortcomings.
Of course, there's nothing wrong with striving to have no problems with neighboring countries, but Ankara's overly optimistic approach -- which, among other things, failed to see how its own ambitions for regional leadership would set off alarm bells in the capitals of other countries with similar aspirations -- was not able to withstand the tensions and dynamics unleashed by the new crises in the Middle East, especially in Syria.
But it's fairly clear now that Ankara is working on rebooting its regional foreign policy, with its strained relations with Iraq being used as a test case of what a new version of the "zero problems" policy might look like.
Ties between the two countries hit rock bottom in April of last year, when Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, upset about Ankara's support for his political rivals, labeled Turkey an “enemy state” bent on interfering in his country's internal affairs. In response, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said his Iraqi counterpart – leader of a Shiite party – was fanning the flames of sectarianism in Iraq. The exchange of words led to ambassadors being summoned in both capitals.
In recent weeks, though, Turkey and Iraq have had reciprocal visits by their foreign ministers, and visits by their prime ministers are in the works. Writing in Today's Zaman, analyst Yavuz Baydar provides the background to all the action taking place on the Turkey-Iraq front:
The launch of commercial production at Kashagan, Kazakhstan’s supergiant Caspian Sea oilfield, has been delayed again and will not begin until 2014.
Christophe de Margerie, chief executive of France's Total, one of the consortium partners, made the unwelcome announcement that the storied project would miss its latest target of starting commercial production in 2013. He said Kashagan “will not restart before the end of the year” following the suspension of production in October to deal with a gas leak. “It's more than simply repairing pipes,” Reuters quoted him as saying this week.
The North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC) – which also includes Kazakhstan’s state energy firm KazMunayGaz; oil majors ExxonMobil, Shell, and Eni; China’s CNPC; and Japan’s INPEX – has not confirmed that production will not re-start this year, but Hans Wenck, NCOC’s external communications manager, told EurasiaNet.org that “inspections and investigations will take some weeks to conclude.”
“The Kashagan oil and gas production remains shut in until the inspections are completed and results of the expert studies are available, and restart of the facilities can be carried out safely,” he said in an emailed statement on November 12. “Until such investigations are completed it will be too early to discuss any possible remedial actions and time required to implement them.”
Reuters quoted an unidentified industry source on November 11 as saying that Kashagan exports would restart in March “in a best-case scenario.”
Staying true to its foreign policy principle that if you love me, you must love my late leader’s monument, Azerbaijan has halted billions of dollars’ worth of planned investments in Mexico.
At a November 8 lecture to Universidad Iberoamericana students, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Mexico, Ilgar Mukhtarov, claimed that Mexico City’s January decision to remove the statue of the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev from its downtown cost the country $3.8 billion in supposedly planned Azerbaijani investments in the oil-refinery business and other sectors. “All these funds have been put on hold,” Mukhtarov was quoted by the Voice of America as saying.
Reactions from Mexican officials have not surfaced in the non-Spanish-language press. The statue, part of a global network of statues to Heydar-Aliyev, was disassembled after reporters and activists looked up who that bronze man was sitting near the Paseo de la Reforma, and decided that you can take a country out of the USSR, but you can't take the USSR out of a country.
Mukhtarov, however, defended Aliyev, saying that the late leader was “not a dictator,” and pointing to his abolition of the death sentence as proof that the president, who died in 2003, cared as much about human rights as the next guy. He also again blamed the apparently omnipresent Armenian Diaspora for causing trouble over the monument.